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ABSTRACT 
REGIONALISM IN THE NEW GLOBALIZED ECONOMY: 
POLITICS OF SCALE AND THE DISCOURSE OF REGIONALISM 
- COMPARATIVE POLITICS OF TWO JAPANESE GLOBAL CITY-REGIONS-
Takashi Tsukamoto 
December, 2005 
This study examines the effects of globalization on state restructuring and the 
status of cities and local governments. I conduct a comparative case study of two 
Japanese world cities, Tokyo and Osaka, Japan. Existing globalization theories offer only 
partial explanations that fail to grasp the dynamic aspects of such rescaling. To explore 
the dynamics of government restructuring, this study investigates the relationship 
between decentralization, regionalization and globalization, highlighting the role of local 
leaders who employed political rhetoric in their efforts to rescale the city. 
This research finds that uneven economic effects of globalization are not the 
direct cause for the political actions of local leaders for government rescaling. Instead, 
local leaders pursued regionalism as political strategy, including to improve their ability 
to gain central government aid and to improve independent local economic viability, 
depending on the conditions of locally specific intergovernmental relations. Regionalism 
was a function of competition between city-regions over central government aid rather 
than globalization. The Japanese central government favored directly Tokyo as its 
strongest city-region for investment under globalization. In response, 
IV 
the leaders of the disadvantaged region Osaka sought decentralization for autonomy and 
regionalization for economic viability. The consequence is the combination of 
decentralization and regionalization under globalization. This process observed in Japan 
can provide insight as to the effects of globalization on government structure and the 
importance of local politics in the government rescaling. 
This theoretical approach to globalization and its effects on government does not 
contradict existing theories in the literature. Rather, this local strategic interactive 
approach supplements them by weaving them together. By introducing the strategic 
actions of local actors to the existing theories, it can reconcile competing theories, such as 
world cities thesis versus the nested scale theory and state glocalization versus new 
localism. 
v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................................................. .iii 
ABSTRACT .................................................................................... .iv 
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................. vii 
LIST OF FIGURES .......................................................................... viii 
CHAPTER 
I. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................... 1 
II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE ................................................... 17 
III. RESEARCH METHODS ...................................................... .49 
IV. JAPANESE POLITICAL SYSTEM AND ITS CITIES .................... 74 
V. REGIONALISM IN TOKYO: 
CUTTING OUT THE "CAPITAL REGION" .............................. 110 
VI. REGIONALISM IN OSAKA: 
CAN KANSAI BECOME ONE, BY "ONE BY ONE?" ................. 145 
VII. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS ................................................. 188 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS ................................................................. 209 
REFERENCES ................................................................................. 221 
CURRICULUM VITAE ...................................................................... 233 
VI 
LIST OF TABLES 
TABLE 
3-1. Regionalism in Tokyo and Osaka .................................................. 64 
3-2. Source of Data .................................................................... 66 
3-3. Interview Questions ............................................................. 67 
3-4. Coding Categories ................................................................ 71 
5-1. Capital Region Population .................................................... 117 
6-1. Kansai Region Population ..................................................... 151 
7-1. Tokyo and Osaka Comparison ....................................... .184 - 186 
7-2. Comparison of Discourse ..................................................... 202 
VB 
LIST OF FIGURES 
FIGURE 
2-1. Savitch and Kantor: Urban Politics Model.. ...................................... .38 
2-2. DiGaetano and Strom: Urban Politics Model. ................................ 39 
3-1. Sellers: De-Centered Comparison ............................................. 57 
3-2. Decentralized Local State ........................................................ 59 
3-3. Logic Diagram ................................................................................. 69 
5-1. Tokyo Logic Diagram ......................................................... .111 
5-2. Capital Region Megalopolis Plan ............................................. .135 
6-1. Osaka Logic Diagram .......................................................... 146 
7-la. Rescaling Japan Post-War Era ................................................ 190 
7-lb. Rescaling Japan 1980s ........................................................ .193 
7-lc. Rescaling Japan 2000s ......................................................... 196 





This chapter delineates an overall picture of this research study, including the 
research topics, objectives, questions, and thesis and brief descriptions of the chapters 
that follow. 
Introduction 
We should not conceive of the structures of domination built into social 
institutions as in some way grinding out 'docile bodies' who behave like the 
automata ... Power within social systems which enjoy some continuity over time 
and space presumes regularized relations of autonomy and dependence between 
actors or collectivities in contexts of social interaction. But all forms of 
dependence offer some resources whereby those who are subordinate can 
influence the activities (Giddens 1984 p16). 
Globalization stems from advancements in technologies and capitalism. Such 
developments have been stretching the spatial and temporal boundaries of our 
communities ever wider for "time-space distanciation" (Giddens 1990) and accelerating 
the speed by which events travel across different communities for "time-space 
compression" (Harvey 1989). As a consequence, under globalization, unprecedented 
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scopes of territories and societies simultaneously interact and inter-depend, producing 
overreaching yet multi-faceted changes in their economic, political, social and cultural 
conditions. In this way, globalization represents a social change process and force to 
produce new configurations in the relationship between politics, economy, society, 
culture and geography. Anticipated new configurations from globalization include "the 
end of nation-states" (Ohmae 1995) and "the end of history" (Fukuyama 1992). 
Although these understandings of globalization assume structural and macro-
environmental functions working "top-down," globalization also develops "from below" 
in the sense that it is a result of strategic actions taken by a large number of locally-rooted 
human agency (Cox 2002a; Jessop 2000). The latter interpretation of globalization 
indicates that globalization is a consequence of structuration (Friedmann 2001; Brenner 
2004), in which human decisions and behaviors collectively reform patterns of societies 
(Giddens 1984). That is, over time, out of recursive interactions between independent 
agencies and structural influences of social systems emerge new patterns of societies. 
Through the process of structuration, human agents gradually opt out from existing forms 
to adopt new forms of social systems as Giddens (1984) axiomatically expresses in the 
above quote. It follows that, although macro-economic forces and higher level 
governments constrain local governments in the frameworks of existing political 
structure, local governments are cable of restructuring the frameworks from below. 
According to some researchers including Friedmann and Brenner, globalization 
internalizes this kind of from-below political structure reformulation. 
These understandings guide this research to gain theoretical understanding about 
the effects of globalization on existing government systems, particularly on horizontal 
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and vertical intergovernmental relations. I will examine the process of political rescaling 
under globalization through investigations of the from-below activities implemented by 
local political leaders. This research approach contrasts with the "regulationist" approach 
often represented by phrases, such as "relativization of scale" (Jessop 2000), 
"glocalization" (Swyngedouw 1992), and "reterritorialization" (Brenner 1999) of national 
states to explain government restructuring under globalization. In stead of focusing on the 
central government policy, which regulationists tend to do, I will study the role of local 
political actors and their political strategies through grounded accounts of their behaviors. 
This political action-based research will also complement earlier globalization studies, 
which are often prone to economic determinism and structurism (for example, Friedmann 
and Wolff 1982; Ross and Tracht 1990; Knox and Tayor 1995; Sassen 2001 b). 
To implement this research conception, I will conduct a comparative case study of 
two Japanese world cities, Tokyo and Osaka. Japan was traditionally a highly centralized 
developmental state. Yet, since the late 1980s, decentralization has been an important 
political agenda, with administrative and fiscal decentralization reforms accomplished in 
recent years. Another development is a government-appointed committee, which is 
currently under session to discuss the way to implement major local government 
reorganization for higher local autonomy. At the local level, Osaka and Tokyo have been 
planning regionalism strategies to gain global economic competitiveness, each having 
contrasting policy directions: a concentrated functional regional development in Tokyo; 
an extensive local state building in Osaka. Another difference with regard to these 
Japanese world city-regions is the nature of their relationships with the central 
government. These developments and differences present opportunities to gain 
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understanding about the political restructuring, its relation to globalization and the 
functions oflocal actors. For example, the variance in the central-local relations between 
these two areas could account for the different goals these two Japanese world cities set 
out for regional development strategies. Comparisons of differences open up 
opportunities for theoretical inquiries (Pickvance 2001; Lickback and Zuckerman 1997). 
By limiting observation points to two city-regions in a single national state, this 
study aims for a holistic inquiry with nuanced analyses of political actions and 
interactions. Since an exploratory inquiry to contribute to theory is the primary objective 
of this study than testing a model, a compact comparative study for incisive findings is 
sought. With this design, this research tries to shed light on the effects of globalization on 
the government restructuring resulting from policy choices at the central and local levels. 
The assumption is that the effects of globalization on cities and local governments is 
largely politically induced, involving both central and local decision-makers. Their 
actions and interactions gradually shift the structural properties of institutions. Many 
researchers consider political decentralization and local government regionalization the 
defining political changes arising from globalization. The strategy of this research is, 
therefore, to observe political interactions to describe the process of regionalization and 
decentralization. In so doing, I will examine the effects of globalization on government. 
In the following sections, I will explain through the descriptions of research 
topics, objectives, questions, and thesis how I will approach to the goals of this study. 
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Research Topics 
This comparative case study investigates effects of globalization on state 
restructuring and the status of cities and local governments. Many researchers generally 
agree on cities and local governments gaining economic significance and political 
autonomy under globalization. However, there are debates as to whether the significance 
of the central government has diminished (for example debates between Hill and Kim 
(2000) and Friedmann (2001) and Sassen (2000 a) and between White (1998) and Sassen 
(1998)). Some empirical study shows that many central governments have reinvigorated 
their policy interventions in their world cities under intensifying globalization 
(Tsukamoto and Vogel 2004). Therefore, understanding of the impact of globalization on 
government structures/relations is far from conclusive. Given this, I will explore how, if 
any, the economic globalization stimulates governmental changes by examining the 
process of rescaling in territorially defined political economies, common interests and 
community identities. 
Within this research goal framework, there are three central topics to investigate. 
This first topic is about the state decentralization and local regionalism. Interrelations 
between the economic globalization and empowerment of cities have been in scholarly 
discussions since 1980s. A score of researchers described networks of advanced capitalist 
cities forming a new global economic system (Friedmann and Wolfe 1982, Friedmann 
1986, Feagin and Smith 1987, Ross and Trachte 1990; Sassen 2001). Cities in the 
commanding positions of the global economic networks are often called "world cities" 
(Friedmann 1986) and/or "global cities" (Sassen 2001). The formation of the world city 
networks marked the era of globalization in which the hegemonic power of national 
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states dissolved into uncertainty: the reterritorialization of national states characterizes 
globalization (Brenner 1999) as they hollow out from the controlling role of capital 
(Jessop 1993). Under this territorial uncertainty from globalization, it is said that various 
forms of political restructuring and territorial rescaling are occurring. For example, 
neoliberal policies devolve responsibilities to lower governments (Pickvance and 
Preteceille 1991; Kincaid 1999); "new regionalism" emerges where regional economic 
networks consolidate local socioeconomic space (Amin and Thrift 1994; Storper 1997; 
Barnes and Ledebur 1998; Scott 1998); and local identity and culture regain political 
importance for regionalism and autonomy (Keating, Loughlin, and Deschouwer 2003). 
These developments underscore the tendency towards decentralization and 
regionalization under globalization. These research results indicate that the two types of 
political rescaling are of key importance to understand of governmental restructuring 
process resulting from globalization. Given this, I will examine the topic of 
decentralization and regionalism under globalization as the operationalization of the 
effects that globalization has had on government structures and political orders. Through 
this examination, the question of the effects of globalization on government will be 
explored. 
The second topic is the rhetorical aspects of political rescaling under 
globalization. Rhetoric plays important part in politics (Edelman 1985) while identity can 
be a rhetorical tool for political ends (Calhoun 1985). Rhetorical use of identity can 
change the understanding of territorial political space and scale. For example, Agnew 
(2002) observes political parties use identity to position political space and define scale 
with which political territorial claims are determined. In this territorialization process, the 
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rhetorical aspect of place identity is considered a central factor along material conditions 
(Agnew 2002). Given this, I will investigate the discourse included in rescaling politics 
as the second topic of this research, such as "positioning" of political identity and 
"scaling" of territory. It is hoped that the examination of this topic will reveal the 
contents of political actions, particularly those of local leaders. Incidentally, once the 
behaviors of local leaders in their rescaling efforts were revealed, it would suggest the 
need for new urban politics models. General agreement on urban politics is that the scope 
of local politics is limited by the nature of intergovernmental relations and the free 
market system (Peterson 1981; Kantor 1988). However, if local leaders can change the 
nature of intergovernmental relations through rhetorical politics from-below under 
globalization, this implied that local leaders can change the nature of the structural limits 
of their policy scopes. The corollary is a new analytical modeling for urban politics, 
policy decisions and development. 
The last topic is the government scope and rescaling under globalization. 
Regionalism under the global economy contains both decentralizing and centralizing 
consequences. Although regionalism generally has a decentralizing tendency with 
enhanced autonomy in relation to the central political power, it is centralizing for the 
lesser communities being bundled up with powerful major cities in the regions. The logic 
of competitiveness puts heavy pressure on decision-makers to regionalize and use its 
resources on concentrated strategic sites to enjoy internal and external economies of scale 
and higher return on investments. The dilemma for the public leaders is the tendency that 
free market system makes sure that governments rescale themselves to satisfy the demand 
of capital (Jessop 2000). Iflocal decision-makers are under economic pressure for 
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regionalization, then, is regionalism under globalization really a political choice? Can 
government have a control over political scale? Alternatively, if it is not possible for 
government to maintain political autonomy free from capital motives, then how much can 
it resist and what are the resources for resistance? To identify the problem areas oflocal 
rescaling under globalization, the third topic is a discussion of the scope of the public 
sector vis-a.-vis the mandate of the free market force. I will review the dilemma of 
government and explore the potential and limit of the public sector for government under 
globalization. 
Research Questions and Objectives 
Descriptions developed in the above section can be restated that this study deals 
with political reactions to the emerging geographical mismatches under globalization 
between the motivations of capital and existing government structures. Governments 
have innate disadvantages to capital. The public sector is not only geographically bound 
but also territorialized by various scopes of political representation, ranging from national 
to municipal. Under this, various governments compete to adapt to the behaviors and 
demands of capital. Scale becomes the central issue in this competition and 
accompanying political dilemmas and struggles. Neil Smith (1993, p99) defines scale as 
"geographical resolution of contradictory processes of competition and cooperation." 
That is, scale determines who constitute "insiders" and "outsiders." Once these groups 
are identified by scale, members of each group share common territories internally and 
cooperate for geographically determined mutual goals while they compete against the 
members of other geographically bound groups. It can be quite arbitrary as to how the 
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determination of scale and the consequent definitions of the boundaries are determined. 
As introduced above, one of the most important debates of globalization is how it leads to 
political processes of scale definition and redefinition. Thus, the goal of this research 
includes examination of the political process for rescaling. This examination contributes 
to the knowledge of globalization's effects on government structure. 
The following three questions reflect the three topics described above and 
represent the central inquiries of this research project: 
• How globalization, political decentralization and local regionalism interrelate? 
• What political leaders do to implement regional rescaling under globalization? 
• How local communities can resist the rescaling driven by economic 
competitiveness? 
These research questions are translated into three research objectives. Although described 
separately, these objectives interrelate and cross-reference one against another. 
The first objective is to examine the political process of rescaling under the global 
economy. As briefly touched above, many researchers discuss state rescaling in relation 
to globalization. For example, the behaviors of capital undermine the territorial control of 
national states (Friedmann 1986; Sassen 2001 b; Knox and Taylor 1995; Jessop 2000), 
national government neoliberal policies implement "glocalization" (Swyngedouw 1997; 
Brenner 1999; MacLeod and Goodwin 1999), and economic activities enhance regional 
ties and its relative importance (Amin and Thrift 1994; Storper 1997; Barnes and Ledebur 
1998; Scott 1998). Their analytical perspectives to explain rescaling rely on either the 
function of economic system or central government behaviors. Contrary to these 
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approaches, this study pays attention to local political actions, including central-local 
negotiations and local-to-Iocal competition, to study the process of government rescaling. 
The investigation includes political negotiations between local and central political 
leaders in state rescaling, the power of local actors, particularly that of the strategic city 
of state interests, and competitive relations between different city-regions, particularly 
between the most powerful and others. The speculation is that local political actions play 
crucial roles in the redefinition of state political economy. With these propositions, the 
first objective is to implement examination sensitive to strategic actions and interactions 
between differing scalar interests of central, regional and local governing bodies. This 
objective will be achieved through the investigation of decentralization and regionalism 
under globalization. 
The second objective is to analyze the discursive process of regional rescaling. 
Places, including regions, are the "settings for social and economic existence, and for 
forging identities, struggles, and strategies of both a local and global nature" (Amin and 
Thrift 1994, p9). Place is a process: it does not have boundaries for simple enclosures, or 
single identities but have specificities that are continually reproduced (Massey 1993). As 
such, the scale, identity and power order of place are contested, reproduced and 
transformed for eternity. Regionalism is an example of the evolving processes of political 
territorialization. The continuous territorialization process includes political efforts to 
negotiate ideological and epistemological understanding about shared values and interests 
attached to space. It contains rhetorical politics to redefine community with a newly 
positioned identity in relation to a reinvented scalar world order. It includes redrawing the 
scale of social system to determine which space is relevant to local interest and which 
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others are external. With this conjecture, the second objective is to investigate the 
discursive strategies existing in the politics of scale by which political agents transform 
ideas about communities and their spaces. 
The third objective is to discuss the problems of rescaling and equitable 
governance. Regionalism may be a desired strategy to compete in the global economy. It 
can be considered an example of how "globalization makes (city-)states" (Keil 2003) 
where competing ideas of local government aspire to local political determination and 
independence. However, regionalism to maintain and/or increase economic 
competitiveness could create new peripheries within the newly defined regions. For 
example, a regional economic development authority would concentrate investments on 
the most developed areas of the entire region and shift resources from secondary regions 
that would have received more public investments if their own local governments had 
maintained the policymaking authority. In the U.S. context, a metropolitan regional 
development authority would concentrate on downtown revitalization and suburban 
developments at the cost of overall inner-city and inner suburbs developments. Spatial 
selectivity to "privilege certain places through accumulation strategies and hegemonic 
projects observed at the national scale" (Jones 1997, p849) can happen to the regional 
level. Capital always demands the most efficient scalar arrangements from the state to 
take advantage of the public sector's need for capital (Jessop 2000). This amounts to a 
situation where the public sector does not have autonomy under the logic of global 
competition and mobile capital. It means local governments cannot resist globalization 
but support elite local business interests through regionalization. This begs questions: can 
governments not rescale according to the logic of equity and democracy? In what ways 
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can local governments resist politics of scale motivated by economic growth? What is the 
scope of government? These are important questions under the neoliberal economy of 
globalization. The third objective includes discussions to identify normative grounds to 
answer these questions. 
Scope and Significance of Study 
An inquiry into the process of deterritorialization and reterritorialization consists 
of the main content of this study. The tensions and conflicts caused by the incompatibility 
between expansive yet selective capital motives and territorially-bound state interests will 
be examined to understand the political interactions leading to decentralization and 
regionalization under globalization. I will explore the process and politics of rescaling 
and discuss the problematics the new scalar arrangements internalize. An outline of some 
of research findings would include: 
• Globalization has uneven geographic development effects at the local level. 
• This threatens existing national state structures and upsets scalar understanding of 
existing political communities .. 
• Under this condition, local leaders have unique incentives, depending on the 
conditions of their economic advantages, to implement from-below politics to 
improve their local competitive advantages. The most competitive city would 
look for central government investment by arguing higher return on investment 
while other cities would seek central aid on equity ground. 
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• The central government has its own competitive logic under globalization: it is 
increasingly persuaded by the logic of its most competitive city and sees 
redistribuitonal policy as unwise. 
• This pushes other areas for self-determination. They demand political autonomy 
while promoting regionalism for economic viability after higher autonomy 
through from-below political activities. 
• As a consequence, there will be the combination of decentralization and 
regionalization changing the nature of government structure while limited 
centralization taking place at the growth pole city. 
• This government restructuring is mainly the result from political actions initiated 
by local leaders and strategic interactions among them in counter to the uneven 
economic impacts of globalization. 
• In this way, the uneven economic effect of globalization results in government 
fragmentation at the central level and regionalization at the local level. A 
combination of various from-below local politics and policy plays a central role in 
this government restructuring. 
With analytical findings and theoretical arguments developed from the above 
outline, this study would contribute to the literature in a number of ways. The first is a 
nuanced empirical account of central-to-Iocal and local-to-local political interrelations to 
explain decentralization and regionalization under the global economy. Globalization 
literature often alludes to decentralization-regionalization linkages but only limited 
studies attempt explicit analysis of the linkages (e.g. Keating, Loughlin, and Deschouwer 
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2003). By ascertaining the mechanism that connects decentralization and regionalism, 
this study describes the effects of globalization on government structure and the centrality 
of local political actors in the mechanism. This will be an addition to the literature. The 
second is an understanding of the content of regionalism politics through the rhetorical 
elements involved in the politics of scale. This study decomposes the arguments 
developed for the creation of new regional scale, interests and advantages. Once the 
discursive elements of region building were identified, it would not only allow critical 
analysis of regionalism politics but also help identify methods that can make regional 
planning easier. The third is an addition to the critical discussion of regionalism for 
global competitiveness. Regionalism for competitiveness cannot fundamentally solve the 
mismatch between capital and state motives. Thus, this type of regionalism is only a 
temporary solution to the uneven development arising from globalization within a 
national state. Findings from this research may shed light on the way to redirect 
competitiveness logics towards more equitable and sustainable government goals and 
forms. 
This is a case study based on a single country, including a comparison of its two 
world cities. This method was chosen because of its facility for nuanced observations and 
in-depth analyses. Because this study has a characteristic to explore theoretical 
understanding, case study fits its purpose. On the other hand, as a study based on a single 
national state, not only the applicability of the findings to other political culture and 
government frameworks is limited but the findings might be a rel1ection of unique 
phenomena of the Japanese political culture. To compensate this ideographic nature, I 
will heavily rely on existing theories to build analytical framework (details will be 
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discussed in Chapter 3). Consequently, the research data are contrasted against 
generalized analytical criteria. However, fundamentally, nomothetic inquiry is not the 
main purpose of this study. Therefore, the findings of this study should be tested against 
the experiences of other cases for better abstraction and theorization in later research 
studies. 
Organization of Study 
Chapter 2 reviews the literature to position the research questions and objectives 
of this study in relation to what is currently known about globalization, de- and re-
territorialization, scale, regionalism and urban politics, rescaling, agency, identity and 
globalization. It also discusses the theories of the social regulation of economic 
conditions and agency-structure relationship in social change. Finally, it explains the 
politics of scale in relation to place identity and culture. 
Chapter 3 describes research methodology. This pertains to the approach taken to 
conduct an empirical study to answer research questions. I will discuss the rationales and 
theories as well as the descriptions of the research methods used in this research. Data 
collection, coding and analysis methods are also detailed in this chapter. 
Chapter 4 covers a review of Japanese political system, reform processes and 
current conditions. This includes the conditions of two Japanese world cities, Tokyo and 
Osaka. An attempt is made to connect the theoretical topics covered in the literature and 
the changing conditions of Japanese political system and its world cities. 
Chapter 5 and 6 are the empirical analyses of scale politics and regionalism 
development in Tokyo and Osaka, respectively. Both chapters include the current 
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conditions of regionalism in these Japanese world cities articulated according to the 
analytical framework based on the grounded theory. 
Chapter 7 compares the findings from Chapters 5 and 6 to reach theoretical 
understanding about regionalism and the roles of local political actors. The comparative 
findings include the mechanism of local government rescaling from below and the 
process of discursive politics in the politics of scale for regionalism. 
Chapter 8 concludes the research by presenting the findings obtained in Chapter 7 
in a generalized form, including a nonnative argument for the role and scope of the local 
government in the global economy and competition. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Overview 
This research studies political restructuring under the global economy and the role 
of political actors in the change process. It is generally agreed that globalization became a 
force during 1970s. Since, it has brought about broad economic, political, and cultural 
changes to the societies. Globalization has also been accused of making changes to the 
ways political institutions organize and operate. Of these changes, the change in 
relationship between the economic, the political and the geographic is the topic of this 
study. I will examine this by paying attention to the inter-governmental relations and 
local political initiatives. In this section, I will review the literature to synthesize what is 
already known in the relevant fields and build a theoretical platform on which the 
research design and objectives ofthis study will sit. 
Globalization and Decentralization 
Globalization encompasses a broad range of phenomena including the economic, 
the social, the political and the cultural. Yet, probably, it is best described as of 
geography to signify its most fundamental nature. To prove, two of the most succinct 
descriptions of globalization refer to the change in the spatiality of human life. "Time-
space compression" used by Harvey (1989) refers to "the intensification of' discrete' 
events in real time and/or the increased velocity of material and immaterial flows over a 
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given distance" (Jessop 2000, p340). That is, the speed-up in the pace of life is 
overcoming spatial barriers so that "the world sometimes seems to collapse inwards upon 
us" (Harvey 1989, p240) and "time-space distanciation" introduced by Giddens (1990) 
describes that "the stretching of social relations over time and space so that relations can 
be controlled or coordinated over longer periods of time (including into the ever more 
distant future) and over longer distances, greater areas or more scales of activity (Jessop 
2000, p340). Consequently, "the relations between local and dist,mt social forms and 
events become correspondingly "stretched"" (Giddens 1990, p64). 
Strategies and ideological projects sponsored by the advanced economies of the 
West have been promoting globalization (Keil1998; Brenner 1999; Jessop 2000; M. P. 
Smith 2001). A geographic understanding of globalization can most clearly highlight the 
uneven, multi-scalar developments involved in the economic globalization process from 
these projects. The levels of integration to the global economic system vary across 
various parts of the world. The best example of this situation is the world cities and their 
hierarchal order (Friedmarm 1986; Knox and Taylor 1995; Sassen 2001 b). By 
conceptualizing the leading cities in the global economy as hierarchically connected 
nodes of economic command and accumulation, the world city theorists explain that 
global economy is produced and distributed unevenly through and within world cities 
(Friedmarm 1986; Knox and Taylor 1995; Sassen 2001 b). Other geographically uneven 
and multi-scalar developments resulting from globalization include: economic blocks 
comprised of cross-boarder regions such as NAFTA and EU (Jessop 2000), continued 
strata of the "core," "semi-periphery" and "periphery" in the world system (D. A. Smith 
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and Timberlake 1995) and the triad of Europe, North America and East Asia (Hill and 
Kim 2000). Jessop (2000, p341) explains: 
Thus economic globalization clearly involves a combination of processes on 
many different scales and is certainly far from being a purely' global' 
phenomenon ... what globalization involves ... is the creation and/or restructuring 
of scale as a social relation and as a site of social relations. 
This "creation" and "restructuring" of scalar relations is the source of relative decline in 
the national state as the supreme scale, often expressed as "hollowing-out," (Jessop 
1993), "glocalization" (Swyngedouw 1992) and "reterritorialization" of nation state 
(Brenner 1999). Politically, decentralization has become the trend accompanying 
globalization (Rodriguez-Pose and Gin 2003). The nature of capital itself causes the 
relative decline of nation-states as the dominant political economic scale. Capital is 
mobile in search of accumulation. Capital, for example, seeks cheaper labor forces and 
better investment sites regardless of political boundaries. Globalization process supported 
by advanced technologies as in "time-space compression" and "time-space distanciation" 
allows the economic moment to overrlde territorially fixed political moments (Harvey 
1989; Jessop 2000). There is a mismatch between the mobile motives of capital and the 
fixed interests of state. Consequently, the spatial arrangement of national political 
sovereignty and territoriality is changing (Cox 2002a), the temporal acceleration of 
capital circulation is eliminating national special barriers (Brenner 1999), and the 
political spatio-temporal fix at the national is weakening toward denationalization (Jessop 
2000). Jessop (2000) further explains that denationalization process is accompanied by 
19 
the growth of multi-tiered global city networks, the formation of triad economies (e.g. EU 
and NAFTA), the re-emergence of regional and local economies in national states, and 
the insurgence of local cultural and national identities. Denationalization also includes 
de- and restatization - a shift in the political system from the public sector to the private 
sector, including change from government to governance, and the opposite trend of the 
political regulation of private sector at different scales (Jessop 2000), leading to regional 
development and independence (Keating, Loughlin, and Deschouwer 2003). 
Consequently, smaller political scales such as the urban and city-regions are becoming 
the substantive sites of real economic activities, trying to articulate into the global 
system. Thus, it can be argued that these sub-national scales in fact support globalization 
through their collective strategic actions (Cox 2002a). Observing this aspect of 
globalization, Keil (1998) asserts that globalization takes place in local states. These 
developments and arguments add up to that globalization is a result as well as cause of 
decentralization of national political economy system. Decentralization forces create 
globalization as well as the latter creates the former. 
Scale and New Politics of Scale 
Term new politics of scale is sometimes used to represent the process in which 
national states implement denationalization and decentralization in relation to the 
globalization of economy. New politic:s of scale includes the conditions expressed as 
"hollowing-out," (Jessop 1993), "glocalization" (Swyngedouw 1992) and 
"reterritorialization" of nation state (Brenner 1999) briefly described in the above section. 
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Elaborations on these concepts are in order in this section. But before that, the concept of 
geographic scale and its political nature should be made clear. 
Geographical scale is "the level of geographical resolution at which a given 
phenomenon is thought of, acted on, or studied" (Agnew 2002, pI6). Therefore, it is "the 
focal setting at which spatial boundaries are defined for specific social claim, activity, or 
behavior" (Agnew 2002, pI6). Neil Smith's definition of geographic scale (1993) stresses 
power that geographical scale internalizes. For him, scale is "the geographical resolution 
of contradictory processes of competition and co-operation (Smith 1993, p99) because it 
IS: 
[A]n active progenitor of specific social processes ... Scale demarcates the sites of 
social contest, the object as well as the resolution of contest. Viewed this way, 
the production of scale can begin to provide the language that makes possible a 
more substantive and tangible spatialized politics ... It is geographical scale that 
defines the boundaries and bounds the identities around which control is exerted 
and contested (Smith 1993, plOl) 
Therefore, scale determines the order and values of a society by demarcating who and 
what are included and excluded, what are the collective interests and objectives and who 
and what are subject to privileges and prejudices. 
Scale is "not simply an external fact awaiting discovery but a way of framing 
conceptions of reality" (Delaney and Leitner 1997, p94-95). Thus, scale is socially 
constructed, determining how a place is different from another (Smith 1993). "The 
differentiation of geographical scales establishes and is established through the 
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geographical structure of social interactions" (Smith 1992, p73). Naturally, the framings 
of scale - "the particular ways in which scale is constructed" (Marston 2000, p221) - are 
contested, instable and subject to political process (Marston 2000). Thus, power and scale 
are mutually constructive. Politics of scale fixes "the focal setting at which spatial 
boundaries are defined for specific sodal claim, activity, or behavior" (Agnew 2002, 
p16) and, subsequently, determines "the dominant geographical scales of political 
rhetoric and organization" for further entrenchment of political power (Agnew 2002, 
p192). Swyngedouw (1997, p140) summarizes: 
Spatial scale is what needs to be understood as something that is produced; a 
process that is always det!ply heterogeneous, conflictual, and contested. Scale 
becomes the arena and moment, both discursively and materially, where 
sociospatial power relations are contested and compromises are negotiated. 
Scale, therefore, is both the result and the outcome of social struggle for power 
and control. 
Scale is an essential concept to regulation theory, which attempts to explain how the 
contradictions of capital are resolved through sociospatial relations (Swyngedouw 1997). 
Swyngedouw (1997, pl45) describes: 
If indeed, capitalist society is rife with conflict, tensions, and power struggles 
along intraclass, class, gender, and ethnic lines, the practical and theoretical 
problem of political economy lies exactly in explaining why a restless, deeply 
heterogeneous, conflict-ridden mode of social organization maintains some sort 
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of coherence while being intensely dynamic through the perpetual struggle for 
power and empowerment through which forms of domination and oppression are 
continuously (re)product~d, changed, and lor transformed. The production and 
reconfiguration of scale is central to this process. 
New politics of scale discusses the power dynamics of scale from the perspective of 
regulation theory and contextualizes it in the relationship between national state and 
globalization. 
In regulation theory, capitalism is considered sustainable only by being supported 
by extra-economic factors, such as "the wage relation, forms of competition, money, the 
state and international regimes" and "the broader social consequences of the dominance 
of capital accumulation" (Jessop 2000, P325). These non-economic, social conditions are 
the mode of regulation, specifying "the political and sociocultural institutions and 
practices which secure (the nature of c:apital) relationship" (Painter 1995, p227). Without 
the mode of regulation, capitalism faces crisis because of its internal contradictions and 
incompleteness. Capitalism seeks accumulation through commodification of everything; 
reducing, for example, labor and land into their exchange regardless of intrinsic use 
values of labor and land. This commodification practice is unsustainable. For example, 
use of labor for exchange value only will minimize wage to deflate market demand. 
Consequently, governance providing the mode of regulation is essential for the success of 
capitalism (Jessop 2000). The framework of this mode of regulation is the "social fix," 
which provides pattern of structural coherence to solve the contradictions of capital for a 
relatively prolonged period (Jessop 2000). Importantly, this social fix relies on the 
determination of geographic scale. Demarcation of capital system with a scalar fix, or 
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"spatio-temporal fix," allows accumulation in specific locational context by changing 
particular interests of capital into the general interest of a scalar community. Jessop 
(2000, p335) explains: 
These strategies (spatio-t1emporal fixes) seek to resolve conflicts between the 
needs of 'capital in general' and particular capitals by constructing an imagined 
'general interest' that will necessarily marginalize some capitalist interests ... The 
general interest thus delimits the identities and relations relative to which 
calculation of interests occurs; and it confines the spatial and temporal horizons 
within which this occurs." 
In this way, general interest defined by general scale sets normative thresholds about the 
uneven distribution of capital functions; i.e. how much unevenness should be tolerated 
within a community for its "general" interest. 
Keynesian Fordism during the 1950s and 1960s in North American and West 
Europe represents quintessential examples of a social mode of economic regulation with 
a scalar fix. Keynesian Fordism stands: on a virtuous growth circuit of capital based on 
mass production, mass consumption and mass income increase through collective labor 
bargaining indexed to productivity growth and consumer price inflation. Spatio-temporal 
fix for economy, state and society are made at the national scale for a, albeit temporal, 
solution to the contradiction of capital (Jessop 1993; 1994; Amin 1994). 
This mode of regulation at the national scale started to face crisis conditions in the 
1970s as the globalization of economy was emerging as a recognizable phenomenon. As 
earlier discussion indicates, globalization was the consequence as well as the cause of the 
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decline of the Keynesian F ordism. The national scalar fix started to fail because 
internationalization of economy and technological advancements rendered the national 
borders ineffective to control production activities (Jessop 1993; 1994; Swyngedouw 
1997) - this is the capital moment aspect of globalization causing the decline of F ordism. 
About the same period, neoliberal ideologies started to prevail to create post-Keynesian 
Fordism policies. Since, this ideological change has been contributing to the acceleration 
of globalization - this is the political a.spect of globalization discarding the Fordist 
national state scalar fix. The neoliberal ideology in favor of supra- and sub-national scale 
regulations is the thrust for the new politics of scale. Brenner (1999, p439) summarizes: 
Though the highly centralised, bureaucratised states of the Fordist-Keynesian era 
converged around the national scale as their predominant organisational locus, 
since the world economic crises of the early 1970s the older industrial states of 
North America and western Europe have been restructured substantially to 
provide capital with ever more of its essential territorial preconditions and 
collective goods on both sub- and supranational spatial scales (Cerny, 1995). 
This ongoing re-scaling of territoriality is simultaneously transferring state power 
upwards to supranational agencies such as the European Union (EU) and 
devolving it downwards towards the state's regional and local levels, which are 
better positioned to promote and regulate urban-regional 
restructuring ... Throughout the EU and North America, in particular, this 
dynamic of state re-scaling has emerged as a major neo-liberal strategy of 
industrial restructuring and crisis management, aiming at once to enhance the 
administrative efficiency of state institutions, to enable new forms of capital 
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mobility on supranational to promote the global competitiveness of major sub-
national growth poles and to enforce the de- and revalorisation of capital within 
declining cities and regions. 
"Glocalization" (Swyngedouw 1997), described above, is political because it 
reconfigures membership, interests and priorities of society through spatial social 
arrangements. For example, new politics of scale includes "a neoliberal strategy of 
'deregulation' to dismantle the nationally configured redistributive operations of the 
Fordist-Keynesian order" and "a strat(;:gy of 'reregulation' to construct new institutional 
capacities for promoting capital investment within major urban growth poles, often 
through locally or regionally organized workfare policies, non-elected quangos and other 
entrepreneurial initiatives such as public-private partnerships" (Brenner 1999, p440). 
Neoliberalism and its new politics of scale is "productivist," in that state implements de-
and reterritorialization as accumulation strategy (Brenner 1998; 2000). In this view, state 
is the culprit for the decentralization under globalization. 
Nested Scale and National Government 
Are "glocalization" and "hollowing out" really happening? Is the central 
government really withdrawing from local affairs as new politics of scale explained 
above indicate? Or, are the world city networks really neutralizing the significance of the 
political scale of nation states? Some researchers insist on the continued involvement of 
national government (White 1998; Hill and Kim 2000). According to these theorists, the 
impact of economic globalization can only filter through the nested structure of 
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established socio-political institutions, ranging from the national to the local (Hill and 
Fujita 2003). Among the socio-cultural institutions, the national state is most powerful. 
Thus, although the global economic system is profoundly impacting cities and local 
governments, its influence is always mediated through state and national legal-political 
systems. Therefore, the effects of globalization on government cannot be uniform across 
all political institutions. It is always modified by geographically specific factors, 
including political structures, social cultures and historic backgrounds (Abu-Lughod 
1999). For example, historically, the Japanese and Korean governments developed 
Tokyo and Seoul, respectively, into world cities as the engines of national developmental 
policies (Hill and Kim 2000) and the French government nurtured Paris as its cultural 
champion (White 1998). 
However, can we say the same would continue in the future after further 
globalization? Could the structure of nested scale itself not be affected by globalization? 
Indeed, Saito (2003) and Fujita (2003) report that Tokyo, Japan's powerful world city, 
has gained political independence against the central governments. Does this not mean 
that the positive globalization effects on Tokyo shored up its political power, changing 
the nature of the nested scales from-below? Interestingly, a survey oftop twenty world 
cities show that about half (nine cities) experienced increased central government 
involvement in urban planning while the other half (eleven cities) experienced 
decentralization from the central government (Tsukamoto and Vogel 2004). This 
uncertainty in fact emphasizes the important analytical suggestion to the nested scale 
perspective. That is, the impact of globalization on government structure, such as 
decentralization and regionalization, must be examined through the unique interrelations 
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between the nested scales of various political actors. This research adopts this approach 
to examine whether the structure of the nested scale itself is being modified through the 
inter-scalar political interactions stimulated by globalization. 
Globalization and Regionalism 
To systematically examine the relationship between the global and local, it will be 
helpful if two aspects of globalization described by Jessop (2000) are introduced. 
According to this categorization, globalization has the structural moment and the strategic 
moment. The former is about the increased interconnectedness between various parts of 
the world as a result of technological advancements in, among others, telecommunication 
and transportation. This aspect of globalization is "the compression and transgression of 
time- and space-barriers" (Amin and Thrift 1994)." The strategic moment refers to the 
intentional aspects of globalization from the policies and activities of institutions and 
organizations. Supranational organizations such as IMF, the World Bank and WTO, 
many NGOs and large scale business conglomerates have been promoting globalization 
to achieve their organizational goals and effectiveness (Jessop 2000). Both aspects of 
globalization require the local and its integrity to the regional in different but related 
manners. The resurgence of region under globalization can be argued in relation to these 
two moments: on the ground of the functionality in relation to the structural aspect of 
globalization and in terms of policy objectives where globalization is regarded a strategy. 
In terms of functionality, the global scale and national scale share a zero-sum 
relationship. The advancement of global networks reduces the significance of national 
states and increases the importance of subnationallocales. Under this process, regions 
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have reemerged as the central scale of economic and social life (Storper 1997; Barnes and 
Ledebur 1998; Scott 1998). In the "borderless world," regions are the scale of economic 
production (Ohmae 2001) and their industrial clusters are the source of competitiveness 
(Porter 2001). That is, in the "space of flow" (Castells 1996), there are in fact only 
particular locations creating wealth. Paradoxically, the more globalized is the economy, 
the more concentrated the locations of economic activities (Sassen 2001 b). Under this 
condition, world cities constitute the regions of economic determination (Friedmann and 
Woff 1982; Friedmann 1986; Ross and Trachte 1990; Sassen 2001 b; Scott et aI2001). 
One of the corollaries from the attentions to particular locations is the inquiry into 
the secrets of successful regions (Amin and Thrift 1994). Research on places, such as 
Silicon Valley and the Third Italy caught attention and concepts such as "social capital" 
(Putnam 1993) and "institutional thickness" (Amin and Thrift 1994) became vogue. The 
importance of territoriality for economic growth through socio-cultural "embeddedness" 
confirmed the status of particular location under globalization (Amin and Thrift 1994). 
This, in turn, contributed to the increased interest in regional policies, particularly 
metropolitan "global city-regions" (Scott et aI2001). This is a new developmental 
paradigm of regionalism based on the global economy to assert regions in the 
international division oflabor (Keating 2001). P. J. Taylor (1994) predicts that city-states 
would resurrect as the major political scale after nation-states failing as the "wealth 
container." The interests and enthusiasm gathered around region in these developments 
are often labeled, "New Regionalism" (Lovering 1999; MacLeod 2001). Lovering (1999, 
p380) summarizes New Regionalism with its two traits: "(1) the historico-empirical claim 
that 'the region' is becoming the 'crucible' of economic development; and (2) the 
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normative bias that 'the region' should be the prime focus of economic policy. Not 
missing the boat, American new regionalism, whose theoretical ground is mainly based 
on metropolitan governance, has also turned to the importance of regional economic 
planning under globalization (Pierce 1993; Savitch and Vogel 2000). 
New Regionalism, which is predicated on the structural/functional globalization, 
assumes the end of Fordism; i.e. the decline of nation state as the commanding scale of 
economic management and social policies. In contrast, others argue that regionalism is, in 
fact, a part of strategies to end the Fordism. The strategic moment of globalization 
underlies this understanding of regionalism and the new politics of scale described above 
centers its analytical paradigm. This paradigmatic interpretation amounts to an assertion 
that globalization was created as a neoliberal project. It is an attempt to solve the crisis of 
Fordism with the free market disciplines and restructuring of national states into the 
global-local nexus (Swyngedouw 1992; Peck and Tickell 1994), in which globalization 
and glocalization become "two deeply intertwined moment of a single process of global 
restructuring ... " (Brenner 1998, p27). MacLeod and Goodwin (1999) agree to the 
"productivist" intervention by the state posited by Brenner (2000) to explain, "Nation 
states are not passive recipients of some global logic but are, through the actions of their 
constituent properties (governments, courts, bureaucracies), active agents in the 
structuration of globalization, 'glocalization', post-Fordism and 'hollowing out'" 
(MacLeod and Goodwin 1999, p506). In this neoliberal project, regions, particularly 
global city-regions have become the strategic sites of state reterritorialization (Brenner 
1999; 2000) as the targets of "spatial selectivity" (Jones 1997) to implement the state 
globalizationiglocalization strategy (MacLeod and Goodwin 1999; MacLeod 2001). In a 
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similar vein, Brenner (2002) determines that American new regionalism for metropolitan 
governance is a place-specific response to the competitive pressures and sociospatial 
polarization arising from neoliberal state retrenchment. Brenner (2000, p372) explains: 
[P]articularly on subnational and supranational scales, state institutions are 
increasingly seen to operate as instruments for reactivating the productive force 
of social space rather than as mechanisms for institutionalizing social 
compromises, for overcoming spatial disparities or for promoting social 
cohesion. 
All these arguments and developments characterize the relationship between 
globalization and regionalism as a consequence of an intended state neoliberal project. 
More importantly, they demonstrate the ideological and functional inter-connectedness 
between globalization, regionalism and decentralization through the new politics of scale 
for the reterritorialization of national state. At the central level, state implements 
neoliberal strategy with the mixture of devolution and selective urban development while, 
at the local level, city-regions are under pressure to compete and implement successful 
regional policies. 
However, the new politics of scale is not the only explanation that connects 
globalization, decentralization and regionalism. Keating (2001, p375) insists, "[t]he 
effects of economic change are powerfully mediated by culture, by institutions, and by 
politics." He agrees that scale and place are built and rebuilt as systems of social 
regulation but asserts that the economic determinism of Marxism or neoliberal regulation 
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cannot explain the complex and multifaceted process involved in regionalism. Savitch 
and Kantor (2002, p326) define regionalism as: 
[T]he ability of multiple localities within an identifiable geographical setting to 
work collectively towards common ends ... a range of institutional forms that can 
engage in interlocal cooperation on a metropolitan or regional scale. 
Once defined in this way, regionalism requires political leadership to adjust various 
aspects of region, ranging from topography, economic functionalism, culture, politics, 
and intergovernmental administration to create a political space (Keating 1998; 2001). At 
least some regulation theorists agree. For example, Goodwin and Painter (1997) accept 
that regulation only partially explain changes in the local state and local governance, 
pointing to the influences of local histories and institutional characteristics. In fact, 
Keating (2001) argues that globalization would make political leadership more crucial to 
reframe local governing body because it adds to already contlictual process of region-
building further complexities, including environmentalism, gender issues, and 
neighborhood movements as well as new types of criminality and social pathology. 
Goodwin and Painter (1997, p28) concede to recommend, to analyze state restructuring 
process, "a critical political sociology of the local state and urban governance based on an 
investigation of the material and discursive practices in which the local state and urban 
governance are grounded." Discursive process is an important element of regionalism 
even under the structural force of economic globalization. 
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City-region as Local State 
The above argument sets out a new path for the investigation of the relationship 
between globalization, decentralization and regionalism for a local perspective. That is, 
regional rescaling from below. But can urban politics really do locally-based 
restructuring given the fact that they are the medium through which national regulatory 
practices are delivered (Goodwin, Duncan and Halford 1993) and dependent on the 
central government (Kantor 1988)7 Keil (2003) asserts that globalization makes local 
states, indicating the possibility of from-below rescaling for local political determination 
in relation to globalization. 
Keil (2003) argues that the local political impetus is not based on the weakening 
of nation states under the structural globalization or "glocalization" from the strategic 
globalization. Rather, globalization introduces new political conflicts in urban regions. 
This tension is the political impetus for local state making in the global city-region. He 
(2003, p286) explains: 
Due to its growing diversity and dynamics, urban society is becoming the most 
significant integrative mechanism of the global age. The challenges of globalized 
urban society call for new mechanisms of regulation and new forms of 
governance; these in turn produce new kinds of local states ... the conflictual self-
regulating needs of local civil society help to produce a wide range of municipal 
state structures. 
According to Keil, global city-regions have potential for political self-determination 
precisely because globalization introduces to urban areas messy multiple-scalar interests, 
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which Keating (2001) describes above. Under this condition, city-regions have to respond 
through locally contingent political processes to "distinctive arenas of social struggle and 
policy formation: growth and development; immigration and citizenship rights; identity 
and anti-racist politics; neighborhood versus "world class" culture; use and exchange 
value; new forms of class struggle; collective consumption; and sustainability" (Keil 
2003, p287). These struggles take place as the "globalization of urban region, and the 
fragmentation of urban civil society and political sphere" (Ibid.). Keil (Ibid.) further 
argues that "[t]he emergence of new global-local arrangements in the world city should 
be seen as a dynamic process of mutual definition of social forces and as the product of 
material power relations." In other words, local political actions have performed the 
"jumping of (national) scale" to deal with the multi-scalar urban problems of 
globalization. Keil (Ibid.) states, "[u]rban politics in the world city is the forum in and 
through which the nexus among various scales of globalization is being produced." With 
various scalar interests and identities converging at global city-regions, urban politics 
"creates urban regulation and a new kind of urbanity" to transform global city-regions 
into local states (Keil 2003, p286-287: italics in the original text). Sellers (2002) similarly 
observes the increased demand for localized governance because local scale has become 
the foci of various scalar policies and interests. Keil (2003) recommends a careful 
combination of regime theory approach, regulation theory approach and discourse 
analysis approach to build a theoretical basis for the local state development. Regime 
theory lends the perspective of political economy, regulation theory explains the 
scale/space structuring process, and discourse analysis accounts for material processes. I 
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will examine each of these approaches to evaluate their theoretical appropriateness to 
explain the political restructuring from-below. 
Regulation 
Continued development of capitalism confounded orthodox Marxists because 
crises resulting from the contradictions and tensions of capitalism should not allow such 
continuity . Yet, capital accumulation carried on. Regulation theory emerged out of this 
perplexity to account for how capitalism maintains its development despite internal 
problems (Peck and Tickell1994). Regulation theory's answer to this question is the 
mode of regulation. According to Peck and Tickell (1994, p16): 
The theory holds that capitalist development proceeds through a succession of 
historically specific phases of stability and crisis, sustained growth and intense 
restructuring. Emphasis is placed on the role of state forms, social mores, laws, 
and habits - the so-called mode of social regulation (MSR) - in underwriting 
sustained phases of growth. These phases, in which the schema of reproduction 
(the complex of production, consumption, and distribution systems) is broadly in 
synchronization, are termed regimes of accumulation. 
Through the examination of the mode of regulation, regulation theory pays attention to 
"the intrinsically sociopolitical character of restructuring processes," "the role of social 
institutions in underpinning modes of economic development" and "the historically and 
geographically specific nature of capitalist (re)production" (Peck and Ticke1l1994, p16). 
With growing conceptual spectrum, regulation theory is becoming "a very broadly based 
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movement towards a more institutionally grounded political economy" (Peck and Tickell 
1994, p 16; Painter 1997). One of the consequences of the broadening scope would be the 
attention to subnational scale regulation. Regulation theory tends to use national state as 
the unit of analysis (Peck and Tickell 1994; Painter 1997; Cox 2002a) although 
theoretical grounds exist for regulation theory to connect the national and subnational to 
include subnational regions as subjects of examination (Goodwin, Duncan and Halford 
1993; Peck and Tickell 1994). Thus, regulation theory is limited to analyze local state 
building. On the one hand, "[ s ]tructuring of space is one of the key dimensions of 
regulation. Urban regions (rather than nations) are the pivotal points of post-Fordist 
restructuring" (Keil 2003, p289). On the other, regulation at urban regions, including 
space structuring, is determined by the national mode of regulation as its element, with 
urban scale being a medium of the national regulation (Goodwin, Duncan and Halford 
1993; Peck and Ticke1l1994). Thus, local restructuring, according to this, is a part of top-
down regulation - this is contrary to the from-below process of local state making Keil 
(1998) claims to occur. Indeed, Painter (1997) determines that regulation theory cannot 
explain local state making. In practice, this means regulation theory still tends to 
privilege national scale as its analytical objective. Urban restructuring is a part of its 
observations to explain changes in the national mode of regulation (cf. MacLeod and 
Goodwin 1999; Brenner 1999). Regulation theory would let researchers realize non-
economic factors, including culture and discourse, are at work in the continued capital 
growth under globalization but, with bias towards national government for analysis, it can 
confound rather than explain the cause of rescaling from below (Cox 2002a). 
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Urban Political Economy 
Local political is essential to investigate the process "globalization makes local 
state" because this claim is based on the proposition that globalization and local actors 
interact to change central-local governmental relations. As described above, while 
regulation theory is limited to examine this change, the analysis of urban political 
economy has a better chance to do the task because it directly inquires the behaviors of 
political actors at the local level. For example, "Who runs regional city?" (Hunter 1953) 
and "who governs?" (Dahl 1966) make such investigation as the classics in this field. 
Since these early studies of local politics, there was a prolonged debate about the nature 
of community power until Stone (1989) made a breakthrough with his regime theory 
(Vogel 1992; Stoker 1995). Stone defined regime as "informal arrangements that 
surround and complement the formal workings of governmental authority" (Stone 1989, 
p3) and is "a relatively stable group with access to institutional resources that enable it to 
have a sustained role in making governing decisions" (Stone 1989, p4). With regime 
theory, it is explained that community power is systemic in that its power source is the 
access to the economic and political structures. Therefore, it is "power to," rather than 
"power over," and it is socially produced by the coordination of those who have the 
economic or political resources (Stone 1989). Although regime theory has offered great 
insights to explain American urban politics, it is not free from its criticisms. For example, 
it is ethnocentrism based on American urban conditions and it fails to include the 
conditional factors of social, economic and governments external to urban politics in the 
analysis (Stoker 1995). However, probably the criticism that is most relevant to the study 
of local state making is about the scale issue. Regime theory practically confines the 
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political scale for its analysis to the jurisdiction of a particular local government (Lauria 
1996; Cox 1997). Later models of urban political economy successfully overcome the 
American centrism and negligence of external forces. Yet, these improved models still 
limit the scope of urban political economy to municipalities. The later urban political 
economy models based on regime theory include interactions between various scales 
from global to local. Yet, they treat these scales as fixed and the direction of influences 
largely flowing top-down, from larger scale to smaller. To plain, I will show two recent, 
sophisticated models produced by Savitch and Kantor (2002) and DiGaetano and Strom 




















Source: Savitch and Kantor (2002, p48) 
*This is a simplified version of the original 
Figure 2-2 
Structural Context 
Reproduced from DiGaetano and Strom (2003, p373) 
Both models include inter-scalar interactions to account for their influences to the urban 
scale: the model by Savitch and Kantor includes the effects of global market competition 
and the intergovernmental relations to evaluate the "bargaining positions" of cities, 
which, in turn, determine urban policy decisions. The model by DiGaetano and Strom use 
the "structural context," which is the combined influences of globalization and 
intergovernmental arrangements to "institutional milieu" and "political actors," whose 
coalition composition determines policy choices. Although the two models take different 
approaches, their objectives are similar: to explain how urban governance decisions are 
made, following the tradition of Hunter, Dahl and Stone. With this objective, it is a 
methodological necessity for the two models that the scale of the political community 
they investigate be fixed at a certain level. In fact, both models suggest regionalism 
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implemented by city leaders as local policy options but little theoretical explanation is 
given to the regionalism process itself. Generally, both models regard the flow of inter-
scalar influences moving from larger scale to smaller; from global to national to local in a 
nested scale system, placing urban communities at the bottom with larger scale forces 
constraining urban policymaking options. Bargaining by local governments described in 
the model ofSavitch and Kantor is a form of from-below activity but it is portrayed as a 
source of policy leeway for cities, rather than political empowerment for local rescaling. 
The authors explain its methodological focus on the existing scale as follows: 
Within its distinct territorial boundaries and by legal authority the city is the 
bargaining unit for capital investment. As one collective actor among others it 
may be engaged with national or regional authorities in orchestrating 
development, but it alone possesses a systematic interest in promoting the 
wellbeing of its citizenry" (Kantor and Savitch 2005, p143). 
This fixed local scale approach to urban politics is obviously not favorable to the study of 
changing local scale from below. Their top-down approach for modeling and the bottom-
up approach this study will be taking to explore local rescaling processes simply have 
different research objectives and paradigms. 
Globalization offers local governments the new local opportunity structures, 
consisting of decentralized central-local government relations and increased local 
economic development potentials (Goetz and Clarke, 1993). The new localism has 
emerged with the premise that local governments engage in economic development with 
global perspectives and transcend conventional nested political systems (Clarke and Gaile 
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1998). This development is tantamount to from-below political restructuring. To prove, 
what is required is a theory of urban politics that addresses the upward mobility of local 
governments. Another theoretical support for governing from below is presented by 
Sellers (2002). Examining local/regional political initiatives and central-local government 
relations, he finds local leaders increasingly play more significant roles in the 
implementations of centrally devised policies. He observes local efforts account for 
growth of globally-oriented industries in some cities despite the mobility of global 
capital. From these, Sellers (2002) asserts that local governments have substantially 
contributed to the condition of de-centered state (as opposed to nested national-centered 
state) in the central-local government relations (also refer to Figure 3-1 in Chapter III). 
This indicates local actors have played important roles to change the nested structure of 
national system from below towards more dispersed and decentralized state forms. 
Sellers (2005, p433) suggests: 
The nation-state, beneath its ordered, rationalized appearance from above, 
emerges as archipelago of local and regional logics that are ordered from below. 
In each urban setting, these logics depend on relations and coalition building 
within civil society. In the most extreme form, local actors become the principals, 
and hierarchical superiors within the state become the potential agents. 
Cox and Mair (1991) introduce a concept, the scale division of labor, which can 
account for the local level political rescaling actions. It refers to "the division of activities 
between different levels of the hierarchy of spatial scales, the territories composing it 
therefore being nested" (Cox and Mair 1991, p200). This concept is an extension from 
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Doreen Massey's spatial division of labour (1994) to add to its uneven special 
development the fact that uneven spatial interests are represented by different scales. 
There are four important points in scale division oflabor: firstly, different groups 
function at different scales to create different scalar economic interests; secondly, scale 
sizes in which spatial interests are formed change over time and space; thirdly, economic 
interest groups support the government sectors that represent the scales on which the 
groups' interests are most strongly reflected; and, lastly, different scalar interest groups 
compete for scalar fix, resulting to create winners and losers (Cox 2002a). Thus, the 
political contests center on the "question of what powers and responsibilities should 
reside at differtent levels of the state's scale division of labor" and what forces "drive, 
transform, the state's territorial organizations" (Cox 2002b, p254-255). For example, 
some industrial sectors form clusters to operate in regional scales, such as Silicon Valley. 
In those areas, economic interest groups would support regional planning because that 
will more efficiently deliver the kind of public services and facilities they need for 
growth, such as housing for employees, airports, new freeways and more industrial sites. 
However, the industry'S support for regional planning can conflict with narrower local 
interests protected by municipalities. There will be political competition as to which 
interests should take the political power and which scale should prevail (Cox 2002b). 
Similarly, dispute over trade restrictions, such as the protection of the US steel industry, 
have the content of scale division of labor. Interest groups from the Midwest would 
expect the fed¢ral government to step in while other export-oriented industries across the 
nation might support WTO to liberalize international trade. Cox (2002a) asserts his 
theory better fits the reality of political rescaling under globalization than the new politics 
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of scale based on regulation theory described in the above section. According to Cox 
(2002 a), firstly, political rescaling is taking place at more diverse scales and locations 
than the "glocalization" thesis indicates, secondly, such rescaling activities are instigated 
by local actors from below than centrally contrived as the new politics of scale suggests, 
and lastly, globalization and political rescaling are not necessarily two sides of the same 
coin as the advocates of the new politics of scale suggest. Cox (2002 a) points that 
political resca~ing occurred before globalization and also within a single nation-state (the 
annexations oiunincorporated areas by central cites in the 19th century or the at-large 
electoral reforms during the early 20th century in urban America were examples of 
contests between groups of different scalar interests). 
As the above examples show, scale division of labor explains politics of scale. 
Economic interests lobby to the public sector to protect and enhance their positions in the 
scale division oflabor. The political actions would intensify when the economic interests 
were those of location-bound (Cox and Mair 1991), such as real estate concerns and 
farming. ThroliIgh the political campaign to connect local geography and economic 
interest, locality becomes agent (Cox and Mair 1991): that is, "certain identities and 
interests are defined as local and action is taken on this basis" (Cox and Mair 1991, 
p204). This is a leap from "locality as localised social structure," which merely represents 
"a set of social relations at a particular spatial scale" (Cox and Mair 1991, pI97). Under 
this condition, locality is heavily dependent on external forces, such as macro economic 
conditions and higher government policies (Cox and Mair 1991), as depicted in the urban 
governance m<1>dels ofSavitch and Kantor (2002) and DiGaetano and Strom (2003). The 
scalar interests at certain locale are largely marginalized in a larger scheme of scale 
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division oflabor developed under, for example, the national government regulation. Yet, 
locality can develop to agent, in which: 
[P]eople interpret localised social structures in explicitly territorial tenns, come 
to view their interests and identities as 'local', and then act upon that view by 
mobilising locally defined organizations to further their interests in a manner that 
would not be possible where they to act separately ... (Cox and Mair 1991, p198) 
Once this occurs, locality can assert their own "scalar expressions" (Cox 2002a) in the 
scale division of labor. Under the globalization of economy, needs for localities to 
"defend a quasi-monopoly position" are intensified in the global scale division oflabor. 
Strategic actions taken by localities, in turn, can create changes in the political scale 
division of labor for new state scalar fixes (Cox 2002 a). The scale division of labor and 
scale expressions of local agent are important concepts in the rescaling from below. 
Discourse 
According to Giddens (1984, p164-165), societies are social systems with "a 
specifiable overall 'clustering of institutions' across time and space," which must have 
"an association between the social system and a specific locale or territory," "normative 
elements that involve laying claims to the legitimate occupation of the locale," and "the 
prevalence, among the members of the society, of feelings that they have some sort of 
common identity ... Such feelings may be manifest in both practical and discursive 
consciousness." It follows that discourse should play an important part in the process of 
state formation. Regulation theorists similarly consider discourse an integral part of 
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cultural regulaltion to consolidate hegemony in political economy (Goodwin and Painter 
1997). Regarding the establishment of political hegemony, Keil (2003, p290) comments, 
"[I]t is ultimately ... impossible to maintain an ontological position in which discourses 
are separate from or causally removed from material processes" of state making. 
According to Rose (2001, p136), who follows Foucault's conceptualizations, 
discourse refeJ1S to "groups of statements which structure the way a thing is thought, and 
the way we act on the basis of that thinking." Discourse "is a particular knowledge about 
the world whi¢h shapes how the world is understood, and how things are done in it" and 
is a particular language form situated in certain settings where it is created and used with 
its own rules and conventions. Discourse creates a specialized form of knowledge that 
defines meaniIl1gs for the understanding of people in the settings (Rose 2001, P136). 
"Human subjects are produced through discourse. Our sense of our self is made through 
the operation of discourse. So too are objects, relations, places, scenes: discourse 
produces the world as it understands it" (Rose 2001, pI37). In this process, discourse 
develops knowledge system by determining what reality is. The claims to truth, in turn, 
confer power to the discourse. Thus, "knowledge and power are imbricated one in the 
other" based oh the truth discourse constructs (Rose, p138). Discourse, in this way, is a 
means as well as a form of power, through which, social order is determined. From this 
dictum, it follows that discourse creates place. Human agency and their discourse turn 
space into a place of politics (Keith and Pile 1993) through the forms of culture, identity 
and imagination (Prazniak and Dirik 2001). Yet, at the same time, the human subjectivity 
to space is developed through materials and their arrangements. Discourse produces a 
knowledge system for "placing," "ordering" and "naming" of spatial objects, which, in 
45 
turn, organize space and shape place into a system of meanings (Hetherington 1997). 
Consequently, human agency and material objects create place interactively, as 
Hetherington (1997, p184) explains that human subjectivity and experience become 
"folded into the material world and each becomes imbricated in the agency of the other." 
As the following section further describes, discourse is central to the "scalar expressions" 
of local agent. 
Identity, Positioning and Place Making from Below 
The discursive agency-material interaction for place making described above has 
an important bearing on the transition of locality from a localized social structure to 
agent. According to Hetherington (1997), "placing" subjectifies space for territorial 
claims, "ordering" differentiates a place from others, and "naming" induces continued 
shaping of pla<ee towards idealized goals that the naming inspires. Through these actions, 
humans turn a locale into a process of relational arrangements made up of agency-
material interactions (Hetherington 1997). Thus, place is not only a location but a means 
to materialize human subjectivity. As such, place is agent, which articulates social 
relations in cel1ain ways at certain location in the scale division of labor. This explains 
the process of scalar expressions by local agent that Cox (2002a) argues. 
Identity and culture are important elements in this process, for they create "a 
symbolic realrrtt in which a territorial level can be endowed with meaning and a set of 
values to which actors can subscribe" (Keating, Loughlin, and Deschouwer 2003, p35). 
Political leaders use identity both as "a conditioning factor" and "a political resource" to 
detennine the scale of political territory (Castells 1997). In fact, there are many identities 
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associated with space and all have different implications for intra- and inter-Iocational 
relations (Massey 1994). Consequently, political mobilization around certain identities 
will fix boundaries and "stabilize the meaning of particular envelopes of space-time" 
(Massey 1994, pS) over other combinations of identity, space and time. The political 
construction of identity and place is a source of from-below state restructuring. Brysk 
(1994, pS7S) explains that identity includes the semantic framework that ascribe "who we 
are, what interests to seek, what is political, what is just, and what is possible" to people. 
When anomalies occur to existing semantic frameworks, people are awakened to the 
artificialness of the established identity paradigm and motivated to seek new one. 
Globalization induces this awakening, offering opportunity for local identity remaking 
(Castells 1997). 
Identity is a part of social positioning. In social systems, all actors are positioned 
along certain time-space paths, forming social relations among individuals. Positioning 
provides actors with the specifications of identity within a network of social relations 
(Giddens 1984). In other words, identity is relative and requires referent points through 
positional perspectives (Keith and Pile 1993). The same can be said to place identity. 
Spatial positioning provides a referent setting that allows place to construct its identity. 
Positioning, in turn, requires a new geographical understanding of social world, so that 
positioning of place identity can be performed easily as drawing geometrical images on a 
blank canvas than on an old map. From this, it can be understood that the discourse of 
"placing" entails redefining of social system, in which, "ordering" performs positioning 
and "naming" constructs new identity. Globalization offers conditions for re-specification 
of place identities and positioning at local as well as national levels through renewed 
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discourse of place (Prazniak and Dirlik 2001). It is an opportunity to erase the existing 






This study selects comparative case study as its research methodology. Two 
Japanese city-regions, Tokyo and Osaka are its observation units. This section describes 
the rationales for this methodology, the research design and model, the details of data 
collection, coding procedure and the analysis strategy. 
The Nature of Study 
Research purpose and objectives should guide the selection of research method. 
The overall purpose of this study is exploratory for theory development. As stated in 
Chapter 1, this research looks for a theoretical understanding about the relationship 
between decentralization and regionalism under globalization. A theory is truly useful 
only when it is largely applicable but in this particular research the weight of emphasis is 
placed on searching, not on confirming. In other words, the nature of study is not 
deductive for nomothetic ends. No hypotheses are set out for test. Nevertheless, there are 
some propositions better investigated by deductive approach in this study. For example, 
the speculation that local governments play important roles in the processes of state and 
local restructuring needs to be verified through empirical analyses. Some models are also 
introduced to ascertain causal implications although their main use is to facilitate 
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conceptual understanding rather than testing. The following sections will describe the 
rationales for the research method and design adopted in this study. 
Comparative Study 
"Almost any observation, whether one makes it in academic research or real life, 
implies some form of comparative assessment, such as big-small or tall-short. Without 
comparison, one cannot tell whether an object is big or small" (Pierre 2005, p454). This 
is the very basic of why we should compare. This can be useful "to explore a 
theoretically postulated relationship in which societal features are a key type of 
independent variable. A comparative research design will allow some of these variables 
to vary" (Pickvance 2001, pI5). But a comparative analysis should explain in addition to 
juxtaposing or exploring (Pickvance 2001). The next use of comparison is to "examine 
whether a relationship reported in a study in one society also holds in another" 
(Pickvance 2001, P 15). The aim is to test the existence of correlation between variables in 
question across different cases. A more systematic approach is comparison for control, or 
"to examine whether a condition which is given or fixed for one society is influential or 
not" (Pickvance 2001, pI5). For example, urban politics, like any social phenomenon, 
takes place under the influence of various environmental conditions. This fact presents 
difficulty to identify which factors are genuinely accountable for certain urban 
developments. The comparative method allows researchers to manage this problem. By 
comparing a number of cases, the researcher can control the "noises" of a research design 
and identify the causal factors under study in a manner analogous to a quasi-experiment. 
In other words, multiple comparisons improves the validity issue of a simple comparative 
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study findings by isolating from temporal and spatial vagaries the conditions essential to 
the phenomenon and generalizable to other settings (Orum, Feagin and Sjoberg 1991). 
A number of advanced urban governance models have been proposed in recent years 
including those by DiGaetano and Klemanski (1999), Sellers (2002), Savitch and Kantor 
(2002) and DiGaetano and Strom (2003). The methodologies to examine the validity of 
these models are the comparisons of variables among a number of selected cities. These 
comparative studies select case cities to combine similarities and differences to test and 
control variables and to crystallize the underlying structures of urban decision making 
patterns. For example, the underlying structure of Sellers' model (2002) is the inter-
governmental relations and that of the study ofSavitch and Kantor (2002) is the 
bargaining capability of urban governments. In this way, "comparison more precisely 
shows how variables work differently in a variety of settings" (Kantor and Savitch 2005, 
p 13 5) and "observers assesses the defining features and significance of an object under 
study" (Pierre 2005, p454). In practice, these comparative studies include the above three 
uses of comparisons identified by Pickvance. 
Yet, comparative study can perform one more task: "to examine a small number 
of empirical cases holistically to grasp the causal processes leading to observed 
similarities and differences" (Pickvance 2001, pIS). The nature of this comparison 
slightly differs from the above three in that this holistic comparison is more qualitative in 
nature. Indeed, according to Pickvance (2001), similarities and differences can be 
examined more qualitatively, including "the occurrence of events or patterns of events" 
and "the shape of the relations between variables," in addition to more quantitative 
"values of variables." As an example, Abu-Lughod's (1999) comparisons between New 
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York, Chicago and Los Angeles is a holistic comparative analysis to test the development 
patterns of these cities against the global city model proposed by Friedmann and Wolff 
(1982), Sassen (2001 b) and Knox and Taylor (1995). Although certain variables such as 
natural geographical settings and sociopolitical conditions are measured individually, this 
comparative study takes in essence a holistic approach comparing over a hundred years 
of historic paths of urban developments in these cities. Comparative study can also be 
heuristic. Pierre (2005, p456) laments that heuristic value of comparative analysis is 
rarely fully exploited. He (2002, p456) explains: 
An important element of comparative research is not just to isolate causal 
processes but also to present the cases as a set of interrelated economic, political, 
and social processes embedded in an institutional system. 
By describing the cases in a holistic fashion, highlighting the internal logics of 
each of the cases while at the same time teasing out changes in the variables 
identified by the analytical framework, the final analysis will both set the stage 
for meaningful comparison as well as tell a good story. 
Kantor and Savitch (2005) testimony that comparative study allows researchers to gain 
in-depth comparison of agency behaviors and interests to conduct heuristic probing. 
A dichotomy can be drawn between the variable/model-oriented nomothetic 
comparative study (as in the studies of DiGaetano and Klemanski (1999), Sellers (2002), 
Savitch and Kantor (2002) and DiGaetano and Strom (2003)) and the holistic ideographic 
comparative inquiries (as in the study of Abu-Lughod (1999)). Yet, in practice, many 
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researchers have positions along the continuum between the two types (Pickvance 2001). 
In this way, comparative study is a flexible research method adaptable to both variable-
oriented studies and "whole society" inquiries. It can accommodate combinations of 
deductive analyses and inductive explorations. This flexibility matches the above 
mentioned hybrid nature of this research study to become its method of choice. With 
comparative study's versatility, the research goal of this study - theoretical understanding 
about the relationship between decentralization, regionalism and globalization - is more 
likely to be attained by the combination of nuanced interpretation of case situations and 
identification of underlying causal relations between variables. 
One of the issues involved in determining a comparative study design is the 
number of observation sites for comparison. The larger the number, the more robust the 
research validity will be. However, a large number of observation sites compromise the 
depth of research such as contextualized observations of individual cases. So that the 
researcher loses hislher ability to make detailed examinations of the ways things actually 
work (Keating 1991, Creswell 1998). Therefore, scope and depth is a matter of trade off 
between the avoidance of small case idiosyncrasy and prevention of large case spurious 
examination (Kantor and Savitch 2005). In addition, larger cases would introduce more 
vagaries from additional cases to comparisons for control problems. At the end, the 
research goal should dictate the balancing act. This study observes only two locations 
within a single state to emphasize the holistic approach than the variables/model 
approach. This obviously limits the generalizability of the findings. However, by limiting 
to only two locations in a single state, this research design overcomes "noises" from the 
differences in country-level history, ecology, and culture that are inherent in cross-
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national comparisons (Abu-Lughod 1999). As a result, the compact comparative design 
can take advantage of the best feature of a qualitatively oriented study - research with a 
texture rich, nuanced in-depth investigation suitable for inductive exploration. 
Case Study 
Although this study compares two cities, it can be argued that this is a single case 
study of state restructuring in Japan. Case study offers a holistic research approach 
(Drum, Feagin and Sjoberg 1991) suitable to deal with the complexity of the research 
topics and objectives. Drum, Feagin and Sjoberg (1991, p2) define case study as "an in-
depth, multifaceted investigation, using qualitative research methods, of a single social 
phenomenon." Its multiple sources of information include observation, interviews, audio-
visual materials, and documents and reports (Creswell 1998), allowing the observer "to 
examine social action in its most complete form" and "to examine not only the complex 
of life in which people are implicated but also the impact on beliefs and decisions of the 
complex web of social interaction" (Drum, Feagin and Sjoberg 1991, p9). The subject 
matter of this study includes interactions between global market forces, national 
government strategies and local government responses. The analysis of these interactions 
requires multiple levels of information, such as international political and economic 
influences, national policies, and regional and local government strategies. The sources of 
information include in-depth personal interviews, government publications, census data, 
minutes of meetings and newspaper articles. On the other hand, the geographic 
boundaries in which the subject phenomenon occurs are specific. The combination of 
clear geographical demarcation of the case (the national state of Japan) and the need to 
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combine data from multiple sources render itself to a case study method. The above 
mentioned generalizability problem applies. However, the exploratory nature of this 
study appreciates case study's conduciveness to heuristics more strongly than its 
shortcomings. 
Theoretical Framework for Comparison 
Harry Eckstein (1975, p87) describes theory as fundamentally an attitude towards 
scientific inquiry, whose only requirement is that the forms of its statements must be 
"conducive to the goals of the theoretical activity." In addition, Eckstein (1975) require 
four elements in the goals of theoretical endeavors: "to arrive at statements of regularity 
about the structure, behavior, and interaction of phenomena," to require "not merely 
empirical rules, but also that the rules be as reliable and valid as possible," "the correct 
anticipation, by sound reasoning, of unknowns" or foreknowledge, and lastly parsimony 
for incisiveness. Therefore, for a set of ideas to become a theory: 
[I]t must state a presumed regularity in observations that is susceptible to 
reliability and validity tests, permits the deduction of some unknowns, and is 
parsimonious enough to prevent the deduction of so many that virtually any 
occurrence can be held to bear it out (Eckstein 1975, p90). 
The goal of this study is to identity a theoretical proposition to the research questions set 
out. Exploration is a large part of this undertaking as repeated so far. However, the 
animus of the inquiry, as Eckstein requires, must be congruent to these four criteria. The 
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first step to this end would be the review of research questions, which are the reasons for 
this theoretical inquiry. The questions of this study include: 
• How globalization, political decentralization and local regionalism interrelate? 
• What political leaders do to implement regional rescaling under globalization? 
• Can local communities resist rescaling for economic competitiveness? 
The regularity criterion implies that phenomenon in question for research is not a unique 
incident only related to a single case. The assumption is that the research topic applies to 
many societies/occasions. As the literature review in Chapter II exhibits the condition of 
decentralization and regionalism in relation to globalization is a prevalent phenomenon 
across many parts of the world but there are disagreements about the reason behind. 
Thus, the research task for regularity is to explain why and how this happens in a way 
that is applicable to all similar cases with a sense of solving the "puzzle" (Eckstein 1975). 
The next step towards a theoretical inquiry is to set up a research framework for 
empirical investigations. The quality of this framework is the source of reliability/validity 
test, foreknowledge and parsimony. 
The investigative focus of this study is set in the interactions between 
governments, whose scalar political and economic interests have been transformed by the 
process of economic globalization. The proposition is that globalization has been 
provoking strategic actions and counter actions in the national-to-Iocal government and 
local-to-Iocal government relations to the effect that the premises on political scale and 
territorial interests have been subject to renegotiations. Political dynamics over scale 
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arising from these intergovernmental struggles explain the relation between 
decentralization, regionalism and globalization. This is the hypothetical thesis of this 
study. To operationalize these propositions, I will construct a conceptual model for a 
comparative case study but before that I will refer to the following comparison of two 
comparative politics approaches created by Sellers (2005, p432). 
Figure 3-1 
National-Centered Analysis 
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De-Centered Comparison Versus Nation-Centered Comparison (reproduced from Sellers (2005, p432)) 
National-Centered Analysis on the left is the traditional research approach towards urban 
development, in which national, regional and urbanllocallevel polities are treated 
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hierarchically nested and the intergovernmental influences flowing top-down. Sellers 
(2005) criticizes this perspective for its assumptions: "because national governments, 
policies, institutions, and interests operate as hierarchies, local governance and politics 
are derivative of what happens at higher levels" and "when local elements of governance 
and politics are significant, their importance must be measured in terms of the aggregate 
national (or macro-level) consequences rather than the effects on specific places or 
regions" (Sellers 2005, p431). Consequently, this approach fails to capture the changing 
mode towards governing from below. What is recommended is De-Centered Analysis on 
the right in Figure 3-1. This approach "highlight(s) both what combination of influences 
causes local results and how local participation and local agency contribute to those 
results" (Sellers, p435). Importantly, by paying attention to local identity and political 
initiatives, it "emphasizes bottom-up logics that are particular to a given place" (Sellers 
p433). As a result, this perspective allows researchers to examine the political actions at 
the urbanllocallevel where most dynamic influences are being generated in the 
intergovernmental relations and under the globalization of economy for political changes. 
Since the topic of intergovernmental relations is also central to this study, I will consult 
with the insight for De-Centered Analysis approach in my conceptual model. On the other 
hand, this research takes more holistic approach than the variable-oriented approach of 
Sellers' model. Also the main subjects of this research are government structure and scale 
while Sellers' are the urban governance and the intergovernmental relations. From this, 
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and City-regions 
On the left, Hierarchical Nested Order represents the traditional government system in 
the intergovernmental relations before the globalization era. Nation-state government 
manages the economic system for the entire country towards overall economic growth 
and even national development through a hierarchically managed government system. 
Local governments operate within the nest and are engaged in the international economy 
indirectly. In this system, strong vertical flows of policies exist. On the right is 
Decentralized Local State Order, representing an ideal case of advanced government 
restructuring under globalization. In this stage, national state government retreats from 
redistributive economic management, giving decentralized responsibilities to subnational 
governments. As a result, subnational governments are more directly exposed to the 
vagaries of global economy. At the same time, national state government is likely to 
implement selective urban development policies, creating further uneven development 
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across the nation. Meanwhile, the arena of subnationai/local governments is in a 
condition of transitional milieu. Local leaders initiate political reorganizations and 
realignments. This restructuring includes resolutions of subnational government bodies 
and regional realignments towards local-state under increased inter-local rivalries. 
Provided with this model, the main inquiry of this study is to learn how the order of 
intergovernmental relations shifts from the nested hierarchy model to the decentralized 
local state model. It asks in what processes the scalar understanding of national territories 
change from a nested hierarchical system to dispersed "archipelago" of local/regional 
governments. The observation points of this study include politics at central and local 
levels, their strategic actions, and the discourse developed for the reformulation of place 
identity and scale. A detailed plan for variable observations in this holistic-oriented 
comparative study is discussed in Coding and Data Analysis Strategy section below. 
Studying Japanese World Cities 
The above model can specify the outline of the case cities that are suitable for this 
comparative study. These cases will be selected for the model to be fleshed out with 
empirical accounts and examined heuristically for validity. First of all, the host nation-
state of the case cities must have gone through government restructuring towards 
decentralization for obvious reasons. Decentralization is one of the main conditions of 
this study. It follows that the second and third requirements of the cases are regional 
developments and the influence of the global economy. For the same reason to 
government decentralization, the case cities must have some sort of concerted 
regionalism efforts and plans. Also, the cities should have exposures to the global 
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economy, ideally with relatively high statuses in the hierarchy of world cities. Fourthly, 
the two cities should be reasonably comparable in terms of industrial structure and 
population size although they may be following diverging paths in terms of economic 
growth patterns. Finally, these two cities must be relevant one against another. This 
means that the two cities are not oblivious to the other's economic/political conditions 
and policy decisions made with some influence of the other's actions. This is a factor that 
many comparative studies would wish to avoid because interactions between the cases 
distort the quasi-experimental design to control variables (although researchers usually do 
pay much attention to this). Nevertheless, for this study, interaction between cases is an 
important condition for this study. This is one of the factors contributing to the holistic 
leaning of this comparative study and having a single case study characteristic for 
nuanced analysis. 
The Japanese world cities, Tokyo and Osaka match these requirements. Japan has 
been experiencing a dramatic government restructuring for decentralization since the 
1980s. Traditionally, Japan has been a strong case of centrally managed developmental 
unitary state. Yet, as Chapter IV will describe the detail, diverse developments arising 
from globalization forced this national state to go through arduous procedures for 
government restructuring for decentralization. Because of the large contrast between the 
Japanese political system before and after the restructuring, the study of Japanese cities 
offers a rare opportunity to evaluate the impact and process of globalization on 
government restructuring. Tokyo and Osaka are world cities. Friedmann's hierarchy of 
world cities (1986) and Sassen's global cities (2001 b) include Tokyo among one the top-
tier group. Osaka was not included in the original; Friedmann (1995) adds it to the world 
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city hierarchy later. Beaverstock, Smith, and Taylor (1999) identify Tokyo among the 
Alfa world cities and Osaka, Gamma world cities. Although Tokyo dwarfs Osaka in 
population and economic capacity, both areas share similar economic profiles with 
clusters of business headquarters, financial centers and modem international airports. 
Importantly, local leadership for regionalism exists in both areas. Finally, as the two 
largest economies in a relatively compact country, the two city-regions cannot avoid 
influencing each other economically and politically, particularly Osaka feeling the impact 
of larger Tokyo as globalization intensifies (Hill and Fujita 1995; Kamo 2000). 
Government restructuring towards decentralization under globalization is 
widespread across many countries (Jessop 2000; Rodriguez-Pose and Gill 2003) while 
attention to regional development is gathering pace (Taylor 1994; Storper 1997; Scott 
1998; Keating 2001; MacLeod 2001). Given this, as a study of a representative case, 
investigation of Japanese two world cites should be able to present explanations 
consistently applicable to the conditions of other places. The above presented conceptual 
model is simple to indicate that the interactions of politics of scale between national and 
local polities have the key to explain the shift from the traditional nested system to the 
milieu of uneven and dispersed local states/city-regions. This is the underlying current to 
tie together decentralization and regionalism under globalization. With this research 
design and propositions, analyses will be conducted with attention to validity and 
prediction power to raise the findings to a theoretical quality. 
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Data Collection 
Source of Data 
A number of regional planning, policy concepts and collaborations have been 
under way in Osaka and Tokyo. For example, the Tokyo Metropolitan Government 
(TMG) published a regional urban development plan in 2001 and in the Kansai region - a 
large region comprising of Osaka city, Osaka Prefecture and their neighboring cities and 
prefectures - a group of local governments and private leaders formed a quasi-public 
corporation in 1999. Some are more formal than others. Similarly, some are in progress 
one way or another and others barely passed the conceptualization stage. The following 
table lists the regionalism plans/actions put forward for consideration in Osaka area and 
Tokyo area, with parties sponsoring the plans/actions. I targeted these schemes as the 
source of data to grasp the underlying motives, political intentions and leadership 
conditions of regionalism in these areas. The public sector and private sector involved in 





• Tokyo Megalopolis Plan (a regional urban development plan) by TMG 
• Roundtable meeting by mayors and governors 
• A three-tier federal regionalism by Kanagawa Prefecture 
Osaka Area 
• A two-tier federal regionalism plan by Osaka City 
• Osaka Prefecture-City merger plan by Osaka Prefecture 
• Kansai Council (a quasi-governmental corporation) by city and prefecture 
governments and business leaders 
• Kansai-shu Model (a three-tier federal local state) by Kansai Economic Federation 
• Osaka Prefecture-City merger by Kansai Business Executives Association 
• Roundtable meeting by three governors of three prefectures 
Personal in-depth interviews were conducted with officials belonging to the 
city/prefecture governments, quasi-governmental organizations and the private sector 
groups involved in the regional plans/actions listed in Table 2-1. The interviewees were 
typically senior managers in charge of policy making and analysis, or with similar 
responsibilities. The names of organizations that took part in this study are provided in 
Table 2-2. Twenty-six complete interviews were made (multiple interviews were 
conducted with some organizations). Data from official publications, documents, minutes 
of meetings and newspaper articles regarding these regionalism movements were also 
used for analysis. In addition to these data gathered from local data sources, interviews 
were conducted with the bureaucrats in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications, the national bureaucracy in charge of local government reforms, and 
with a representative from the National Governors' Association, which had been making 
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effective campaigns for Japan's decentralization refonns. Infonnation from these sources 
comprises the main data to this study. Apart from this, several researchers both in Osaka 
and Tokyo, who were familiar with government restructuring issues, and Japanese 
academic books and journal papers provided this study with valuable background 
infonnation and insights about political changes in Japan. The total interviews, including 




• Tokyo Metropolitan Government 
• Kanagawa Prefecture 
• Yokohama City 
• Kawasaki City 
• Chiba Prefecture 
• Chiba City 
• Saitama Prefecture 
• Saitama City 
• Japan/Tokyo Chamber of Commerce 
Osaka Area 
• Osaka Prefecture 
• Osaka City 
• Hyogo Prefecture 
• Kobe City 
• Kyoto Prefecture 
• Kyoto City 
• Wakayama Prefecture 
• Shiga Prefecture 
• Kansai Council 
• Kansai Economic Federation 
• Kansai Association of Corporate Executives 
Others 
• The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 
• National Governors' Association 
66 
Interviews 
The personal in-depth interviews were conducted in a semi-structured format. 
Occasionally, a list of questions had been sent to interviewees before the interview date 
upon request. The interviews ranged between sixty to ninety minutes. The interviews 
developed from base questions listed in Table 3-3. 
Table 3-3 
Base Questions for Interview 
• What are your community's issues and problems considered appropriate being 
solved by regional approaches? 
• Are there any regional plans, approaches or solutions implemented in this area? If 
yes, what are they? 
• What are the most difficult issues in implementing regional plans and policies in this 
area? 
• Are regionalism and decentralization related matters in any way? If yes, how? 
• Who or what groups take the leadership roles for the regional planning andlor 
approaches in this area? 
• Do you find any effects from the globalization of economy taking place in your 
community? What are they? 
• Do you find any relations between the effects of economic globalization and the 
regionalism movements taking place in this area? 
• Do you find any relations between the effects of economic globalization and 
decentralization? 
Coding and Data Analysis Strategy 
The raw data collected through the above process must be filtered, categorized 
and woven to theoretically explain an apparent correlation between decentralization, 
regionalism and globalization. To this end, this study taps into the "grounded theory 
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analysis." Grounded theory is a type of qualitative research approach to generate or 
discover theory (Creswell 1997). The "nitty-gritty" of this method exists in its data 
coding scheme and data re-articulation facility. It allows researchers to deconstruct data 
and reconstruct them into "an abstract analytical schema of a phenomenon" (Creswell 
1997, p56). Grounded theory utilizes two stages of data coding. The first state is called 
"open coding," involving segmentation of row data into categories of information 
(Cresswell 1997). Once categorization of raw data was identified, 
properties/subcategories within each category and their degrees of variation, or 
dimensionality, must be developed (Cresswell 1997). The second stage of the coding 
process is called "axial coding," where the researcher reorganizes the open-coded data 
into the analytical schema of the phenomenon in question. Through this process, the 
researcher discerns the imbedded generalizable mechanism of causality in the open coded 
data and their properties. This theory building part of the grounded theory approach can 
be assisted by the use of "coding diagram (or logic diagram)" (refer to Figure 3-3), in 
which: 
the researcher identifies a central phenomenon (i.e., a central category 
about the phenomenon), explores causal conditions (i.e., categories of 
conditions that influence the phenomenon), specifies strategies (i.e., the 
actions and interactions that result from the central phenomenon), 
identifies the context and intervening conditions (i.e., the narrow and 
broad conditions that influence the strategies) and delineates the 
consequences (i.e., the outcomes of the strategies) for this phenomenon 
(Cresswell 1997, p57) (bold type in the original). 
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After this axial coding process, the "selective coding" articulates the categories of 
information fit into the coding diagram to produce a narrative account, or the "story," of 
subject phenomenon (Cresswell 1997). 
Figure 3-3: 
















Politics of scale: Discourse of 
Scale division of place-making: 
labor and scalar 
:-+ 
Place identity 










Scale of new 
localism 
Modeled after a diagram in Cresswell (1997, p305): 
Dotted arrows are additions to the original 
To implement open coding, I refer to the literature to determine coding categories 
appropriate to this study. This may be a variation from the open coding introduced by 
Cresswell (1997). Although referring to the literature might not make the coding as 
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"open" as otherwise, it helps to relate to the established knowledge of the relevant fields. 
In other words, at least as the foundation, this research lets the literature take the lead in 
deciding what kinds of information it looks for for coding and analysis. This should 
improve the generalizability of the analysis findings and supplement the limited sample 
size of this research design and higher generalizability itself contributes to the improved 
theoreticalness of findings (Eckstein 1975). The open coding categories selected from 
the literature include: "structural forces," "urban politics," "local institutions," "politics 
of scale," "discourse of scale," and "conditions of regionalism." The profiles of 
properties sought under these categories include, respectively, "global market and 
state/urban restructuring," "urban regime and political arenas," "culture and history," 
"scale division of labor and scalar expressions of local agent," "place making and 
positioning," and "scale of new localism." The combinations of open coding categories 
and their properties will be fit into the logic diagram through axial coding process. The 
logic diagram depicted in figure 3-3 illustrates this coding scheme. The analyses of 
politics of scale for Tokyo (Chapter V) and Osaka (Chapter VI) follow this logic diagram 
format. To prepare for the coding, the taped interviews were translated from Japanese to 
English and transcribed. 
Explanations on the literature sources from which open coding categories are 
drawn are in order. The following table 3-4 summarizes this information along with open 




Property profile Description Reference 
categories 
Structural Global economy Market forces, intergovernmental Savitch and 
forces and state/urban structure and local economic Kantor (2002) 
restructuring conditions drive/constrain local DiGaetano and 
development policy and scalar Strom (2003) 
interest 
Urban Urban regime and Membership of local elite Ferman (1996) 
politics political arena coalitions and the setting of their DiGaetano and 
decision-makings characterize scale Strom (2003) 
and nature of discourse 
Local Local culture, Local culture, history and Keating, Loughlin 
institutions history and ecological relationship of the and Deschouwer 
ecology region influence the nature of (2003) 
regionalism, identity and power Abu-Lughod 
(1999) 
Politics of Scale division of Competing scales of economic Cox (2002a) 
scale labor and scalar interests, public interests and Smith (1993) 
expressions political representations cause Cox and Mair 
conflict over political scale (1991) 
determination 
Discourse of Place identity and Rhetorical representations of local Rose (2001) 
place-making positioning political identity and positioning Hetherington 
maneuver its scale, economic (1997) 
interest and political goals 
Conditions of Scale of new How politics of scale resulted in the Goetz and Clarke 
regionalism localism vertical and horizontal (1993) 
intergovernmental relations and Clarke and Gaile 
local political goals (1998) 
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The category "structural forces" is derived from the urban development models 
developed by Savitch and Kantor (2002) and DiGaetano and Strom (2003). Their 
models' "driving variables" (Savitch and Kantor 2002) and "the structural context" 
(DiGaetano and Strom 2003) include global market forces, their urban economic 
restructuring effects, and changing nature of intergovernmental relations to describe the 
conditioning effects of these structural forces on urban political choices. The coding 
category "structural forces" therefore includes infonnation relating to the global 
economy, state government restructuring and urban economic conditions from raw data. 
The category "urban politics" similarly refer to the urban development models ofFennan 
(1996) and DiGaetano and Strom (2003). These models consider the membership of 
urban political coalitions and the setting, or "arena," in which these coalitions exert 
leadership influences interact to detennine the contents of urban decisions. Given this, 
data on the conditions of urban regime and political arenas are evaluated under "urban 
politics" for analysis. The next coding category "local institution" gathers infonnation on 
local culture, history and ecological relationship between the communities of region 
because Keating, Loughlin and Deschouwer (2003) and Abu-Lughod (1999) demonstrate 
that local culture and history have strong bearing on regionalism, political agenda and 
urban developments. This is followed by the category "politics of scale" adopted from 
Cox (2002a), Smith (1993) and Cox and Mair (1991). These researchers point to the 
cooperation/contest paradox and conflict of interest existing in the nature of scale to 
describe the new political mobilization under globalization. Infonnation about dynamics 
in scalar division of labor and new scale claims by local leaders are captured under this 
coding category. "Discourse of place-making" is a category about political rhetoric in the 
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formation of epistemological power for place-making posited by Rose (2001) and 
Hetherington (1997). Data regarding the discourse of place identity and positioning for 
political maneuvering on scale, economic interest and political goals are recorded under 
this category. Finally, the category "conditions of regionalism" gather information about 
the new local scale, if any, produced as a result of local politics of scale initiatives. This 
includes changes in central-local relations and regional political affiliations, following the 
new localism concept posited by Goetz and Clarke (1993) and Clarke and Gaile (1998) 
Once data coding for these categories and properties are completed, the coded 
variables are analyzed for axial coding. They will be assigned to the logic diagram 
components: central phenomenon, causal conditions, strategies, context, intervening 
conditions and consequences as illustrated in Figure 3-3 to complete the axial coding 
process. A coding diagram will be constructed for each of Tokyo and Osaka areas. These 
diagrams will be compared to find indications to the research questions of this study: 
• How globalization, political decentralization and local regionalism interrelate? 
• What political leaders do to implement regional rescaling under globalization? 
• Can local communities resist rescaling for economic competitiveness? 
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CHAPTER IV 
JAPANESE POLITICAL SYSTEM AND ITS CITIES 
Overview 
Japan has been experiencing important yet difficult political changes since the 
early 1990s. It is this conditions under which local government restructuring is taking 
place in Tokyo and Osaka. Therefore, it is critical that the analyses of political rescaling 
in these city-regions reflect the national political changes. This chapter first describes the 
Japanese political system and its central-local relationship. Then, it describes the political 
reform efforts implemented since the 1980s to reach the current point. As Japan's 
political structure changes, the functions of its largest metropolises, Tokyo and Osaka 
have evolved over the years. The last section of this chapter compares Tokyo and Osaka 
for their urban developments. 
Political System and Culture 
The state has led the economy in Japan, not vise versa. The core contradiction 
driving Japan's political economy is rooted in international relations not class 
relations, as the Japanese have sought to preserve state autonomy and national 
integrity in the face of Western market penetration and geo-political domination. 
The nation and the enterprise thus subsume (international) class relations in 
Japan (Hill and Fujita 2000, p686) 
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National economic growth to catch up with the West has been the historical state mandate 
in Japan. Muramatsu (1994) explains that the administrative means to fulfill this goal was 
the use of "maximum resources" - a collective approach to achieve organizational 
objectives, permitting compromises on legalistic controls and member individualism. 
This group-oriented attitude and identity towards the state mandate underlie Japanese 
political culture upon which its political system stands. 
The post-second war Japan was the period when the Japanese growth mandate 
shaped her policies and politics towards the collective national interest (Muramatsu, Iqbal 
and Kume 2001), which was unchallenged for the most of the rest of the twentieth 
century. After a political turmoil during the 1950s over constitutional amendment and 
defense policies, which closely overlapped an ideological debate between the capitalism 
in alliance with the United States and the socialism with neutrality to both the Soviet 
Union and the United States, national economic growth became the general political 
objective in the 1960s (Kamo 1993; Ohtake 1999). Japan's central leadership had a clear 
idea about its developmental policies and administrative system under this economic 
nationalism: the central bureaucracy positioned local units as the locations of economic 
production while local elites took advantage of the central economic policies to achieve 
local growth. In so doing, the local elites delivered the success of the central development 
policies to the central bureaucracy in return (Kamo 1993). As a result, there established 
was a clientalistic relationship between the central bureaus and local polities. The 
bureaucrats relied on local economic development for their policy success and credibility 
while the local leaders needed central guidance and financial support for policy 
implementation. Kamo (1993) determines that the neutralization of the post world-war II 
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radicalism through this central-local clientalistic growth policy during the 1950s shifted 
the Japanese political agenda from ideological engagements to economic materialism. 
The economic development policy was political in nature; the conservative government 
tried to curtail the political radicalism gathering force among the urban working class at 
that period. Kamo (1993) concludes that the shift from political idealism to economic 
materialism marked the beginning of the "Japanese political system" saddled with 
clientalism and developmentalism controlled by oligarchic bureaucracy. 
It was the central bureaucrats, rather than the political leaders, that commanded 
the post-war state developmentalism and policies in Japan (Kamo 1993). For example, 
the central ministries built grounds for Japan's post-war economic activities after the 
Second World War. According to Kamo (1993), first of all, the central bureaucrats made 
concentrated investments in the basic infrastructure, such as roads, railways, 
telecommunication, harbors and industrial site developments through the 1960s. 
Secondly, they designated strategic industrial development zones and provided tax 
abatement for targeted industries to encourage investment. Thirdly, they directed private 
banks through the influence of the central bank or developed special purpose public funds 
to provide the private sector with much needed low interest finance for their production 
capacity building. Finally, the central government orchestrated cooperative labor 
movements by offering welfare state policies and by establishing the Shunto system - an 
annual comprehensive labor negotiation, linking the national economic growth rate to the 
basic wage increase for both private and public sectors. These labor policies, combined 
with the adoption of lifetime employment and seniority system then emerging in large 
Japanese business organizations coaxed the Japanese labor movement into a cooperative, 
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company-oriented sort (Kamo 1993). The corollary from these organized efforts was the 
aggressive economic developments since the 1960s that the Liberal Democrats - Japan's 
perennial ruling conservative party - and their cozy central bureaus implemented in 
collaboration with the private sector. It was then when the private sector increasingly 
became organized as an interest group (Kamo 1993). The consequent rapid economic 
growth made the labor manageable, the centralized political system strong, and an 
oligarchic relationship between the central administrations, the ruling party politicians 
and the business sector secure in place as the mainstay of the Japanese political system 
(Kamo 1993). 
Kamo (1993) illustrates state developmental ism and oligarchic cliental ism as the 
Japanese political culture through the case of the growth period Osaka. Osaka was one of 
the four Japanese urban areas selected for the sites of national industrial development 
projects during the 1960s. In this selection process, the local bureaucrats in Osaka 
(particularly those of Osaka Prefecture!) played an instrumental role. They successfully 
coordinated the central administrative planning and the business motivation of the local 
private sector to materialize urban industrial development in the area (Kamo 1993). The 
subsequent central-local growth coalition resulted in the construction of a massive oil 
processing and refinery complex on a reclaimed land in Sakai City, Osaka Prefecture. 
The complex was perceived as a promise for jobs in the area and pacified the radicalism 
among the local working class, marginalizing objections against the excess government-
led developmentalism and concerns for the local quality of life (Kamo 1993). Similar 
I Bureaucrats in Japanese prefectures usually have strong relationship with the central ministries. Often, 
prefecture governments and the central ministries exchange personnel for policy coordination and political 
ties. 
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economism at local politics and their desire to link up with the central developmental 
policies strengthened the 1960s onward. As a result, in the 1970s, Zoku politicians 
became powerful national political actors (Kamo 1993). Zoku means tribe in Japanese 
and connotes belongingness and allegiance to certain groups. Thus, the Zoku politicians 
are those who have strong connections with particular central ministries and use these 
connections to deliver central government funds and projects to certain locales and/or 
industries. In return, the Zoku politicians accumulate political power through the political 
loyalty that the beneficiaries of this clientalism guarantee through, for example, local 
elections. In return, the Zoku politicians use the political power to influence as well as 
support central bureaucrats and their policies. Hojokin (special-purpose government 
grants) is the government fund that the Zoku politicians mainly use as the patronage to 
dispense. Kakuei Tanaka, the Prime Minister between 1972 and 1974 arrested in 1976 
and convicted later for a bribery case involving a purchase of passenger airplanes from 
Lockheed Corp, symbolizes the prototype of the Zoku politicians. He represented the 
interest of the Ministry of Construction and channeled disproportionate amounts of public 
investments and projects to his rural precinct region throughout his career. His powerful 
political machine continued to influence the Japanese politics even well after his arrest in 
1976. The reason existed in the fact that the centralized bureaucratic developmentalism 
based on the Japanese oligarchic clientalism continued and Takana kept his influence and 
support for this political system (Kamo 1993). Contemplating on the strong Japanese 
political culture this example demonstrates, Kamo (1993) summarizes the Japanese 
developmentalism with following characteristics: 
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• Even distribution of wealth 
• Efficiency, unity, equity, inclusiveness in policy implementation and governance 
• Corporatism without the working class 
• Concentrated central bureaucratic control 
• Center-local interdependence in the bureaucratic network to allow decentralized 
decision making, particularly for private business decisions 
The clientalistic oligarchy was tolerated to achieve national economic development goals 
these developmentalism characteristics subsume. This indicates that there was strong 
political regulation, including local level regulation, over the system of capital 
accumulation in the Japanese political economy. 
Intergovernmental Relations in Japan 
Researchers debate on the nature of Japanese intergovernmental relations as to 
whether it has a top-down structure or a more politically motivated central-local 
integrated system (Kamo 1993; Muramatsu 1997). This debate is another way to evaluate 
the nature of Japanese political system. lfthe top-down was the character of Japanese 
intergovernmental relations, it would indicate strong national political scale and the local 
are administrative units of the national. On the other hand, if the central-local integrated 
system was the prevailing intergovernmental relations in Japan, then that could prove a 
level oflocal political independency and from-below influence. Before getting into this 
debate, some description about the system oflocal government in Japan is necessary. 
Japan has a three-tier government system. Below the central government are the 
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prefectures as the intermediary level of government, followed by the fundamental units of 
municipalities. There are forty-seven prefectures. The number of municipalities is now 
declining under central government sponsored merger initiatives but it is approximately 
2,400 at the time of this writing. The basis of the current intergovernmental relations 
between the three tiers was formulated during the post second war period although 
reforms since the 1990s have brought new changed in recent years. Prefectures and 
municipalities were given substantial political autonomy with governors and mayors 
publicly elected after the democratization and administrative reforms during the post-war 
period. However, the central government managed to retain substantive control over 
prefectures and municipalities through administrative and fiscal instruments. The 
administrative control was maintained by the "agency delegation" system. Under this 
system, the central government appointed the governors/mayors of prefecture/municipal 
governments as the agencies of the central government to implement major delegated 
functions of the central to these subnational governments. This put prefectures under 
direct control of the central government and municipalities, under prefectures to the 
degree that the publicly elected governors and mayors could be, "in principle, removed 
for non-compliance by central government authorities (Muramatsu, Iqbal and Kume 
2001, p4). Subnational governments were fiscally controlled by the central government. 
Through the allocation tax (national redistributive tax transfer to local governments) and 
grants-in-aid, central government was successful to push to the subnational governments 
centrally devised policies and administrative mandates. In this way, a nested hierarchical 
administrative system had been practically in force until the reforms in the late 1990s. 
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Moving back to the debate on central-local relations, there are two theories to 
support for the top-down interpretation. The first one is called the "Dispersed 
Concentrated System." The main argument states that Japanese administrative 
responsibilities are widely distributed to local governments but the political authority to 
determine the administrative mandates remain at the center (Jinno 1999). The second is 
the "Integrated Concentrated Model," in which the advocates describe that Japanese local 
governments perform subsidiary functions of the national government, which controls the 
decision-makings of the local governments (Nishio 1999). In contrast, Muramatsu, Iqbal 
and Kume (2001) raise a number of factors that indicate the integrated nature of central-
local relations, which are mediated by the actions of politicians in the Japanese political 
system. Their arguments include an observation that local elites in different areas 
compete for larger shares of the central government resources and use their political 
power to negotiate more favorably than others with the central bureaucracy. In so doing, 
local interests represented by their politicians are reflected on the central policy 
decisions. The researchers (2001, pi 0) describe this process with the following example: 
[L]ocal officials would go to Tokyo (the national capital) to persuade the officials 
of the national government to grant special national support to their cause. 
Locally elected parliamentarians and local politicians, along with local public 
officials, went to the LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) headquarters and to the 
ministries of the national government. 
Further, the researchers (2001) add that the rivalry among central ministries also existed 
in competition for local resources. With this, they conclude (2001, p6-7): 
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[A] reciprocal consultation system emerged between locally elected politicians 
and bureaucrats, both at the centre and at the periphery in the process of 
implementing policy decisions ... In Japan it is the mixture of political and 
administrative elements that has contributed to the maintenance of the coherence 
and the integrity ofthe national community. 
With this, they name the Japanese central-local relations as the "Lateral Political 
Competition system," which claims that politicians play the important roles, including a 
local political representation in the Japanese political system, and indicate that the top-
down political control dominated by the central bureaucracy until the mid-1950s had to 
change its nature. Since, the central-local elite clientalism provided the Japanese political 
system with the flexibility to maintain its strong centralized structure relatively crisis free 
in which the central core political regime would implement the state developmental 
policies during the post-war growth era (Kamo 1993). 
Yet, this did not necessarily mean the lateral political competition system was 
democratic. The problem is the tendency of this system toward a single party domination. 
The important intermediary role played by politicians practically means that political 
parties, in practice the LDP given its perennial political control, support and control the 
clientelism describe above (Muramatsu 1994; Murakami 2003). However, the success of 
the clientalistic system deprived local polities of real political options and autonomy 
(Kamo 1993). Under this interdependent central-local administrative-political 
relationship, local polities feel strong incentives to maintain good relationship with the 
central bureaucracy. Since the central ministries and the LDP are paired up for the 
centralized developmentalism, LDP also dominates the local political scene supported by 
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the interest of local economic elites eager to connect to the central ministries. This, in 
turn, forces other several political parties, to coalesce with the LDP and forego the 
prospect of running their own candidates at local elections. This creates an odd but not 
unusual condition of Japanese local elections where all political parties nominate 
common candidates. It is known as the "car pooling election" - a rather pathetic effort by 
non-LDP parties to have, or claim to have, at least some influence to the central 
government policy decisions. 
As the debate over Japanese central-local governmental relations described above 
indicates, the central-local relationship in Japan is not set in stone but has been evolving 
albeit slowly. Muramatsu (1997) demonstrates this by identifying three stages of 
Japanese intergovernmental relations. The first stage is the central bureau domination 
experienced before the birth of a strong conservative party, the Liberal Democrats in 
1955 after the occupation period by the Unites States military had ended. The slogan, 
"catching up with the West" emerged during this period. The second stage is the "local 
regionalization" of the Japanese statist system, where local polities were constrained by 
the strong statist system while they were empowered within the integrated structure to 
assert their interests. This is the condition describe by the Lateral Political Competition 
system above. The last stage is the system currently emerging. The advent of the global 
economic system since the 1980s has been bringing about various contradictions of 
Japanese centralized political system and its scale defined at the national (details in the 
following section). Consequently, a number ofneoliberal political reforms have been 
attempted since the 1980s. Muramatsu (1994) argues that this marks the turning point of 
Japanese political system towards decentralization. The catching up economic 
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development policy for the nation as the state goal became less meaningful. Diversity and 
individuality, rather than equity and unity, were becoming virtues, accepting uneven 
national developments. Apparently, the local political scale and identities have been 
strengthening political significance under the globalizing economy whereas the assertion 
of state interests based on the national scalar identity, once unquestionable, was losing 
credibility. The following section reviews the historic events in the Japanese political 
scene since the 1970s to investigate how this change might have taken place. 
Globalization and Reforms 
The Second Provisional Administration Reform Council 
The Japanese political system described in the above sections was the social filter 
though which the nation absorbed and responded to the large external environmental 
changes arising from globalization. The first of such changes was the Oil Shocks in the 
1970s. Since the mid-1960s, the Japanese government had been accumulating a large 
budget deficit to finance state developmental policies. The two Oil Shocks in the decade 
forced the government to continue to do so to overcome the Oil Shock-induced economic 
recession (Ohtake 1997). This left the government a serious budget deficit by the end of 
the 1970s. When the government attempted to introduce a consumption tax to restore the 
budget balance, the public and business leaders determinedly opposed to the new tax, 
resulting in a defeat of the ruling party in a national election and the resignation of then 
Prime Minister Ohira in 1979. The first major political reform became an important 
political agenda in the early1980s against this background. 
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The issue of fiscal crisis was soon expanded into a structural refonn movement2 
to break the central-local clientelism and centralized, oligarchic political system (Ohtake 
1997). The reason behind this was two-fold: firstly, the Japanese private sector, 
overcoming the Oil Shocks through internal austerity measures, strengthened their belief 
in the market principles whereas, secondly, the political clientelism was persistent, 
protecting loss-making government-controlled corporations, symbolized by the Japan 
Railway System (Ohtake 1999). The Second Provisional Administrative Refonn 
Commission (SP ARC), an independent committee headed by a prime minister-picked 
business leader, led the administrative refonn during the early 1980s. The refonn was set 
to privatize public corporations because, it was considered, these organizations were the 
structural factors through which the clientelism between the central ministries, their Zoku 
MPs (mainly the ruling Liberal Democrat Party (LDP) members) and local 
publiclbusiness interest groups survived and for which government budgets were 
squandered. Another element of this refonn was the ideology of "small government" 
neoliberalism that then Prime Minister Nakasone adopted through the influences of 
Margaret Thatcher in the U.K. and Ronald Regan in the U.S.A. (Ohtake 1997). 
However, this neoliberalism-inspired refonn movement stopped short of making 
structural transfonnations in the Japanese political system as the "bubble economy" in the 
late 1980s grew so extravagant that the increased government revenues paid off the 
budget deficit and made many feel free from the refonn need (ironically, the seed of the 
bubble economy was sowed by the policies implemented by Nakasone himself as 
explained later). In addition, Ohtake (1997) suggests another reason for the failure. 
2 In fact, it was often called a "political and fiscal refonn" (Ohtake 1997). 
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According to him, the Japanese belief in the free market discipline and neoliberalism 
differed from those in "Thatcherism" and "Reganganomics" in that the Japanese 
adoration for a small government was primarily intended to tackle the country's 
persistent political corruptions and clientelism, but not to convert its government into a 
genuine neoliberalism ideologue. In fact, the leaders of SP ARC did not actually forfeit 
the Japanese statism. On the contrary, their ultimate objective from their reform was to 
strengthen the future of Japanese welfare state through a more efficient "small 
government" (Ohtake 1997). The attitude of Japanese public reflected their leaders' 
sentiment. The citizens never seriously considered the option of smaller government with 
smaller public welfare provision (1999 Ohtake). Privatization of major public 
corporations and the setting of spending limits on public projects did take place during 
SP ARC but the oligarchic statist culture and centralized political structure practically 
weathered the reform. 
The Plaza Accord and Political Consequences 
Although the neoliberal ideology, which was spreading through the Western and 
Latin American countries during the 1980s, did not take root in Japanese politics, the 
globalizing economic order, which accompanied the neoliberalism ideology, hit Japan 
squarely. The Japanese political reform efforts in the late 1980s through the early 1990s 
were closely tied to the global economic order, following the Plaza Accord of the G5 
Meeting in 1985. Since the meeting, the international league of elite nations urged Japan 
to contribute to the global economic growth by reducing its trade surplus, especially 
against the United States, and expanding domestic demand to weaken its export reliance. 
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This is the second of the globalization-induced external environmental changes that 
eventually affected the structure of Japanese political system. The Japanese yen 
immediately soared after the accord. The Nakasone Administration, the avowed advocate 
of the SP ARC reform, needed to expand the domestic demand to compensate the 
industries for their suffering from the expensive Japanese currency as well as to absorb 
US trade deficits. His strategy was the mixture of a nation-wide land redevelopment plan 
and the introduction of private sector incentives for it. With this idea, Nakasone compiled 
the Fourth National Comprehensive Development Plan in 1987. This general plan 
included the Urban Redevelopment Policy (a.k.a. Urban Renaissance), which in practice 
concentrated on the redevelopment of Tokyo (Murakami 2003). 
These expansionary, deregulatory and Tokyo-oriented policies set off an almost 
euphoric economic boom in Japan through 1987 and 1988. This boom - the bubble 
economy - sapped the thrust for the political reform as mentioned earlier but set off two 
more important events: intensification of the "Tokyo monocentric concentration" 
problems (details in the following sections) and the return of corruption to the Japanese 
political system. A chain of bribery scandals came to surface between 1988 and 1992. 
The involved were then Prime Minister Takeshita, the deputy leader of the ruling Liberal 
Democratic party, an upper house representative, a top-ranking bureaucrat, two 
governors, and a mayor. These two apparently separate developments intersected at a 
point. Vigorous debates about these problems accused the Japanese political system of 
the cause of the two evils, concentrating political power and economic wealth in Tokyo. 
These debates led to another round of reform recommendations (Murakami 2003). 
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The Third Administrative Reform Promotion Councils 
After the above political developments, politicians proposing political 
decentralization as the solution to the corruption-prone political system and the economic 
polarization gained the upper hand in the early 1990s. Their explanations included that 
decentralized local governments would break the iron triangle between the bureaucracy, 
politicians and the businesses in the center-local relationship by doing away with the 
oligarchy's life blood, the central grant system. Furthermore, local independency would 
foster initiatives for local economic development and reduce the culture of dependency 
on the center - another cause of Japanese clientelism. At the same time, local economic 
development based on decentralization was expected to solve Japan's economic trade 
surplus by expanding domestic demands. This was strategically important for the central 
policy makers because Japan's market liberalization and domestic market expansion 
remained crucial under the persistent US pressure since the Plaza Accord. Finally, local 
development would alleviate the problem of the "Tokyo mono centric concentration," 
which included the twin troubles of the excessive economic concentration in Tokyo 
creating economic weakness in rural areas and exorbitant land price and housing costs in 
the capital. Both of these problems were considered factors curtailing Japanese domestic 
demand expansion (Murakami 2003). 
The central figure supporting this decentralization was Morihiro Hosokawa, a 
former Governor of Kumamoto Prefecture and the Prime Minister between 1993 and 
1994. He was also an influential figure in the Third Administrative Reform Promotion 
Councils (1990 - 1993). To become a responsible and contributing partner in the global 
economy, Japan must have strong local governments - this was the rhetoric on which the 
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reform council recommended government rescaling, political decentralization and market 
liberalization policy recommendations (Murakami 2003). The rationale for the 
connection between domestic demand expansion and political decentralization stemmed 
from the belief that the export-oriented economy and the Japanese centralized political 
system fed each other (Murakami 2003). Hosokawa and other reformers argued that the 
central bureaucrats and the business headquarters in Tokyo on the one hand and other 
local regions and their rural economies on the other created the dependency of the latter 
on the former through political clientelism. Consequently, without political 
independence, the local regions would never try to be economically self-sufficient and 
stay poor. This, in turn, would motivate the large businesses in Tokyo to cultivate export 
markets for demands. With this conjecture, the reformers pressed for a shift from the 
centralized to a neoliberal decentralized government system suitable for the globalizing 
economy with highly political motivations, including, to break the centralized oligarchy, 
to respond to the American political pressure for domestic demand expansion and to 
counter the soaring Japanese currency, which was diminishing Japan's export industries 
(Ohtake 1999). Coincidentally, the first Gulf War broke out in 1990. Japan was soon 
challenged by the international community for its global security roles. Taking this also 
into consideration, the Administrative Reform Promotion Councils recommended the 
devolution of domestic administrative responsibilities to local governments so that the 
central government could concentrate on the functions purely of national and 
international significance (Murakami 2003). 
Although many factors appeared to have worked for the decentralization reforms 
in this way during this period, the most notable force was the bottom-up political 
89 
pressures mustered by subnational government leaders, particularly by governors. The 
phenomenon of Tokyo monocentric concentration was a strong urge for them to demand 
local political power and autonomy. The entrepreneurial "new wave" governors and 
neoliberal devolutionalists emerging at this period, including well-known globalist 
Kenichi Ohmae spearheaded the campaigns for higher local autonomy (Murakami 2003). 
This contrasts to the Second Provisional Administrative Reform Council, where reform 
proposals were made top-down for administrative efficiency and fiscal austerity, not 
decentralization, both at the central and local governments. 
Decentralization Reform in the1990s 
Many of the decentralization policy recommendations made by the reform 
councils by the early 1990s in fact did not materialize. Powerful interest groups well-
connection to the central ministries effectively wrecked the enactment of the policy 
recommendations (Kamo 1993). Nevertheless, the political momentum for 
decentralization carried by the leaders of local governments and some business sectors 
(particularly those in Osaka area) did not disappear (Nishio 1999). To prove, in 1993, the 
Resolution for the Promotion of Political Decentralization in both Upper and Lower 
Houses was passed with full bipartisan supports - an remarkable feat considering the 
diversity of Japanese political parties ranging from the LDP to the Japan Community 
Party. Given this, the Third Administrative Reform Promotion Councils presented the 
Framework for Decentralization Promotion. In September 1994, the coalition of six local 
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government organizations3 jointly published a recommendation report for 
decentralization refonn. Separately, the 24th Local Administrative System Research 
Committee - a prime-minister sponsored special committee submitted their version of 
decentralization recommendations in November 1994, reflecting on what the leaders of 
Japanese subnational government leaders had to say about decentralization (Kamo 1995). 
These two decentralization recommendations proposed, among other things, the creating 
of a special task force committee that would detennine the details of the tenns of actual 
decentralization procedures and the contents of the refonn legislation bills. The task force 
would also function as the negotiation mediator between the central ministries and local 
government leaders. At the same time, the two recommendations constituted the basis on 
which later negotiations on the tenns of decentralization refonns were made (Takagi 
1999). In 1995, the Diet passed the Decentralization Promotion Law, which mandated the 
setting up of an independent decentralization promotion committee as proposed by the 
two recommendations. In due course, the Decentralization Promotion Committee was set 
up and played the crucial role in the subsequent passage of the Comprehensive 
Decentralization Promotion Law in 1999. The committee leaders, who were business 
leaders and academics, in practice functioned as if they were the legal councils of local 
governments. They made negotiations strategically to extract agreements and 
compromises from the powerful central bureaus on behalf of the local interests for 
decentralization (Nishio 1999). 
The achievement of the Comprehensive Decentralization Promotion Law 
considered most remarkable is the abolition of the agency delegation system between the 
3 The six organizations include an association for each of governors, mayors and the mayors of small 
municipalities, prefecture councils, city councils and the councils of small municipalities. 
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central government and the local governments. By the abolition, local governments were 
supposed to have gained administrative autonomy independent of the central government 
to make the intergovernmental relations even-grounded rather than hierarchical. The 
equivocality stems from the replacement of the agency delegation tasks with newly 
established "legal commission" tasks, which requires local governments to deliver public 
services regulated by the central administration (Kaneko 1999). More contentious was the 
fiscal autonomy of the local governments. Generally, Japanese local government has 
been financing only thirty percent of their total budget. The central government financed 
the seventy percent ofthe services local governments deliver, over which the local 
governments did not have discretion. Fiscal decentralization reforms are comprised of 
three elements: the abolition of central grant system, transfer of decision-making 
authority and the transfer of tax resources from the center to local. Political debate has 
been intense during the last half of the 2004 for the reform of these three elements, 
largely known as the Trinity of Fiscal Reform in Japan. In December 2004, an agreement 
was struck to implement the Trinity Reform but the contents of the agreement were 
watered down from the original goals. Another important development in Japan's recent 
government structural reforms is the review of the local government system itself. In 
2003, the 27th Local Administrative System Research Committee recommended a new 
block system of local governance structure. If implemented, the current forty-seven 
prefectures will be reduced to a smaller number of larger subnational political units. The 
details of this new block system are currently being discussed by the 28th Local 
Administrative System Research Committee. Once these recommendations were enacted 
into a law, large changes in the Japanese intergovernmental relations would be inevitable. 
92 
Urban Consequences of the Reforms 
The Tokyo Problem and the Capital Relocation Agenda 
The above sections explained that the Tokyo problems stemming from the Tokyo 
monocentric concentration was a main factor among the reasons motivating the 
government decentralization reforms in the early 1990s. Tokyo dwarfs the rest of Japan 
and, as the national capital, Tokyo and the central government have strong linkages in 
their histories of development. Once this fact was taken into account, we could observe a 
picture of Tokyo versus other local interests in the decentralization reform efforts of the 
early 1990s. There are a number of examples that can attest the contributions the central 
government policies made to the Tokyo monocentric concentration. The Fourth National 
Comprehensive Development Plan announced in 1987 included the Urban 
Redevelopment Policy (a.k.a. Urban Renaissance) targeted at the concentrated 
redevelopment of Tokyo (Murakami 2003). The urban policy's main plan was to develop 
Tokyo into the world city of Japan (Kamo 1993). The government's rationale was 
efficiency: it makes more strategic sense to concentrate global finance and information 
management functions in one central location and redistribute the wealth across the 
nation than spreading out functions over the country (Kamo 1993). The "world city 
Tokyo" was already under government plan since the late-1980s largely at the cost of the 
second economic zone, OsakaiKansai region4 • Kamo (1995) accuses the Second 
Provisional Administration Reform Councils (SP ARC) of the power concentration in 
Tokyo and ensuing monocentric concentration. According to him, the SPARC reform 
was a Thatcher-style top-down privatization combined with the centralization of political 
4 Kansai is the name of a region including major cities Osaka, Kyoto and Kobe and their surrounding areas. 
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control. The refonn's privatization policies created new business opportunities but 
business leaders needed to have access to the core political network to receive 
infonnation for the new business opportunities. Since such political network is infonnal 
in nature, face-to-face interaction became essential for the access. This brought up further 
business and political concentrations in Tokyo. The consequent power concentration even 
necessitated local governments to have their own satellite offices in Tokyo (Kamo 1995). 
With fonnal and infonnal power structures building up in Tokyo, the Tokyo monocentric 
concentration was inevitable as far as the capital existed there under the centralized 
Japanese political system. Ironically, the high concentration of business and political 
activities turned to be Tokyo's weakness by raising its land values to the extreme. 
Businesses started to leave Tokyo to avoid its very expensive rents, foreign companies 
started to find investments in Tokyo unattractive and married couples started to hesitate 
to rear children because of expensive housing and long commuting. 
The relocation of capital became an important national political agenda against 
this background during the 1980s. It was SPARC after the Fourth National 
Comprehensive Development Plan announced in 1987 that made an official idea of the 
capital relocation a political agenda during the 1980s (Osaka 2002). In 1992, Japanese 
lawmakers passed the "Law for the Relocation of the Diet" to start the legal ground work 
for the relocation. The end of the growth era Japan reached in the late 1980s did not 
alleviate the Tokyo concentration trend. On the contrary, the post-bubble economy of the 
1990s worsened the concentration. The cause is structural: the economic recession after 
the bubble burst caused plummeting domestic demand, which furthered export reliance of 
Japanese industries. This triggered retaliatory appreciation of the yen instigated by the 
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United States. This forced Japanese businesses to start shifting their production capacities 
to cheap labor countries and/or to the US to hedge the exchange rate. The consequences 
have been the increase in the central research and development functions in Tokyo and 
the disappearance of the production facilities in other regions (Murakami 2003). Thus, 
the need for capital relocation appeared more important and urgent. Despite this, the 
central government reversed its policy and made decisions to concentrate developments 
in Tokyo once more to increase its competitiveness since the late 1990s. A serious 
setback to the capital relocation agenda came from the policy change to prioritize the 
fiscal structure reform that were dealing with the nation's deep fiscal problems since the 
late 1990s. The fiscal crisis was a result from the post-bubble economy recession and the 
failure of massive public spending packages formulated by the prime minister Obuchi 
and his treasury minister Miyazawa to pull the economy out of the recession. In 1997, a 
policy committee comprising of the ruling party's senior members recommended to 
restore the messy fiscal structure first before dealing with the capital relocation. This set 
the fate of the capital relocation agenda thereafter (Osaka 2002). 
In the year 2000, another turn took place in the capital relocation argument. 
Researcher Osaka (2002, p233) reports in his book that then minister of the national land 
agency expressed a virtual opposition to the relocation agenda in July by stating, "It is not 
a capital unless (it is where) the politics and economy integrate. The budget that would be 
spent to the relocation should be spent on Tokyo" (translation from Japanese by this 
author). In an apparent orchestrated move, other powerful ruling party members echoed 
the comment, suggesting the redevelopment of Tokyo while then prime minister, Mori 
indicated the revision ofthe relocation agenda (Osaka 2002). The same minister of the 
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national land agency confirmed her comment in November the same year by mentioning, 
"In the current situation, under the current internationalization, the division between 
politics and economy is not something Japan should pursue," Osaka (2002, p241: 
translation from Japanese by this author) again reports, to explain the global competition 
as a rationale for the government's renewed Tokyo centered policy. Behind this comment 
was a political judgment. Osaka (2002) explains that the ruling party's defeat in the June 
2000 upper house election was caused by the urban populations unhappy about the large 
public spending the Obuchi administration had made in rural areas to stimulate the 
declining economy. After this acknowledgement, the ruling conservative party leaders 
reverted to the fiscal restructuring policies and to the neoliberal "small government" 
ideology popular during the SP ARC reform in the 1980s while the capital relocation was 
labeled as a symbol of the "old-style, big spending politics by the clientalistic politicians" 
(Osaka 2002). This policy change indicates the shift in the scale of political ideology 
from national to urban, as the following sections explain. 
The Economic Strategy Conftrence and the Urban Renaissance Headquarters 
The recoiling from the capital relocation agenda by the ruling Liberal Democratic 
Party leaders was based on the recommendations made by a government sponsored 
special policy study commission, the Economic Strategic Conference (ESC) convened 
between 1998 and 1999. The policy plans presented by this commission bear crucial 
influence to the current urban developments and government rescaling. 
ESC is a brainchild of Prime Minister Obuchi who took office in the middle of 
deepening recession in 1998. The objective of ESC was to lay down long-term, medium-
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tenn and short-tenn strategic action plans to rescue the nation from its deep economic 
problems that even worsened as the 1990s proceeded (Igarashi and Ogawa 2003, p44-45). 
ESC's final report identifies five broad strategic areas to achieve much needed economic 
recovery, including 1) the scenario for economic recovery and a road map towards 
financial sustainability: planning towards a "small government" for better fiscal control, 
2) The development of healthy and creative competitive society and the establishment of 
social safety net: planning for local government self-reliance and free market principles 
to reward individual efforts, 3) the compete settlement of the Bubble economy problems 
and the establishment of the "21 st century type financial system": planning to enhance the 
liquidity of real estate assets to establish an efficient new financial system, 4) The 
establishment of vital and internationally competitive industries: planning to establish an 
institutional support system to encourage the development of competitive industries, and 
finally 5) the strategic infrastructure building and regional approach for revitalization: 
planning for comprehensive regional development approach through urban regeneration, 
environmental improvements, advanced infonnation infrastructure, educationlhuman 
resource development, social welfare and better housing (ESC 1999). 
The enhancement of liquidity in real estate assets is placed as the vital policy in 
the final report to rejuvenate Japanese economy. The depression of the 1990s pushed the 
land market so low that the suffering banking sector was strapped with their 
unmarketable collateral properties to bad loans. The plan aims at not only enhancing 
confidence in the Japanese banking sector but also establishing a better financial system 
that would reactivate real estate transactions and cash flow. Urban redevelopment is 
considered the stimulus to put the real estate economy back into gear. The report explains 
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(ESC 1999, no page number is given: author's translation from Japanese): "the important 
thing is to sell or convert inert real estate assets into profitable uses to produce cash 
flow ... to this end, making large-scale, comprehensive schemes is most crucial. That is, 
we strategically develop new regulations and environmental conditions that 
fundamentally restructure Japan's urban forms and promote further urban 
redevelopments to enhance the liquidity of real estate and profitable land uses." 
Cities are considered of long-term strategic importance for the economic 
recovery. The report points out the need for global competitiveness for Japanese cities 
and recommends a shift in policy from "controlling urbanization" to "inducing urban 
agglomeration" to produce multi-functional cities, including work, dwelling, play, child 
rearing, education and medical services. To realize this objective, the report makes a 
number of recommendations. Firstly, it says, "upon the recognition that cities are the 
basis of the national economy, we consider urban redevelopment policy as a nation-wide 
state strategy" (Ibid.). Measures for natural disasters, such as earthquake, and for better 
traffic and shorter communing are listed as the second and third recommendations. 
Fourthly, it recommends the "future city pilot project," which will be implemented by a 
national-level advisory board. The board is expected to "materialize multi-purpose, large-
capacity and high-rise buildings and to develop comprehensive implementation plans for 
those projects by revising related laws and using the powerful leadership of the state" 
(Ibid.). Fifthly, it recommends around-the-clock airport operation, particularly for the 
capital region area. Lastly, it recommends the construction of under-ground tunnels to 
burry electricity lines to improve the aesthetics of the nation's cities. 
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These are the strategic directions towards which another prime-minister advisory 
committee was called for to devise new national urban redevelopment strategies. As the 
following section describes, Tokyo was heavily favored for the implementations of urban 
redevelopment strategies. 
The Urban Regeneration Headquarters 
The Urban Regeneration Headquarters (URH) was established in 2001, following 
the recommendations from ESC. It is important to note that Prime Minister Obuchi did 
not try to implement the recommendations from ESC immediately. Instead, he and his 
treasury minister Miyazawa first opted for the traditional Keynesian strategy of public 
work spendings throughout the country to stimulate the economy. Despite its huge scale, 
it failed. Meanwhile, Japan's most powerful economic interest organization, Nippon 
Keidanren prodded the prime minister to work on urban redevelopment following the 
ESC recommendations (Igarashi and Ogawa 2003). Apparently, the influential economic 
interest group persuaded the government; Obuchi convened two committees, one for the 
Tokyo area and the other for the Osaka area in 2000. These two Urban Renaissance 
Roundtable Committees, comprised of local government leaders, intellectuals and 
business group representatives and real estate interests, recommended urban development 
plans. In the following year, the plans presented by the roundtable committees started. 
The newly-elected Prime Minister Koizumi announced in his inauguration speech, 
Igarashi and Ogawa (2003, p44-45: translated from Japanese by this author) reports in 
their book, "we will raise the international competitiveness and attractiveness of our 
cities through urban regeneration and flow of land (through developments and more land 
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transactions). To this end, we will soon set up 'the Urban Regeneration Headquarters 
(URH),' with myself becoming the director." 
The objectives of this new government agency include, "to direct the public 
sector's capital and expertise to our cities, particularly to large metropolitan areas such as 
Tokyo and Osaka" and "to create world cities internationally competitive and to develop 
safe, attractive, sustainable and nature-friendly cities" (URH 2001). The discernable 
common ideas running through ESC, Urban Renaissance Roundtable Committees and 
URH include, that the government should deal with the prolonged economic crisis in the 
contexts of the global economic competition and Japan's economic structural reform; that 
neoliberal structural changes, including devolution for local initiatives and privatization 
for increased private sector involvements, are essential; and that urban redevelopments, 
particularly in Tokyo and Osaka, link these two strategies. 
The first and second rounds of urban regeneration projects adopted by URH 
concentrated in Tokyo, including a Tokyo Bay area restoration, the Haneda Airport 
expansion, and the construction of three loop bypasses in the capital region, all of which 
had already been planned by Tokyo Metropolitan Government (TMG). As Chapter 5 
reveals, TMG and its governor had the leadership for the redevelopment plans in the 
region that URH proposed as national projects. These facts illuminate the political 
economy formulated through the coalition of the central leaders and TMG and its scalar 
understanding of Japanese state interest. In contrast to the Obuchi administration's 
nation-wide (or country-wide) state development approach it first tried, the current 
administration prioritizes the urban regions, particularly Tokyo for economic 
development for the entire state. This ideological shift seriously undermined the viability 
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of the capital relocation agenda, the ideal of which declared the need to break the Tokyo 
monocentric concentration of politics and economy and the introduction of new political 
culture for decentralized nation-wide development. It is an indication, at least at one level 
in the current Japanese politics, that the urban is replacing the national as the 
interpretation of the state interest. It is true that this was not the first time that the central 
government implemented strategic urban-centered development. In fact, that is exactly 
what the post-war central economic development policies did as described in the 
beginning of this chapter. The Tokyo-centered developmental state had long been the 
model (Hill and Fujita 1995) by which the state was geared towards national growth 
while Tokyo become the economical, social and cultural center of the nation (Fujimoto 
1992; Sakaiya 1992). Despite this urban concentration, Japan's clientalistic central-local 
interactions maintained the nation-wide concept of state identity and scale for even 
standard of living. The "Lateral Political Competition system" (Muramatsu 1997), in 
which politicians mediated the tension between the central-local relations by representing 
local interests, provided political stability needed for national economic growth (Kamo 
1993). Now this nation-wide developmental system is being challenged along with the 
scalar definition of the state in a way different from the decentralization movements until 
early 1990s. The decentralization promoted during the Third Administrative Reform 
Promotion Councils in the early 1990s was a bottom-up demand for local political 
independence against the excessive Tokyo mono centric concentration. It was a local 
political determination movement mainly supported by prefecture governors who became 
increasingly entrepreneurial and discontent with the political nature of the clientalistic 
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urban-rural adjustment system. Their cause is still strong currently demanding fiscal 
decentralization reforms against the central ministries. 
Thus, a complicated picture illustrates the decentralization and political rescaling 
movements taking place now in Japan. On the one hand, there is a strong urban ideology 
supported by business leaders, the current Prime Minister Koizumi and urban elites, 
notably Tokyo's, towards neoliberal reforms of devolution and marketization. On the 
other, there is a localism demanded by subnational political leaders, particularly 
prefecture governors, towards decentralization and local autonomy. The difference can be 
subtle: the former emphasizes the market and tries to stimulate the economy through 
Tokyo's redevelopment. The national bind of redistributive welfare state will be 
loosened. The latter is more idealistic with fervor for local sovereignty and 
democratization but the premise of national redistributive network is subsumed. Yet, 
these ideas are rife with confusions, opaqueness and even disagreements surfacing within 
each camp. Sometimes, the interests of these two sides overlap against, for example, the 
central ministries staunchly resisting relinquishing power. But other times, there is a 
conflict of interests between the two along the urban-versus-rural spectrum; often this 
means Tokyo versus the others. Presently, these two geographically-determined and 
economically-motivated ideological groups opportunistically cooperate against the 
central bureaucrats. For example, the governor ofTMG Ishihara regularly attacks the 
central government to demand more local autonomy as a local government leader and a 
member of the governors' association but he has a strong urban-centered nationalism 
agenda (details will be in Chapter V). Other governors, particularly those of rural regions, 
are wary of strong neoliberalism that would make Tokyo the single winner. It seems to 
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me that as an island country with a history of isolationism and imperial nationalism, the 
scale of state has been taken for granted at the national level for long in Japan. But now, 
under direct and indirect influences of globalization, the nation-state finds its idea of 
political scale in turmoil. 
Tokyo and Osaka 
The sections so far extended in this chapter can testify through the experience of 
Japan that central government policies, such as economic development and political 
reforms create direct and indirect influences on the country's cities and regions. In this 
section, to continue this observation and to prepare for the comparative urban case study 
that follows this chapter, I will briefly describe the influences of Japanese state policies to 
two Japanese metropolises, Tokyo and Osaka. 
Tokyo is the capital of Japan. Its Tokyo Metropolitan Government (TMG) is the 
nation's only metropolitan incorporation. Osaka is Japan's second urban economy. The 
city of Osaka is the capital of Osaka Prefecture, making up approximately thirty percent 
of the prefecture population. These metropolitan areas combinedly make up about 17% of 
Japanese total population. When their entire city-regions are added together, this 
proportion will increase to more than forty percent. Both areas are considered world cities 
in the roaster of world cities by Beaverstock, Smith, and Taylor (1999), with Tokyo 
among the top-tier Alfa world cities while Osaka, a third-tier Gamma world city. Since 
TMG is an equivalent of a prefecture in the Japanese intergovernmental relations, Osaka 
Prefecture will be the better counter part than Osaka City for many comparisons. 
Chapters V and VI include further descriptions about these two metropolises. 
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Tokyo is Japan's flagship. A system of economic and political inter-dependency 
has been in operation between the city and the state. For example, during the post-war 
growth era, the central government hosted the Olympic Games in Tokyo with 
concentrated urban development investments to project Japan's modern state status to 
Japanese citizens internally as well as to the world community externally. In recent years, 
the national government developed Tokyo into a world city (Hill and Kim 2000). Under 
the global competition, the mutual dependence between the central government and the 
capital intensified (Saito 2003). In contrast, the lack of likewise central government 
attention affected Osaka to decline its relative status vis-a-vis Tokyo despite the fact that 
Osaka was superior to Tokyo early in the twentieth century (Hill and Fujita 1995; Kamo 
2000). The central government privileged Tokyo as its capital region over Osaka for 
urban development. It has been directly involved in the planning and investments of 
Tokyo but preferred to apply a public-private partnership formula to Osaka. Two 
international airports constructed in these two areas exemplify this difference (details will 
be discussed in Chapters in V and VI). The central government policies also produced 
differences in the local institutional structures of these cities, which, in turn, have led the 
two economies to diverging paths. Japan's then imperial government forced the merger 
between Tokyo City and Tokyo Prefecture as a part of war effort in 1943. This 
subsequently advantaged Tokyo's regional planning capability and development (Kamo 
1999). In the Osaka area, on the other hand, Osaka Prefecture and Osaka City have had 
very contentious relationship, particularly after the central government having granted 
Osaka City a special city status with a rivaling political status to Osaka Prefecture. The 
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contentious relationship between Osaka City and Prefecture has haunted them for 
difficulty in regional coordination and development (Kamo 2000). 
However, the differences of the central government's involvements in these two 
city-regions do not entirely account for the growth gap between Tokyo and Osaka. 
Globalization has been amplifying the economic structural differences between the two 
metropolitan economies. Kamo (2000) contrasts Tokyo and Osaka by using a two 
dimensional model of globalization, including the global competitiveness measured by 
industrial product transactions and by financial transactions. According to these 
measurements, Tokyo has both the better-constructed industrial and financial structures 
than Osaka. This naturally means that Tokyo has the capacity to successfully compete in 
the global marketplace whereas Osaka will have much harder time. With only two and 
half hours away by the bullet trains, the global economic networks would easily place 
Osaka under Tokyo's massive economic infrastructure. This is an important factor to 
explain recent growth difference between the two urban economies although the central 
government policies have affected the development patterns through policies and 
investments they implemented in the earlier years. Just two examples of such earlier 
policies are the location of industrial association headquarters and mass media 
regulations (Sakaiya 1992). Publicly directed industrial developments were central to the 
state economic policies and to the central ministries. In this policy, one of the many 
regulations the central bureaucrats laid down was to have the headquarters of various 
industrial associations located in Tokyo to direct and regulate the industries. This caused 
many businesses to relocate their headquarters to Tokyo. Similarly, the central 
bureaucracy supervises broadcasting and publication industries. The regulations stipulate 
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that only broadcast stations based in Tokyo can make programming for the nation-wide 
broadcasting. Similarly, publications that will be sold across prefecture borders are 
regulated to use Tokyo-based distribution companies to make the cross-border shipping 
regardless of the original publication prefectures. This required unnecessary 
transshipment for local publishers and caused virtual disappearance except for those in 
Tokyo (Sakaiya 1992). In this way, Japanese central government has had a diverse range 
impacts to assist the development of Tokyo at the cost of other areas (Fujimoto 1992), 
notably at the cost of the former largest economy Osaka (Hill and Fujita 1995). 
Yet, local governments can respond. Osaka has been making efforts economically 
and politically. Economically, for example, Osaka's decline in status motivates the city to 
strengthen its ties with Chinese and Korean cities (Hill and Fujita 1998; Kamo 2000). 
Politically, regional development planning has been repeatedly tried in Osaka. For 
example, in the 1960s, the Council for Promoting the Development of Kinki5 (CPDK) 
was established. Kansai Economic Federation and Osaka Prefecture, backed by National 
Land Agency, produced a regionalism plan for the Kinki-Kansai area in the early 1980s. 
In 1987, the initiative resulted in an ambitious long-term regional development plan, the 
"Subaru Plan" with a planning body called, Creating New Kinki Committee. In 1998, the 
Kansai Economic Federation and other four economic associations (Osaka Chamber of 
Commerce, Kansai Economic Fraternity Association, Osaka Manufacturers Association, 
and Kansai Corporate Managers Council) created Kansai Council, combining the CPDK, 
the Subaru Plan Committee and other regional associations. The council is a region-wide 
public/private consortium, having a comprehensive research, planning, project-
5 "Kinki" is a name for a region including the major cites of Osaka, Kyoto and Kobe and their surrounding 
prefectures. 
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promotion, coordination and consensus-building functions (Kamo 1999). However, the 
outcomes of these initiatives have been mixed at best for various reasons, including 
within region rivalries: the two major metropolises in the region, Kobe City and Kyoto 
City insisted on their own interests while Osaka City and Osaka Prefecture failed to 
cooperate each other. Another adversary came from the post-bubble recession hitting 
hard on the Osaka area. Despite these setbacks, Osaka area's political and economic 
elites are set to continue attempting regionalism in response to the Tokyo-centered state 
economic developments described in the above sections. Having observed many Osaka-
based business organizations moving their headquarters to Tokyo, leaders in Osaka are 
acutely aware of a zero-sum relationship existing between their economy and that of 
Tokyo (details will be added in Chapter VI). Thus, it can be argued that Osaka's regional 
development initiatives in fact reflect the central government's Tokyo-centered neoliberal 
economic development policies. They implicate the reactions of the remaining areas in 
Japan to the market-based Tokyo-centered state development. 
These experiences of Japan's central development policy and local reactions can 
be reframed in reference to some of the theoretical perspectives reviewed in Chapter II. 
The latest Tokyo-oriented state developmentalism for global competitiveness fits the 
concepts of the new politics of scale and denationalization (Brenner 1999; 2000; Jessop 
2000; MacLeod and Goodwin 1999; Swyngedouw 1997). The Japanese central 
government has essentially submitted to the market forces and the post-bubble economy 
aftermath to adopt neoliberalism for policy directions. The state is "deterritorializing" the 
national scale through devolution without comparable financial transfer while 
"reterritorializing" to make concentrated urban investments in Tokyo to compete in the 
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globalized economy. Meanwhile, actors in the Osaka/Kansai region have attempted 
regionalism to secure its economic status in response to the central government's new 
politics of scale as much as to the global economic competition. It is an example of the 
new localism in that local governments seek development opportunities in the changing 
intergovernmental relations under the global economy (Goetz and Clarke 1993; Clarke 
and Gaile 1998). Although strong regionalism is hard to come by because of competing 
local interests and ideological goals, out of this political struggle can emerge a new idea 
about locality political independence as locational "agency" (Cox and Mair 1991) for 
potential local state building as Keil (2003) claims. TMG and interest groups in Tokyo 
have in fact been active to press the central government for the political rescaling toward 
Tokyo-centered state building while the leaders of the rest, including the Osaka area 
campaign strongly for rescaling toward autonomy and fiscal independence while tacitly 
requiring a safety net of the national scale statehood. These political negotiations 
represent the "scale division of labor" and "politics of scale" Cox (2002a; 2002b) 
explains. 
The quote by Hill and Fujita (2000, p686) at the very beginning of this chapter 
explains Japan's national solidarity in the international hierarchical competition. The 
historical accounts of economic development policies under the Japanese political system 
that follow the quote prove the point raised by Hill and Fujita. However, does their case 
still hold in the face of latest urban-oriented state rescaling and neoliberal devolution 
explained in this chapter? The hierarchically nested nature of Japanese society between 
the national, regional/prefecture, and local/municipal appear in transition. The structure 
of the nests and the pattern of integration between them appear changing. In fact, Hill and 
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Fujita (1995) themselves see potentials for disintegration in the national class solidarity 
as a result of Tokyo-centered state developmentalism. Osakans generally agree that their 
opinion, "Tokyo's functional primacy is the spatial creature of Japan's developmental 
state" (Hill and Fujita 1995, p191) whereas, in the capital region: 
Tokyo's administrative and fiscal power sets Kanto's6 political culture and 
state/economy relations off from outlying regions. Because they live in the 
capital, Tokyoites extend their identification with their locality to the nation as a 
whole. People living elsewhere in Japan have more distinct regional identities 
(Hill and Fujita 1995, pI91). 
The above brief comparison between Tokyo and Osaka in this section indicates that a 
comparative investigation of these two Japanese world cities and their relations to the 
central government can provide important about the changing nature of political economy 
and scale division of labor in Japan under globalization. Given this, now this study will 
turn to detailed analyses oflocal politics and regionalism in Tokyo and Osaka in the 
following chapters towards this goal. 
6 Kanto is the name of region including Tokyo and its neighboring areas. It is the counter part of Kansai. 
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CHAPTER V 
REGIONALISM IN TOKYO: CUTTING OUT THE "CAPITAL REGION" 
Overview 
This chapter analyzes the nature of regionalism in the Tokyo area by following 
the format of the logic diagram explained in the methodology chapter. This includes the 
deconstruction of the process of regionalism development in the capital region7 by the 
open coding categories: structural forces, local institutions, urban politics, politics of 
scale, discourse of place-making and conditions of regionalism. As a summary, the 
following Figure 5-1 depicts the result of these analyses. The interpretation of this 
diagram will be made as the story of regionalism in Tokyo at the end of this chapter. 
7 Capital region includes a combination ofTMG, Chiba Prefecture, Kanagawa Prefecture, Saitama 
Prefecture. This region contains major cities such as Yokohama, Kawasaki, Saitama and Chiba. Both the 






Local Institutions: Logic Diagram for 
Regionalism: • Tokyo overwhelms the neighboring polities though its economic might 
Tokyo • Cautious cooperation between Tokyo and its neighbors 
• With economic centrality, TMG takes the political leadership in the region. 
• Strategic identity as the state economic champion defines the common 
interest and the basis of the regional cooperation 
Structural Forces: 
• The end of "upward-slope 
economy" era and economic 
crisis 
• Loss of confidence in the 
Japanese political system and its 
policy effectiveness 
• Tokyo as the site and tool to ~ 
solve the national economic crisis 
as a part of strategic policy 
reform 
• Anti-Tokyo monocentric 
concentration and support for the 
capital function relocation 
agenda 
• The steady progress towards 
political decentralization reform 
.. 
Politics of Scale: 
• The regionalism advocated 
by the Capital Region 
Summit stood on the existing 
scale of local government 
system. 
• The core alliance of 
LDP/economic elite/TMG ~ 
implemented politics of scale 
by which the ideology of 
global-urban competitive 
nexus replaced the national 
scale state developmentalism 
• Decentralization and 




Discourse of Place-making: 
• TMG implements strategic 
discourse to re-identify 
Tokyo as the engine of 
Japanese economy by 
positioning it in the scale 
of global competition. 
• With this, a functional ~ 
urban region is demarcated 
for the place of the Capital 
Region, including only 
urbanized parts of the 





• A league of governors/mayors forms a loose coalition for urban functional 
planning and regional political goals against the central government 
• The core political-economic alliance functions through LDP to determine major 
urban policies of region allna tiona I influence in Tokvo. 
Conditions of 
regionalism: 
• Functional regional 
planning and 
development is the 





between the central 
and TMG. 
• Regionalism as 
voluntary cooperation 
between local 
governments is still 
tentative. 
Conditions of Regionalism in Tokyo 
Tokyo dominates neighboring local governments in the Tokyo region. This fact 
influences the nature of regionalism in this area. It is not so much Tokyo muscles 
agreements from its neighboring governments as its policies have regional significance 
whereby the neighbors are better off if they opportunistically accommodate Tokyo's 
intensions. With this domination, TMG politically pursues the statuses of Japan's 
economic engine and world city in the global marketplace. Regional planning is essential 
for the twin ambitions, requiring cooperation of the central government as well as from 
its neighbors. TMG manages to get both. 
Two kinds of regionalism exist in the Tokyo area. These two are formulated by 
two different political arenas and two different coalitions of elites: a league of local 
government leaders and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. In both arenas, TMG stands 
at the crossroad of economic capacity and political power. From this driving seat, TMG 
successfully establishes strategic connections between Tokyo's regional urban 
redevelopment and the revitalization of depressed Japanese economy. The means is a 
politics of scale. TMG convinces the central government as well as neighboring local 
governments to accept that Tokyo holds the key to the economic fate of entire Japanese 
state in the global competition. By dubbing the economic scale of urban Tokyo onto the 
scale of state political economy, TMG argued, the central and neighboring local 
governments must cooperate to implement regional urban revitalization in Tokyo. TMG's 
strategic regional development plan - the Capital Region Megalopolis Plan manifests this 
development strategy. Regionalism in Tokyo is based on the functional needs of 
competitive world city Tokyo but includes politically-motivated objectives: the 
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postponement of the capital relocation plan and denationalization of Japanese state 
towards urban-oriented state development. 
Structural Forces 
As Chapter IV told, Japan has been going through an economically and politically 
turbulent period since early 1990s. This is a period in which Japanese elites feel large 
structural changes took place (from interview). The fundamental of the turbulence is the 
national economic crisis. The post-bubble economy recession though the 1990s shocked 
Japan socially as well as economically. The country experienced a long and deep 
economic downturn during this period. An expression, "the demise of the upward-slope 
economy" has become a ubiquitous expression since this period to describe people's 
realization that the economic growth taken for granted in the national psych for four 
decades since the 1950s ended. This popular expression in fact includes an interpretation 
of the effects of globalization on Japanese economy. "Globalization" is also frequently 
used in Japan but it does not have much immediate meanings to many Japanese except 
for the sense of extensive connection across the world (from interview). The negative 
connotations of the term "globalization" popular in the West appear to be subsumed in 
"the demise of the upward-slope economy" in Japan. But by calling it "demise" of its 
own economy, the Japanese popularly seem to interpret the economic recession as if a 
fate, rather than the failure of policies or the result of economic competition. To prove 
their historic-fatal view of the event, they often describe the current economic condition 
as "the advent of the mature economy era." On the other hand, the criticisms towards the 
banking and real estate sectors for the recession were strong, reflected on the term, the 
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"bubble economy," which appears more strongly linked to the-1990s recession that 
globalization. Tokyo was the symbol of this bubble economy. The overly-inflated and 
subsequently plummeted land price became the structural constraints for Tokyo's 
economic health. Tokyo's land price crash caused not only many business bankruptcies 
but it also threatened financial crisis. Strapped with bad loans collateralled with valueless 
lands, banks in Tokyo, many of which were major national, themselves faced bankruptcy 
threats with their balancing sheets counting the collateral lands at before-the-crash values 
(Refer to Chapter IV). 
The second structural force is the loss of confidence in the centralized Japanese 
political system and the sense urgency for reform. As Chapter IV describes, the Obuchi 
Administration still relied on the traditional, centrally managed public investments on the 
basis of even national development to stimulate economy during the 1990s recession. 
However, the massive public spending on public projects across the entire nation 
repeatedly failed, causing severe strain on the national fiscal health. A former central 
ministry bureaucrat describes, "They (the central policy makers) now do not know what 
to do. The centralized planning and command system does not work any more. The kinds 
of plans and policies the central bureaus can do have all been tried" (from interview). 
Under this condition, the Economic Strategy Conference - an ad-hoc cabinet 
taskforce - was convened in the late 1990s to discuss the strategy to counter the national 
economic crisis (refer to Chapter IV). This is the third structural condition surrounding 
Tokyo. The recommendations from this committee were concentrated on urban 
developments in the Tokyo area because this would solve a major cause of the economic 
crisis: the land price depression. The recommendations from this committee had 
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extensive implications to the regionalism in the capital area. However, there was a 
formidable political obstacle to implement this plan. This is the fourth structural 
condition. The capital function relocation from Tokyo to another place had been a 
political agenda with supporting promotional laws since the 1980s. This was the time 
people blamed the Tokyo monocentric concentration as the consequence as well as the 
cause of various economic and social problems in the Japanese political system. As a 
solution, many leaders agreed that the political functions of Tokyo as the national capital 
must be detached from Tokyo's economic concentration to defuse the concentration and 
break Japan's corrupt oligarchic and clientalistic political culture (Refer to Chapter IV). 
The capital function relocation plan was still moving forward during the 1990s despite 
the economic recession partly because the decentralized political system was expected to 
invigorate the economy and solve the severe economic stagnation. This was, on the other 
hand, a serious structural threat to TMG and its local neighboring governments. 
The last conditional factor structurally affecting Tokyo was the political 
decentralization reform. It has been a major political issue since early 1990s, culminating 
in the passage of a historic local government reform bill in 1999 to devolve 
administrative authority to local governments. The need for political decentralization had 
also been voiced during the bubble boom of the 1980s. After the economic failure, 
however, the consensus on the limits of the Japanese centralized political system and the 
need for decentralized decision-making structure intensified. A local government 
bureaucrat in the capital region explains, "Current decentralization movement is a part of 
necessary government reforms after the end of upward-slope economy ... the sense of 
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crisis after the end of the upward-slope era made the political leaders realize the need for 
reform." 
These five structural forces contradict as well as reinforce one against another, 
making up the economic and political environmental conditions in which regionalism 
politics in the capital region was engineered. To summarize, the structural forces in the 
Tokyo area include: 
• The end of "upward-slope economy" era and economic crisis 
• Loss of confidence in the Japanese political system and its policy 
effectiveness 
• Tokyo as the site and tool to solve the national economic crisis as a part of 
strategic policy reform 
• Anti-Tokyo monocentric concentration and support for the capital function 
relocation agenda 
• The steady progress towards political decentralization reform 
Local Institutions 
The institutional characteristics of the Tokyo area can be described as a cautious 
cooperation between an economic giant and its smaller neighbors. Actual population of 
TMG is not particularly overwhelming over others (Refer to Table 5-1). However, as 
described below, commuting patterns and psychological effects give Tokyo the 
dominance. Importantly, this is a consequence of Japanese political history to a 
substantial degree. For example, Tokyo has maintained a metropolitan form of 
government since 1943 when Tokyo City and Tokyo Prefecture were forced to merge as 
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a part of war efforts. No other Japanese metropolises have the same government 
structure. Since, Tokyo Metropolitan Government has had a special relation with the 
central government in the post-war growth era of Japanese political and economic history 
(Refer to Chapter IV). 
Table 5-1 
Capital Region Population by Prefectures 
Prefectures Population Proportion 
Saitama Pref. 6,938,006 21% 
Chiba Pref. 5,926,285 18% 
TokyoMG 12,064,101 36% 
Kanagawa Pref. 8,489,974 25% 
Total 33,418,366 100% 
Major cities in Capital Region 
Cities Population Proportion 
Saitama City 1,024,053 3% 
Chiba City 887,164 3% 
Yokohama City 3,426,651 10% 
Kawasaki City 1,249,905 4% 
Tokyo 23 Wards 8,134,688 24% 
.. Source: The StatIstIcs Bureau (Japan), based on the year 2000 census 
The neighboring communities report the loss of their businesses or the increase in 
vacancy in their prime business districts in recent years (from interviews). This recent 
trend is known as the "returning to capital phenomenon" induced by the combination of 
declined rents and some new developments in Tokyo's CBDs. The officials in the 
neighboring cities and prefectures agonize over the uncompetitiveness of the regional 
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cities against Tokyo's renewed CBDs. For instance, a neighboring city reports a current 
business tenant occupancy rate of approximately 60% - a substantial decline from the 
bubble economy era (from interview). In addition, potentially more alarming is the 
cultural dominance of the entire region by Tokyo. Many residents of the neighboring 
cities more strongly identify themselves with Tokyo to consider themselves Tokyo 
citizens. People's indifference to their own community is harmful for local political 
participation and community building, potentially undermining local independence 
against Tokyo (from interview). It would also be the case that more often than not many 
of those locally un-rooted citizens would not have lived in Tokyo's suburbs ifthere were 
not for Tokyo. In this way, Tokyo offers an opportunity for growth but at the same time 
present itself as a threat to the surrounding communities. On the other hand, since many 
of Tokyo's commuters live outside of its jurisdiction, TMG needs cooperation from the 
neighboring governments to serve for urban needs and plan for competitiveness. 
TMG and its neighboring governments do cooperate to solve common issues 
across the region. The cooperation started as early as 1979 with TMG, Saitama 
Prefecture, Chiba Prefecture, Kanagawa Prefecture, Yokohama City and Kawasaki City 
as participants. Chiba City and Saitama City joined later to form the Eight Local 
Government Executive Conference to deal with regional planning and administration. 
However, consensus building in the groups has not been easy. A member official 
explains: 
The more local governments try to solve their own problems, the more they 
realize they have to take a regional approach. People and problems are 
increasingly moving and expanding across boundaries. This view is shared by 
everyone. However, it is hard to come to consensus as to when we try to 
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detennine what are the common regional problems and which should be solved 
first and how. The attitudes to problems vary depending on the specific 
conditions of each government. 
Consequently, the issues the regional conference takes up for cooperative planning tend 
to be "something everyone can agree," such as overall urban amenity and quality of 
urban life issues, including air pollution control and emergency preparedness. It does not 
embark on more ambitious agendas, such as economic development, urban development, 
and political integration. For example, when TMG introduced its regional urban 
development plan - the Capital Region Megalopolis Plan, the other members politely 
ignored, with attitudes including (from interviews), "We did not feel we have to support 
or oppose it" and "It was a unilaterally produced policy suggestion. So, we did not feel 
the need to discuss the potential of the plan." 
The expansion project of Haneda Airport highlights the division of interests and 
opportunistic alliance among the local governments in the capital region. To carry out the 
project, TMG, Yokohama City and Kawasaki City made an ad-hoc coalition to convince 
the central government while Chiba Prefecture adamantly opposed it. In addition to the 
noise pollution the increased usage of Haneda Airport would cause to Chiba Prefecture, 
the prefecture hosts the Narita International Airport. The Narita International Airport was 
the site of intense and prolonged political struggles between the central government and 
citizen groups. Local farmers and radical student groups bitterly and sometimes violently 
protested against the land expropriation forced through by the central government to 
construct the airport during the 1970s. This struggle still remains in many of Chiba 
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citizens (from interview). In addition, Chiba Prefecture has still strong agricultural 
interests, which are threatened by Tokyo's urban growth needs. After the experience of 
Narita, Chiba Prefecture is very wary about urbanization (from interview). The similar 
concerns exist in the other two prefectures of the capital region, Saitama and Kanagawa, 
although the intensity may vary. 
Nevertheless, Tokyo's existence as the economic giant in the region is clear to all. 
The smaller governments of the region often could not afford to disagree on Tokyo's 
regional development plans, for doing so can jeopardize their source of economic growth. 
Particularly, local disagreements can give credit to the supporters of the capital function 
relocation agenda and reduce the chance to receive urban revitalization investments from 
the central government. To prove, these two subjects were only the few major issues 
unanimously agreed the Eight Local Government Executive Conference members. A 
non-TMG government official in the capital region testifies: 
The most important common interest among the eight local governments is the 
fact that the capital region is the center of political and economic activities in this 
country. And it is a single metropolitan area. The common goal in the region is to 
maintain the capital region attractive and competitive. Also it is to oppose to the 
capital function relocation agenda 
In the "Resolution to Appeal for the Capital Region Regeneration" adopted after 
the Capital Region Summit in 2002, the member leaders express: 
The capital region with its thirty-three million popUlation is the greatest 
metropolitan region in the world, whose GOP equals to that of the United 
Kingdom or France. As such, it has been contributing to the development of this 
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country as the political and economic center. Nevertheless, the Diet is still 
discussing the capital function relocation agenda - the negative legacy from the 
bubble economy era policies. To regenerate Japan, what we need to do now is not 
the capital function relocation, which has already lost its meanings, but the 
revitalization of the capital region that generates Japan's vitality with its 
advanced central functional system" (TMG 2002) 
This statement is in fact practically a reproduction of Govemor Ishihara's preamble 
statement in TMG's Capital Region Megalopolis Plan. That is, the capital region leaders 
endorsed the political stance and regional development plans ofTMG. Under current 
precarious economy and capital relocation policies, it appears that the local governments 
in the Tokyo area cannot help cooperating as the Capital Region and project it as the 
economic engine of the state even if risking Tokyo's economic, political and cultural 
dominance. The identity projected as the state economic champion defines the common 
interest and the basis of the regional relations among the Tokyo area's local governments 
who are otherwise jealously defensive about their own interests. 
To summarize, local institutional conditions of the Tokyo area include: 
• Tokyo overwhelms the neighboring polities though its economic might 
• Cautious cooperation between Tokyo and its neighbors 
• With economic centrality, TMG takes the political leadership in the 
region. 
• Strategic identity as the state economic champion defines the common 
interest and the basis of the regional cooperation 
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Urban Politics 
Discussions of regional development and governance have been taking place 
mainly in two spheres of political activities in the Tokyo area. The first is the cooperation 
between the leaders of the local governments as touched upon in the above section. The 
Eight Local Government Executive Conference (a.k.a. the Capital Region Summit), 
inaugurated in 19798, is a forum among the leaders of the eight major local governments 
considered constituting the "Capital Region" of Japan. It states its objective as follows: 
The governors and mayors of the eight local governments proactively contend 
with regional issues in cooperation from the long-term perspective in order to 
improve overall human living conditions by taking advantage of the great 
regional energy commonly possessed by the local governments (Tokyo 
Metropolitan Government: Head Quarters of the Governor of Tokyo (TMG 
HGT) 2004) 
There are four functional bureaus in the summit, including: the Policy Making Executive 
Committee, the Waste Material Problem Committee, the Environmental Problem 
Committee, and the Emergency Preparedness Committee. The latter three committees 
fundamentally operate to maintain urban quality of life while the policy making 
committee focuses on policy side of the capital region, such as capital functions and 
decentralization (TMG HGT 2004). Political decentralization became an agenda in the 
summit for the first time in 1996 while the capital function relocation appeared in the 
summit agenda in 1999 (40th) meeting. Since 1999, these two matters have been 
8 Originally it was made up of six local government executives. 
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frequently discussed in the summit, shifting the nature of the conference towards 
political. The member officials express: 
In the past couple of years, many mayors and governors in the capital region 
changed. They are more proactive towards the summit and expect more from it in 
tenns of objectives and actual policy making. They intend to use it as a forum 
through which they voice their opinions to the central government. 
We have now new leaders after recent elections. They are more aware of the 
need for regional governance. They are more conscious about the (political) use 
of the Capital Region Summit. 
Political overtone can be noticed in the resolutions the summit passed in recent years, 
including the opposition to the capital function relocation agenda in 2000, the resolution 
on the capital region regeneration investments in 2002, the demand for decentralization 
and the capital region's fiscal sufficiency in 2003, and the warning to the national 
government for neglecting fiscal decentralization consideration in 2004 (TMG HGT 
2005). As the political color increases, ties as coalition strengthen. Yet, despite this new 
direction, the maintenance of urban quality of life remains the major function of the 
summit. The bureaucrats of the member governments produce most results in this area 
(interview). The leaders use the summit for regional planning on, for example, air 
pollution control, industrial waste disposal, emergency preparedness and greenery 
preservation. 
The other arena for regional policy making in Tokyo is less overt. A tight alliance 
appears to exist though a politically party structure. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party 
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(LDP) has been functioning as the arena in which Tokyo's regional development policies 
were taking concrete shapes. A group of core members in the central government, TMG 
and powerful real estate interest of Tokyo are connected through this political party 
network. The most critical political issue for Tokyo and its neighbors was the capital 
function relocation agenda - TMG has intensified its opposition since 1999 and the 
neighboring governments echoed in the year 2000 Capital Region Summit. The decision 
to avert this plan was confirmed within LDP by some of its political elites in the same 
year (Refer to Chapter IV: Urban Consequences of the Reforms). The prominent actor 
among them was the governor ofTMG, Shintaro Ishihara. 
Shintaro Ishihara has been a prominent, long-term LDP member and national 
political player, having experienced a multiple-term house membership and two different 
ministerial positions. Ishihara spearheaded TMG's opposition to the capital function 
relocation agenda and played the central role to have the central government implement 
the capital region's urban revitalization projects as soon as he was sworn in to the office 
in 1999. The proposed urban revitalization projects materialized through the Urban 
Renaissance Headquarters (URH), which was established within the Cabinet Office in 
2001. The urban revitalization projects included circular perimeter bypasses, Haneda 
Airport expansion and improved access to Narita International Airport. These projects 
faithfully followed the' 5-Year 10-Trillion-Yen Capital Region Project' plan TMG 
produced in 2001. According to a knowledgeable individual, the plan had been passed to 
other senior LDP leaders with whom Ishihara had strong ties to use it as URH's action 
plan. The implementation of urban revitalization projects in Tokyo by URH was also in 
accordance with the recommendations made by the Prime Minister's special task force, 
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the Economic Strategy Conference in the late 1990s (refer to Chapter IV: Urban 
Consequences of the Reforms). Researchers Igarashi and Ogawa (2003, p149: translated 
by author from Japanese) determine, "TMG, which Governor Ishihara commands, planed 
in advance the urban redevelopment projects that the Urban Renaissance Headquarters 
would select and TMG and the Headquarters implemented the projects as a team." In 
addressing to the TMG assembly in 2001, the governor himself reports his role: 
TMG has repeatedly been urging the national government to include the 
regeneration of the capital region as the most prioritized national 
project. .. TMG's aggressive actions resulted in the national government's 
decisions to establish the Urban Renaissance Headquarters and the projects it is 
going to choose. It was also confirmed during a meeting the other day in which 
the minister of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport Government 
and I reached a firm agreement. I believe the decision on the national second 
projects including the expansion of Haneda Airport and the development of the 
three circular highways will make a large contribution to the future national 
interest of this country (TMG OOG 2001 9119: translated from Japanese by 
author). 
Igarashi and Ogawa (2003) also identify the connection between TMG/LDP and Tokyo's 
powerful real estate/construction interests. The two researchers report that senior leaders 
of real estate and construction industries cooperated with TMG to press the central 
government to accept TMG's urban revitalization plan as the central government urban 
plan. These industry leaders also influenced the policy recommendations for Tokyo'S 
revitalization concluded in the Economic Strategy Conference (Igarashi and Ogawa 
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2003) (Refer to Chapter IV: Urban Consequences of the Reforms). Finally, it was Nippon 
Keidanren, Japan's most powerful economic organization and a long-term ally ofLDP, in 
which these construction and real estate industry leaders served as senior members, who 
prodded the Obushi Administration to shift from the traditional even national 
development to urban-oriented state development (Igarashi and Ogawa 2003) (Refer to 
Chapter IV: Urban Consequences of the Reforms). These evidences confirm the existing 
of core political alliance through the LDP network that practically made decisions about 
regional development in the Tokyo area, with Governor Ishihara as one of the central 
figures. 
Tellingly, TMG's urban revitalization plans were never seriously discussed in the 
venue of the Capital Region Summit as mentioned in the above Local Institutions section. 
The Megalopolis plan (TMG's regional development plan) was suggested at the capital 
region summit when Tokyo hosted it in 2002 but it was never followed up. Non-TMG 
Capital Region Summit member officials typically evaluated the plan with conspicuous 
disinterest, including, "We did not evaluate the Megalopolis plan because it privileges 
central Tokyo" and "it was a plan made by Tokyo for its own use" (from interviews). 
From this, we can conclude that the league of summit leaders and the core political 
alliance are two separate groups. The LDP was the main political arena in which the more 
influential political alliance interacted to determine the future of regional urban 
development in Tokyo and the fate of the capital function relocation agenda. The Capital 
Region Summit has mainly been an arena for the urban quality maintenance and was 
strategically used by TMG to make a case to establish its centrality in the Japanese state 
and to the other capital region members. 
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To summarize, the conditions of urban politics of the Tokyo area include: 
• A league of governors/mayors forms a loose coalition for urban functional 
planning and regional political goals against the central government 
• The core political-economic alliance functions through LDP to determine 
major urban policies of region allna tiona I influence in Tokyo. 
Politics of Scale 
Scale nests. Taking Japan as an example, its scales range from the national, 
regional, prefecture, metropolitan, municipal, neighborhood and to household. Politics 
determines which scale becomes dominant and which are subservient. According to Cox 
and Mair (1991), a location becomes agency provided with political identity. "Scalar 
expressions" are important parts of this process. Locational political bodies play politics 
of scale in which they attempt to align their territorial interests with scalar political 
authorities to secure their interests by establishing the hegemonic scale (Cox 2002a). In 
Tokyo, as identified in the above Urban Politics section, two locational agencies function 
to affect scalar structure: the Capital Region Summit and the core alliance for Tokyo's 
urban revitalization. This section reviews the politics of scale each political interest 
implement. 
The underlying concept of the Eight Local Government Executive Conference 
(the Capital Region Summit) is cooperation among equal partners to: 
solve problems that need a regional approach and to find problems that can be 
solved more efficiently with a regional approach (and to) seek regional solutions 
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to the problems already each government has been dealing with but can expect 
better results from regional cooperation (from interview). 
As such, the summit fundamentally confirms the existing political structures and 
authorities, for "it is not an attempt to do something new as a larger local government 
body" (from interview). This orientation to status quo can be also found in the rules of 
the summit. For example, the members take turns to host the conference so that members 
have equal opportunities to raise matters as the summit agendas. It is tacitly agreed that 
the summit takes up only subject matters that can be "unanimously agreed." Matters that 
would create unequal distribution of benefits to members such as economic development 
have not been discussed in this arena. The members say, "The summit is for 
administrative purpose only." 
The summit does discuss political matters when it benefits all members. Political 
decentralization and retention of the capital/capital region revitalization by the central 
government are subjects the leaders have discussed in the summit. For the 
decentralization objective, the members jointly demanded increased political and fiscal 
autonomy to challenge the existing center-local political structure. For the call for capital 
region reinvestment, they identified themselves as a region of economic importance to 
the entire state. However, as the Urban Politics section described, their actual bonding as 
a region was weak. As for the decentralization demand, they made joint appeal to the 
central government but it did not mean they would form autonomous regional political 
body. As the premise ofthe Capital Region Summit stipulates, current administrative 
boundaries among the member local governments are expected intact. The members 
express: 
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Regional approach has been implemented but structural reform takes much 
longer time. Decentralization can be and should be pushed forward under the 
current system. Decentralization and regionalism are different matters. 
Decentralization and regionalization are not necessarily the two sides of the same 
coin. Regionalism would be more difficult in a way that each local government 
have stronger self-interests and responsibility in maintaining its benefits and 
polity. 
The governor of Kanagawa once called for a discussion to form a federal type of regional 
government in the capital region earlier in 2004 but it was met with little response from 
the other summit members (from interview). In the Tokyo area, regional redevelopment 
and local decentralization are separate matters. Nor do they mean regionalism political 
integration. The interests of member governments exist in the maintenance of existing 
scales of local government system. 
The second locational political body is the alliance of core LDP, economic 
interests and TMG members. Their spatial interest consists of Tokyo's regional 
revitalization implemented by the central government. As the next Discourse of Place-
making section details, TMG believes regional revitalization crucial for the global 
competitiveness of Tokyo. Under this premise, they implement politics of scale to 
redefine territorial power attached to existing scale structure. The core coalition's spatial 
interests are translated into two scalar political goals. The first goal is the scale of global 
economic competition to be recognized. By establishing this macro scale competitive 
order, they can emphasize the strategic importance to develop a spatial core competence 
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at the most competitive location in Japanese. The second goal is the demarcation of core 
competence space in the Tokyo area. The rationale is to achieve the functional efficiency 
to compete in the global scale economy. The functionally defined urban scale encourages 
regarding of an urbanized area as the space of economic activities and the means of 
global competition. In this conjecture, the two goals work to reorganize the authority 
structure folded in the nested scale of Japanese state system. Rhetorical claim of global 
scale justifies the making of an urban region in the Tokyo area with most efficient 
economic/urban functional spatial design. Also, decided by the scale of urban 
productivity, the competitiveness of the new capital region in the Tokyo area justifies 
central government supports with a promise that it will give the state the much needed 
edge in the global competition. At the same time, the same scale arguments indicate that 
investments in other areas than the core competence region will harm the state by 
wastefully using central resources. In effect, through this politics of scale, the core 
political/economic alliance surrounding Tokyo'S revitalization has been replacing the 
national scale of state development with the neoliberal urban-scale of state development 
interest supported by the core Tokyo-based coalition. The next section investigates the 
politics of scale implemented by the core alliance. It will analyze their discourse of place-
making by focusing on the central figure of the alliance, Governor Ishihara. 
The summary of politics of scale in the capital region includes: 
• The regionalism advocated by the Capital Region Summit did not seek 
rescaling of political structure and stood on the existing scale of local 
government system. 
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• The core alliance ofLDP/economic elite/TMG implemented politics of 
scale by which the ideology of global-urban competitive nexus 
replaced the national scale state developmentalism 
• Decentralization and regionalism are different matters. 
Discourse of Place-making 
Discourse of place making consists of positioning of location by giving it place 
identity and a new scalar framework. "Placing," "ordering," and "naming" of the physical 
arrangement of a place implement these processes (refer to Chapter II: Identity, 
Positioning and Place Making from Below). With this discourse of place-making, politics 
of scale completes. In the case of Tokyo, Tokyo's national champion identity becomes 
meaningful only positioned in the global competitive scale. According to this positioning, 
the place of urban functions will be placed and ordered in the Tokyo area. 
The first public discussion giving birth to the regional development concept in the 
capital region emerged during the Economic Strategy Conference (ESC) held between 
1998 and 1999. The report from this prime minister-appointed ad-hoc committee (ESC 
1999) recommended concentrated urban redevelopment as a part of its economic 
revitalization strategy. This recommendation resulted in the creation of the Urban 
Renaissance Headquarters (URH). The above Political Arena section described the 
central role ofTMG and its governor Ishihara in these political developments. It is the 
political discourse engaged by Ishihara that ascertained a new scale division of labor in 
Japan to discredit the capital region relocation agenda and materialized his state-
sponsored functional regional revitalization plan in Tokyo. The following is the contents 
of his politics of scale and discourse of place-making. 
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A knowledgeable person comments of Governor Ishiara, "He has the political 
perspective for the entire state (not only for TMG). His tenure started to manage the 
capital function (of the state of Japan) in the Tokyo area, not to manage the metropolis 
Tokyo" (from interview). Ishihara appears to have had a clear idea about a new scalar 
division oflabor in Japan even before he became the governor ofTMG. His idea about 
the global scale competition and the importance of urban competitiveness for state 
interest is clear from the start of his governorship. After five months in his office, 
Ishihara clarifies this political perspective at the third regular Tokyo Metropolitan 
Assembly of 1999: 
Today, it is most important for the prosperity and security of the nation and its 
cities that Japan and Tokyo maintain the global player status with substantial 
influence in the international society. Tokyo is the first global city born outside 
of the western world that includes New York, Paris and London. However, now 
it began competing against emerging Asian cities, such as, Singapore, Seoul, and 
Shanghai. If Tokyo lost its international competitiveness, it would mean a large 
decline of Japan's international status as well as Tokyo's reducing to a regional 
metropolis (TMG OOG 19999114: translated from Japanese by author). 
In this argument, Ishihara forcefully establishes the scale of global-urban nexus in which 
Tokyo exists as the champion of the Japanese state for her economic competitiveness. By 
establishing the importance of Tokyo's economic status to the entire state, Ishihara 
attacks the capital relocation agenda: 
The choice our nation should make is not the relocation of the capital function 
that could lead to a large decline in the national wealth ... but the regeneration of 
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Japan by building upon the potential ofthe megalopolis ... with Tokyo as its core 
(TMG OOG 19999/14: translated from Japanese by author). 
His identification of Tokyo as the center of Japan positioned in the global marketplace 
does not solely rely on its current economic capability. He tries to make a case with its 
historic background as well: 
Tokyo has a four-hundred years of history as the capital of Japan since it opened 
as Edo. Since the second war, it has been the engine of our nation's "economic 
miracle" (TMG OOG 2000 9119: translated from Japanese by author). 
In this way, Ishihara connects the state of Japan and the metropolitan region surrounding 
Tokyo symbolically as well as economically to legitimize his vested interest in the 
redevelopment in Tokyo as the capital region. The presumed political legitimacy in this 
discourse is the "national interest" and the leadership based on the economic importance 
of Tokyo to the "nation" in the global mark competition. However, what is included in 
his ideas of "nation" and "national interest" is not the same as the inclusiveness and even 
development the traditional Japanese political culture pursued for its nation building. In 
his very first address in TMG assembly in 1999, he reveals his attitude to the "national" 
interest: 
As the governor of our nation's Capital Tokyo, I renew my sense of duty and my 
resolution to change the Capital Tokyo to change Japan in order to defeat the 
depression prevailing in the era" (TMG OOG 1999 511 0: translated from 
Japanese by author). 
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The slogan, "Change Japan from Tokyo" is repeated in many occasions by Ishihara to 
assert his ideology of urban-global nexus for "national" global competitiveness. With this 
conviction, Ishihara laid out the condition for the capital region urban revitalization (from 
interview). They include, firstly, the national government has to reinvest in Tokyo to 
improve its urban functions and amenities. Secondly, a regional approach must be taken 
to improve urban functionality of Tokyo. Lastly, the functionality of Tokyo/the capital 
region should be not be constrained by the boundaries of the existing local government 
structure. These conditions clarify that Ishihara's regionalism targets functional 
improvements for economic development and global competitiveness: the scale of urban 
functionality determines the urban region and what are included and excluded in this 
space. 
TMG translated these urban concepts into a land use/urban development plan, 
which the central government used to implement the capital region revitalization as 
described in the Political Arenas section. The Capital Region Megalopolis Plan is the 
most comprehensive version of a series of Ishihara's regional plans. As such, these plans 
internalize Ishihara's scalar division of labor and function as apparatuses to formulate 
"knowledge" as a part of his politics of scale. The following section deconstructs the 
nature of regionalism discourse posited in TMG's regionalism plans. 
The Capital Region Megalopolis Plan 
The Capital Region Megalopolis Plan (TMG BUD 2001) was a brainchild ofthe 
Ishihara TMG administration published in April 2001 (Interview). It has a subtitle: the 
image of the capital in the twenty-first century and the strategy to build the regional 
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territory." This document is fundamentally a combination ofland use and transportation 
plans, identifying concentric zones centering Tokyo's CBD as its core and a major 
circular bypass, the Mid-capital Territory Road (the "Regional Access Road Network in 
Figure 5-2) as its perimeter. This perimeter bypass cuts off outer regions of Tokyo's 
neighboring prefectures as urban boundaries. In this way, the "capital region" defined by 
this plan disregards the existing administrative structures of local governments in the 
Tokyo area to improve Tokyo's capital functions and its urban amenities. 
Figure 5-2 
Circular Urban Axis 
(Core Cities urban Axis) 
Hachioji, Tachikawa, 
Tama-Newtown 
Water and greenery Framework 
Yokohama, MM21, Kawasaki 




(Tokyo Bay Water Front Urban Axis) 
From The Capital Region Megalopolis Plan (TMG BUD 2001): translation by Author 
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In the Capital Region Megalopolis Plan, Ishihara repeats his thesis of Tokyo's centrality 
to Japan in tenns of its population and economic power and the dire consequences of the 
capital relocation agenda. Then, he calls for his regional approach to rebuild 
competitiveness, install economic vitality and improve urban functions and living 
conditions in the capital. It emphasizes that the creation of the "regional space" as 
essential to invite the urban agglomeration effects as the engine of the "national" 
economy. 
One ofTMG's major concerns to achieve their urban goal is the traffic 
congestion. It is considered reducing the attractiveness and competitiveness of the city in 
the global market (Interview). The Megalopolis Plan features circular road connections 
(Refer to Figure 5-2) as the proposed solution to solve this "Tokyo Problems." It is 
interesting to note that in this interpretation of "Tokyo problems," the excessive over-
concentration of political power and economic itself is not considered problem whereas, 
in general understanding of the "Tokyo Problems," the national polarization arising from 
the power/wealth concentration in Tokyo is the "Tokyo Problems." This proposal for the 
circular road connections represents how TMG tries to "place" the regional space in the 
Tokyo area. The roads not only symbolize the boundaries of the Tokyo world city-region, 
which cut off rural areas of Chiba Prefectures, Saitama Prefectures and Kanagawa 
Prefectures. But also the "ordering" of the territorial authority and physical planning 
priority in the region. Finally, the name, the "Capital Region Megalopolis" reinforces the 
centrality of the area to Japan and the new regional space unconnected to the existing 
administrative local government boundaries while the grand name "Megalopolis" tries to 
inspire planning towards the top-tier world city. 
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The circular roads connect the sub-core CBDs of the region (North Core-
Ohmiya in Saitama Prefecture, South Core - Y okohamaiKawasaki in Kanagawa 
Prefecture, East Core - Chiba City in Chiba Prefecture, and West Core - Hachiohji in 
TMG) (Refer to Figure 5-2). This would reduce the congestions and concomitant air 
pollution caused by the traffic currently passing across the central Tokyo, for example, 
from the west side to the east (from interview). However, except for the West Core of 
Hachijohji, these sub-core cities are outside the jurisdiction ofTMG. Thus, TMG cannot 
make plans for these areas. From TMG's point of view, this plan was "a suggestion to the 
neighboring governments to start thinking regionally and implement cooperation from the 
issues which can be better governed with a regional approach" (from interview). As 
quoted earlier, the neighboring governments did not look at the plan from the same point 
of view (refer to Urban Politics section) but that did not make much difference. As 
discussed in the above Urban Politics section, Ishihara and TMG did make the circular 
bypass plan and pushed it to the central government's the Urban Renaissance 
Headquarters for adoption as the state urban plan. Plans are instruments in this TMG's 
regional planning to set the physical and authority order of the Tokyo world city-region, 
in which the improvement of urban functionality in the central Tokyo has the top priority. 
Another main pillar of the Megalopolis Plan to improve its urban function and 
competitiveness is the development of better air transportation access to the capital 
region. The Megalopolis Plan offers a solution to this issue by suggesting an expansion of 
Haneda Airport so that it can accommodate international flights. Currently, the Narita 
International Airport is the region's gateway for international flights. This expansion plan 
to Haneda Airport is a contentious proposition included as explained in the above Local 
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Institutions section. However, from the conclusion, the plan has reached an agreement for 
implementation between the central government and the coalition ofTMG, Yokohama 
City and Kawasaki City - the primary beneficiaries from the project. This deal even 
involved a demand for the return of American-occupied Yokota Base, located in eastern 
Tokyo, and its liberation for civilian use (from interview). The opening up of the base 
would not only give the capital region the third air traffic access but open up the air space 
inaccessible to Japanese civilian aircrafts. This latter possibility is important because the 
freeing of Yokota air space allows the decline of air traffic to and from Haneda Airport 
flying over Chiba Prefecture and acquiesce the continued opposition to the Haneda 
Airport expansion raised by Chiba Prefecture. The Yokota issues involved U.S.-Japan 
security treaty and Ishihara has sufficient political influence through the LDP connection 
to the senior national decision-makers, including the prime minister (from interview), to 
press forward his agenda about Yokota. The following are comments of the governor 
about Yokota Air Base issue at the TMG assembly: 
The central government still has no idea about the meaning of airport to the 
maintenance of the national power and sovereignty ... I have been demanding the 
expansion of the Haneda Airport in this context. This issue (the return/private use 
of the Yokota Air Base) is the same. I am convinced that the quick progress in 
this issue will benefit Tokyo and our nation. As the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
will not negotiate with foreign countries properly in coming days, I will do the 
work by myself. I will pass that to the central government once the matter 
reaches a certain point ... I hope the people in the central government ... including 
the prime minister have a firm recognition about (the importance) of this issue 
(TMG 19992/27). 
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This statement demonstrates the political ordering Ishihara envisages in the capital region 
Megalopolis Plan. In his ideas, the development of competitiveness in the world city-
region, Tokyo even takes precedence over the state authority. This, in turn, implies what 
kind of ideas he has when he talks about "national" interest. 
TMG also have published three more planning documents in line with the Capital 
Region Megalopolis Plan since Ishihara took the governor's seat in 1999. As a series of 
political manifestos, they can illustrate TMG's place making strategies in the capital 
region. The first of such efforts was the "Strategic Plan to Overcome the Crisis: the first 
step towards the twenty-first century," published in November 1999 (TMG HGT 1999). 
The key message of this plan was the sense of crisis: Tokyo, and therefore Japan, was in 
grave danger because of: 1) economic uncertainty - post-bubble economy woes and the 
loss of national confidence, 2) demographic changes (aging population and declining 
birth rate), 3) deteriorating quality of life in Tokyo (pollution, housing and traffic 
congestion, 4) competition in the global economy, and finally 5) the policy to move the 
capital from Tokyo. The main tenets of the circular megalopolis plan had appeared in this 
publication to attack the capital function relocation agenda, describing the concentration 
of national politics, economy and culture in Tokyo as the essential condition for the 
success of the entire nation as well as for Tokyo. The land-use and transportation plans of 
the Megalopolis plan also were also included here to solve TMG's version of "Tokyo 
problems." In fact, Igarashi and Ogawa (2003) claim that the basic plans existed since 
1997 within TMG. 
TMG's second planning statement after the above was "The Tokyo Plan 2000: 
towards a world city that millions would visit" launched in December, 2000 (TMG HGT 
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2000). Its key theme was to make Tokyo a world city so vibrant and attractive that 
millions would like to come and live. This was the goal TMG imaged for Tokyo after 
"The Strategic Plan to Overcome the Crisis" to emphasize the importance of urban 
amenity and living conditions competing in the global marketplace. Actual plans in this 
document is consistent with the first plan with regional land-use and transportation 
planning but it also expands in details on the social and living condition issues such as 
environmental preservation, housing, childcare, healthcare, education and emergency 
preparedness. Again this plan asserts the leadership role of Tokyo to improve the nation 
but this time it states these objectives in the context of the need to change the Japanese 
policy and politics, including its life-time employment system, seniority system, the 
"convoy" system (centrally directed industrial policy in which business organizations are 
managed as a "convoy" for regulation and central support), and centralized political 
system. At the same time, it stresses the importance of local government autonomy and 
self-sufficiency. This document can be said a political vision statement ofTMG as to 
how, as the state champion, TMG must change itself to change Japan. 
The last of this series of the plans is the "Tokyo's New Vision for Creating 
Metropolis: a roadmap for urban revitalization," published in November, 2001 (TMG 
HGT 2001). As the one published after the Megalopolis plan, this adds details but more 
importantly it reemphasizes the strategic nature of the capital region revitalization to 
Japan as well as to Tokyo. Ishihara summarizes, "The most urgent task to revive Japan is 
the efforts by the central government to revitalize the capital region with Tokyo as its 
core" (TMG HGT 2001, no page number given). Thus, to restore the "national" economy 
and confidence, Ishihara argues that the state government must implement "the creation 
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of an attractive and lively global city sitting atop the world league" in Tokyo. Similar to 
the Megalopolis plan, TMG explains the need for a regional approach. 
These documents along the Capital Region Megalopolis Plan show the discourse 
of place-making by TMG. Against the threat oflosing the capital status, it identifies itself 
as the economic engine of the state and the central importance for the state economic 
recovery under the post-bubble recession. To further consolidate Tokyo's economic 
status to the state, Tokyo is positioned against the scale of global competition. Having 
identified as the Japanese city competing in the global competition, TMG moves on to 
define the nature of place it has to become. The place of regional space is demarcated and 
the order of urban functionality is determined. The place must be the Capital Region, free 
from existing governmental structure to include only places contributing the Capital 
Region's functionality. Competitiveness must become the urban order, including 
transportation and livability, to protect "national" interest in the global economy. This is 
the ideal of the Capital Region of Japan and what the name, Megalopolis should inspire. 
To summarize, the discourse of place-making includes: 
• TMG implements strategic discourse to re-identify Tokyo as the engine of 
Japanese economy by positioning it in the scale of global competition. 
• With this identity and positioning, a functional urban region is demarcated 
for the place of the Capital Region, including only urbanized parts of the 
Tokyo area, for urban competitiveness and productivity. 
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Conditions of regionalism 
Descriptions of the Tokyo area so far extended in this chapter indicate that the 
scope of regionalism in Tokyo is in fact limited. It is largely taking shape under the 
political ideology of "national" interest and Tokyo's claim that it has the best capacity to 
defend the "national" interest. With these arguments, TMG produced regional urban 
plans, including the Capital Region Megalopolis Plan and persuaded the fellow members 
of the Capital Region Summit and the central government to make it as the basis for a 
state urban development plan for the Tokyo area. Lateral cooperation among the local 
governments in the capital region has been persistent but rather weak in observable 
achievements (interview). On the contrary, there was some ad-hoc bilateral cooperation 
as found in the case of Haneda Airport expansion, which can harm the regional integrity. 
Nevertheless, with regard to economic development, common interests of the local 
governments in the Tokyo area are not fragmented. A non-TMG local bureaucrat 
comments: 
Under the international competition, it is important the capital region remains 
competitive by urban regeneration. The common goal in the capital region is to 
make and maintain the region attractive and competitive. 
This indicates the attitude ofnon-TMG local governments towards a sort of wait-and-see 
for TMG's policies and their regional impacts rather than actively making regional 
development planning. As far as the state capital function remains in Tokyo, it brings in 
state-endorsed power and economy to the region which benefit all. Vertical interrelation 
between the capital region and the central government has increased in this way despite 
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new national deoentralization policies whereas the horizontal intergovernmental relation 
is still tentative and ambiguous. 
The summary of the conditions of regionalism in the Tokyo area includes: 
• Functional regional planning and development is the main form of 
regionalism in the Tokyo area 
• Regionalism in the Tokyo area in fact strengthened the vertical 
relations between the central and TMG because of the strong impact of 
TMG and central government to the development of the region. 
• Regionalism as voluntary cooperation between local governments does 
exist in the capital region but the horizontal intergovernmental 
relations to support it is still tentative. 
The Story of Regionalism in Tokyo 
With the discourse of global economy and competitiveness, and the reality of 
Japanese economic crisis, the core political power of the state, in which TMG is central, 
implements regional urban redevelopment in Tokyo for the "national" interest. Yet, 
neoliberal market principle and devolutionary denationalization characterize this 
"national" political ideology as opposed to the traditional Japanese national interest in 
which state supported the entire nation. With this, the core coalition considers Tokyo as 
the spatial means of state economic development in the globalized economy. From this 
perspective, the existing local government boundaries and their territorial sovereignty are 
obsolete or even detrimental to strong regional planning and coordination. TMG's 
regional development plans that trespass the existing jurisdictions of neighboring 
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governments can hardly hide this frustration. Naturally, TMG approaches the central 
government for higher authority, planning power and finance in the region. 
On the other hand, economic interest binds non-TMG local governments to TMG 
and lets the issue of their sovereignty against TMG stay ambiguous. As far as the 
functional regionalism of the Megalopolis plan produces economic returns, there is little 
incentive for them to strongly confront TMG's regional plans. One the once had, non-
TMG local governments in the Tokyo area show the tendency of opportunistic 
cooperation with TMG. On the other, the Capital Region Summit continues to try some 
lateral cooperation. The end result appears that regionalism in its true sense is at 
equilibrium in the capital region. It does not have strong drive towards certain directions. 
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CHAPTER VI 
REGIONALISM IN OSAKA: CAN KANSAI BECOME ONE, BY "ONE BY ONE?" 
Overview 
This research now turns to Osaka, the second Japanese world city-region to 
conduct case study following the same analytical fonnat used for Tokyo. The following 
Figure 6-1 summarizes the findings. An interpretation of this logic diagram will be made 













relations with the central 
government is the cause 
and result of the 
structural disadvantages 
• Globalization amplifies 
the structural 
disadvantages 
• Osaka Prefecture suffers 
from particularly serious 
fiscal crisis 
Local Institutions: 
• Rivalries and conflicts existing between the local governments 
• Including physically diverse, large sections of rural areas along major metropolitan areas 
• The business sector active in local governance and reform towards regionalism and 
decentralization 
• Mistrust between the private and public sectors while acknowledging the need for cooperation 
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Politics of Scale: 
• Private sector presses to break 
centralized nested scale system 
with regional local state because 
the current system economically 
favors Tokyo and disfavors 
~ Osaka 
• This local economy-oriented 
regionalism stands on regional 
economic scale with centralized 
concentrate-and-command 
• Public sector resists the 
economically oriented scale 
division of labor. Governors of 
Kyoto, Osaka and Hyogo try to 
pursue a public value-oriented 




Discourse of Place-making: 
• Private sector positions Kansai-shu as regional 
space to defend local competitiveness. They 
demand political decentralization and justify 
the "concentration and selection" 
• Coalition of three governors seeks regional 
space to resist the competitive logic and 
defends community values. Decentralization 
and economic development are means to this 
end. 
• Decentralization and regionalism 
complementary for economic development and 
political goals 
• Leaders place "Kansai" in the local state scale 
having a horizontal relation to the central. 




Conditions of regionalism: 
• Regionalism considered a 
means for higher 
autonomy in the vertical 
intergovernmental 
relations towards a local 
~ state status. 
• Horizontal 
intergovernmental 
relations making slow 
progress although limited 
to between three 
prefectures. 
• Economic logic only does 
not progress regionalism. 
It requires political ideas 
• The private sector and the public sector agrees on the demand for decentralization but cannot create strong coalition 
• The private sector initiates regional inter-governmentlinter-sector organizations but face strong resistance from the public sector 
• An alliance between the governors of the core prefectures, Osaka, Hyogo and Kyoto is firm, making slow and modest but steady 
actions for regional develooment. 
Conditions of Regionalism in Osaka 
Regionalism agenda has a long history in the Osaka area. Its leading economic 
organization, the Kansai9 Economic Federation has been pressing for regionalization of 
local governments since 1955. The business sector tries hard to pull the local 
governments in the region together for regional decision making and concerted 
investments. The leadership role of Osaka's business sector resulted in an innovative 
regional quasi-government organization, the Kansai Council (Urban Politics below 
details this organization). Yet, regionalism in Kansai proves to be very difficult. The 
harder the private leaders press the public sector for regional economic development, the 
stronger the ideological difference between the two sectors surface for mutual frustration. 
The economic pull towards enlarged regional capabilities meets the resistance of 
community values and public sector ideals. Also, a number of other conflicts of interest 
exist in the Osaka area. In addition to the mistrust between the private and public sectors, 
rivalries between local governments are strong, rural regions are alarmed by urban 
interests and cities are cautious about their prefectures' supervisions. 
Nevertheless, the reality of economy is harshly felt in Osaka. Osaka area's 
regional economy has been declining relative to Tokyo, particularly since the 1980s. The 
negative effects of number two status in a strong centralized state system have intensified 
after globalization. Leaders are aware that they have to be independent from Tokyo's 
influence politically as well as economically to reverse the trend. Under this condition, 
9 Kansai is a name of a region including Osaka but not an official tenn and often loosely used. Usually, it 
would include the prefectures of Osaka, Kyoto, Hyogo, Nara, Shiga and Wakayama. The Kansai Council 
adds Mie, Fukui and Tokushima to this list (refer to Table 6-1) for its membership. The tenn "Kansai 
Region" is not used as an administrative unit by any state public organizations. This contrasts to the 
"Capital Region." According a survey, Kansai means a much smaller area along the cities of Kyoto, Osaka 
and Kobe for many people's perceptions, particularly in the context of business and economy. 
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the governors of three leading prefectures cooperate with a potential for local state 
building. Regionalism in the Osaka area is contentious and in trouble. However, the 
combined needs of economic survival and sovereignty from central government policies 
nudge the local government leaders towards political rescaling from below. 
Structural Forces 
The economic problems of the 1990s affected Osaka as they did Tokyo but with 
different twists and turns. The "demise of the upward-slope economy" hit harder on 
Osaka than Tokyo. Local bureaucrats evaluate, "They (Tokyo) had recession after the 
bubble burst but their recovery speed and scale exceed other regions by large margins" 
and "Compared to Tokyo, Osaka's economic decline is very large. The national level 
economic data show a recovery but not so in Kansai." Structural causes explain the 
differences. Firstly, the economy in the Kansai area relied more heavily on the "old" 
industries, including steal industries, ship building and heavy manufacturing. The delayed 
transition to the high-technology industries made Osaka susceptible to the global 
competition. Secondly, Tokyo's superior urban agglomeration economy became 
important for business organizations in Osaka to gain competitiveness under the 
economic recession. When Osaka's businesses were trying to compete against their 
Tokyo rivals, they needed to move to Tokyo to neutralize their competitors' locational 
advantages (from interview). Consequently, the number of headquarter functions moving 
from Osaka to Tokyo accelerated since the 1990s. Thirdly, the disadvantages of being the 
second economy in a centralized developmental state, in which Tokyo has been the 
growth pole of the nation (Refer to Tokyo and Osaka in Chapter IV), started to intensify. 
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For example, the central government's urban revitalization policy substantially favored 
its largest city, Tokyo over Osaka, the declining number two, as explained in Chapter IV 
and Chapter V. The globalization of economy underlies these three factors. It is the main 
cause of the "demise of the upward-slope economy;" it helped Tokyo's agglomeration, 
which many businesses in Osaka felt compelled to join; and the global competition was 
the rational used for the state to re-concentrate in Tokyo for urban development. These 
structural forces conspired to inflict severe damages on Osaka as decisive disadvantages. 
The post-bubble recession and the hollowing out of business operations left Osaka with 
very serious fiscal problems. Prefectures mainly rely on corporate income tax for its 
revenue. Thus, all Japanese prefectures have fiscal problems during the current economic 
downturn. However, Osaka Prefecture is experiencing a particularly grim reality. 
The compounded structural disadvantages to Osaka did not stop here. The worst 
headache comes from the large-scale development projects which Osaka City and Osaka 
Prefecture invested during the bubble economy era. The most prominent deficit-making 
project is the Kansai International Airport. Compared to the capital region's Narita 
International Airport, for which the central government financed the total cost as a 
national project, the Kansai International was financed by the "third sector" method- a 
public-private joint venture to finance public projects due to the central government's 
insistence. With the 'third-sector" method, Kansai' s local governments had to take high 
risk unlike similar projects in Tokyo. Unfortunately, the venture faced an unlucky tum of 
events. The Kansai International opened in 1994, after the Japanese economy went into 
the post-bubble recession, while Narita International Airport opened in 1978 - just before 
the economic hey days of the 1980s. The weakening Osaka's economy in the post bubble 
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era has seriously been damaging the Kansai International's commercial success. Such 
risk-taking was once a part of 'reasonable' public sector activities, which "ambitious 
urban governments were supposed to take up during the upward-slope economy era" 
(from interview). Osaka's slower growth relative to Tokyo had been a concern 
throughout the post-war economic growth era but, with unfortunate timing in the 
economic vagaries since the 1990s and accentuating global economic effects in the 
context of the Tokyo-oriented centralized Japanese political system, some alarm that 
Osaka's economic decline has reached the "absolute crisis" condition. 
With this backdrop, decentralization reform and the capital function relocation 
have been a great interest for the local governments and the business sector of the Kansai 
region. Leaders in Kansai campaigned strongly to move forward these political changes 
for their advantages. However, not only has the capital relocation agenda ground to halt 
but the capital region started to receive renewed central policy attentions since the halt in 
2000 (Refer to Urban Consequences of Reform in Chapter IV). 
These are the structural forces, under which regionalism and political 
restructuring are debated in the Kansai region. 
To summarize, the structural forces in the Osaka area are: 
• Structural disadvantages exist in the Osaka area vis-a-vis Tokyo 
• Its unfavorable intergovernmental relations with the central government 
vis-a-vis Tokyo is the cause and result of the structural disadvantages 
• Globalization amplifies the structural disadvantages of the Osaka area 
• Osaka Prefecture suffers from particularly serious fiscal crisis 
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Local Institutions 
Variety characterizes the Osaka area. In contrast to the Tokyo area where Tokyo 
can represent the entire capital region, Osaka is only a player among others (from 
interview). In terms of size, Osaka Prefecture in fact has the same proportion of 
population to the Kansai region as that of TMG to the capital region. Despite this, Osaka 
does not overwhelm its neighbors as Tokyo does. This indicates the strengths of histories 
and identities of each area in Kansai. Its local governments are often said maintaining 
their uniqueness and characteristics for good or bad. 
Table 6-1 
Kansai Region Population by Prefectures 
Capital Region Prefectures Population Proportion to Regional Total 
Shiga Pref. 1,342,832 6% 
Kyoto Pref. 2,644,391 11% 
Osaka Pref. 8,805,081 36% 
Hyogo Pref. 5,550,574 23% 
Nara Pref. 1,442,795 6% 
Wakayama Pref. 1,069,912 4% 
Fukui Pref. 828,944 3% 
Mie Pref. 1,857,339 8% 
Tokushima Pref. 824,108 3% 
Total 24,365,976 100% 
Major cities in Kansai Region* 








Source: The StatistICS Bureau (Japan), based on the year 2000 census 
* According to the membership governments to the Kansai Council 
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To describe the relationship among these local governments, people often quote a 
remark, "Kansai is one by one" to lament their uncooperativeness. The rivalries between 
Kansai's local governments obstruct sustained regional planning. There are three kinds of 
rivalry/conflict among them. The first is the peer competitions. The major cities of the 
region, Kyoto, Osaka and Kobe compete one against another in the economy. By the 
same token, Kyoto Prefecture, Osaka Prefecture and Hyogo Prefecture are rivals. Osaka's 
economic superiority was unquestionable in the past but it has been weakening in recent 
years. A researcher knowledgeable about the region comments that the declining power 
of Osaka-based leading economic organization, the Kansai Economic Federation (KEF) 
is one of the two major reasons for the difficulty Kansai faces in implementing sustained 
regional cooperation (from interview). The second type of rivalry is the vertical conflicts 
between major cities and their prefectures. Kyoto City, Osaka City and Kobe City 
possess prefecture-equivalent statuses as the "designated" metropolises. However, 
In the Japanese hierarchical political system, prefectures still supervise the 
designated cities in many respects. Meanwhile, the designated cities do 
implement their own policies without consulting their prefectures. These cause 
frictions (from interview). 
This sort of vertical rivalries is potentially more harmful than the horizontal peer 
rivalries. Particularly, the contention between Osaka City and Osaka Prefecture is 
legendary in Kansai. The above mentioned researcher speculates that the Osaka City-
Prefecture conflict is the other major obstacle for the regional cooperation in Kansai. Last 
source of local conflict is the urban-rural relationship. The Kansai region is a 
geographically diverse area stretching from the South-sea coastal area of Wakayama 
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Prefecture to the small seaside villages along the Japan Sea in northern Hyogo and Kyoto 
prefectures. In between, there are many mountains, valleys and rural areas. Prefectures, 
such as Nara, Wakayama and Shiga are fundamentally rural in character. These 
prefectures are very cautions about the rescaling of local governments, fearing the loss of 
popUlation and communities to urban areas once the territorial boundaries of prefectures 
are weakened. On the other hand, it is also true that these diversities and the unique 
characteristics of local governments collectively distinguish the historically rich Kansai 
as a region (from interview). Therefore, the individualistic characteristic of Kansai's 
locales can be an advantage as well as disadvantage for regional development in KanaL 
For example, it allowed local governments, business organizations, private businesses 
and mass media to join forces to create the Kansai Cultural Energy Zone Promotion 
Council to invigorate the region's socioeconomic stagnation through the rediscovery of 
its cultural resources. Given this opportunity, some assert, "Kansai is one by 'one by 
one.' 
Another local characteristic is the role of the business sector. Kansai's private 
sector is very active in not only economic development issues but the local governance 
issues. Osaka's economic status declined in relative to Tokyo's under Japan's Tokyo-
oriented state developmentalism as the national economy increased throughout the post-
war growth era. Because of this history, the Kansai business sector determines that 
Kansai's economic development depends on decentralization and local political 
independence. Kansai' s economic leaders have been pressing the central government to 
adopt regionalized block local government systems with increased local authority since 
1950s. No other business sectors in other Japanese regions take the leadership role on 
153 
local governance reform issues as they do partly because ofthe need to complement the 
rivalries in the public sector. The private sector felt the need to pull the competing public 
bodies together for development. Indeed, the Kansai Council, a quasi-government 
regional organization (Urban Politics below details this organization), was established in 
1999 under the leadership of then Kansai Economic Federation (KEF) chairman to forge 
a regional bond under slogans; "Create a 'New' Kansai!" and "Join forces to make 
Kansai into One!" Clearly, this attempt was a counter measure against the "one by one" 
trait ofKansai local governments. Yet, neither is Kansai's business sector necessarily 
monolithic. KEF claims to represent the economic interest of the entire Kansai region but 
in reality the groups is biased towards Osaka. When the members say, "Kansai," they 
often mean only Osaka in mind, alienating business organizations in other cities (from 
interview). Also, there are different arguments for regionalism within the business sector. 
Two organization publicized regionalism ideas in Kansai: the Kansai Model by KEF and 
the Osaka Prefecture and Osaka City merger recommendation by the Kansai Association 
of Corporate Executives. The plan by the former intends political decentralization while 
the latter aims at streamlining of local governments. 
Conflict in Kansai also exists between the pubic sector and the private sector. 
There are deep miscommunications between them with regard to their regionalism 
attempt. The following summaries of both sectors' opinions illustrate the 
misunderstandings: 
The local governments do not make efforts for efficiency because they need to 
finance only thirty percent of their total budget under the Japanese centralized 
government system. As the tax payer, the private sector needs efficient 
governments. Otherwise, businesses move to better places. We must change the 
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culture of public superiority over the private sector. In Kansai Council (KC), 
sectionalism prevents overall benefits for the region. Representatives from each 
local government to KC always try to benefit their own areas rather than Kansai 
as a whole. They say protection of their citizens is their duty. They do not make 
efforts until it is sure that they can get their shares of benefits. Such parochialism 
hinders the consideration of overall benefits to the region. "Kansai" must be the 
determination of the local communities. The attitude of the local governments is 
selfish and very frustrating (a business sector representative). 
It's hard to understand what exactly the private sector is suggesting. Their 
argument is too ideological to define problems and identify plans to solve them. 
They tend to stereotype us - the public sector is reluctant to change. We are open 
for change although some would naturally hesitate to make sudden big changes 
such as government rescaling. They have an attitude of telling us what to do from 
their narrowly defined agenda without trying to understand the basic values as 
well as actual systems on which the public sector works. The public sector and 
the private sector need to develop mutual understanding and trust if we were to 
cooperate but they try to reorganize the public sector as they like according to 
their beliefs. This really discourages cooperative stances between the two sectors 
from the start (a local bureaucrat). 
Despite all these differences, the elites in Kansai unanimously agree that 
cooperation must be achieved between the private and public sector and between the 
various local governments to overcome the adverse economic and political environments. 




Local governments have strong individual identities. This can partially 
explain various rivalries and conflicts existing between the local 
governments 
Kansai region is also diverse physically, including large sections of rural 
areas along major metropolitan areas 
• The business sector is very active in local governance and its reform 
• 
Urban Politics 
towards regionalism and decentralization 
Mistrust exists between the private and public sectors while 
acknowledging the need for cooperation 
Kansai's regionalism political activities take place mainly with two organizational 
formats in two arenas. The first is the cooperation between public leaders and private 
elites and the second is a coalition of key public sector leaders. As mentioned in Local 
Institutions section, Kansai's business elites have been involved in politicizing local 
government structure since as early as 1955. The Kansai Economic Federation (KEF) has 
been very active in the local government reform issue towards a decentralized, larger 
scale local government structure. Currently, two activities exemplify the leadership roles 
of Kansai's business sector to government restructuring and public-private partnerships. 
They are the Kansai Council (KC) and KEF's Kansai Model and its study group. 
KC is regionalism in action as well as an arena. It is an innovative cooperative of 
local governments and business organizations in the Kansai region to promote and 
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implement regional development. Its membership is extensive, including nine 
prefectures, three major cities (refer to Table 6-1) and twelve powerful business 
organizations in the Kansai Region. The two main objectives of this regional quasi-
government include, 1) "to strengthen ... regional networking to upgrade collective 
capabilities and efficiency to make the Kansai an attractive world city-region, and 2) "to 
construct bright, strong and vibrant 'Kansai' on the framework of nine prefectures, three 
designated cities and the private sector under the ideal of 'Kansai is One'" (Kansai 
Council 1999). Its "Kansai Declaration" clarifies the philosophies of its slogan, "Kansai 
is One." There are four strands of rationales in this plea for Kansai's regional 
determination. The first is the new environments that require structural change, including 
globalization, the information technology revolution, the "maturation of Japanese 
economyIO," and the declining birthrate/aging population. The second is the history and 
current status of the "Kansai" region. The declaration (Kansai Council 1999) describes 
Kansai as: 
A region that has prospered with its rich social capital and traditions nourished 
by the beautiful nature and historic culture, the innovative business venture 
spirits and the local attachment and regional pride. 
Having established a glorious local identity, it agonizes over "Kansai's thirty-year old 
decline." Then, it describes "the cooperation between the local citizens, the business 
community and the public sector" as the foundation to rebuild "Kansai." Thirdly, it 
defines its political identity and interest as a region by discussing: 
10 This is another way of saying the end of the "upward-slope economy." The effects of the global economy 
to Japan are implicated in these common phrases. 
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The regional actions that KC tries to undertake is a historical innovation to 
enhance Kansai's overall power and efficiency required ... to compete in the 
global economy: it must create the developmental basis that overcomes the 
barriers existing between various government jurisdictions and between 
private/public sectors ... sharing the region-wide development strategies and the 
common ideal, "Kansai is one." 
Finally, it emphasizes the important implication of its mission to the nation since 
"regionalism is a long-waited political goal of the entire Japanese." To accomplish these 
grand goals, KC engages itself in activities including, the development of culture and 
tourism, public relations and publicity, environment issues, emergency preparedness, the 
development of industry, technology and science, the revitalization of the North and the 
South in Kansai, and information technology management. 
KC has made notable accomplishments in the development of cultural tourism 
and the public relations on this platform. Members support KC: 
KC is a necessary intermediate step that can allow real regionalization once it 
proves its effectiveness and crates strong sense of common benefits, identity and 
interests (from interview). 
Local governments intend to retain their political existence. Given this, KC 
performs a very important function particularly because it is a joint venture 
between the private sector and the public sector (from interview). 
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Despite this, the overall evaluation from the member organizations is mixed at its best. 
The public sector leaders comment: 
It is a unique and progressive idea but it lacks a sense of single entity. It is like a 
gathering of separate interests still representing their home organizations. It has 
been failing to exert leadership (from interview). 
KC is doing a good job for tourism with action plans and clear targets. But it can 
be a place where the disagreements deepen between the private sector and the 
public sector (from interview). 
The private sector similarly expresses: 
KC lacks the gravity (to pull members together) and the capability to implement 
(regional plans) (Hagio 2003). 
KC is a membership organization but the power of each member is stronger than 
the organization itself. KC cannot govern its members (from interview). 
From conclusion, KC is an organization of a unique regional inter-governmentlinter-
sector arena but it has yet to become a solid regional platform. 
The other arena of private-led public-private cooperation sponsored by KEF is the 
"Study Group regarding the Status ofKansai under the Decentralization Reform," which 
KEF organized after its publication of the Kansai Model - a three-tier federal regionalism 
plan (detains in Discourse of Place-making). The study group was designed to continue 
between July 2003 and December 2004 to cover topics, such as, decentralization and 
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governance models, the charter for administrative duties and division of responsibilities 
between prefectures and municipalities, local government finance system, and ideal of 
regionalism in Kansai. The academics from local universities and bureaucrats from the 
same members to KC joined this study group. However, some public sector members 
resisted taking part in the study group because that might indicate an acceptance of the 
Kansai Model. These members needed to make sure that the study group did not have the 
pre-construed conclusion that the three-tier federal regionalism model KEF promotes 
would be inevitable for Kansai's future governance system. All the same, KEF still 
makes efforts to pull the individualistic local governments of Kansai together, which is 
well felt by the public sector (interview). The experiences ofKC and the study group so 
far illustrate the difficulty of public-private cooperation to become the foundation of 
Kansai's regional governance. The private sector in Japan does not have the kind of 
power American counter part. Yet, it is important to not that KC continues to exist 
because the both sector firmly agree that they have to cooperate to earn local autonomy 
from the central government. 
There is another group of leaders that has been discussing local government 
rescaling in the Osaka area. Its arena is still informal but coalition is much tighter than 
the KEF-led groups. These leaders are the governors of Kyoto Prefecture, Osaka 
Prefecture and Hyogo Prefecture. These three prefectures are the heart of the Kansai 
region in terms of population and economy, containing the three major cities in the 
region, Kyoto, Osaka and Kobe, respectively. The three prefectures are currently 
challenged. Their metropolises, Kyoto, Osaka, and Kobe seek higher autonomy from 
their prefectures. Nationally, the Doushu-sei (the regional block local government 
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system) discussion, which entails the mergers of prefectures, is increasing the possibility 
to become reality (Refer to Globalization and Reforms in Chapter IV). Ideologically, the 
Japanese local governments, both prefectures and municipalities alike, increasingly 
embrace the concept of subsidiarity to demand larger autonomy from their higher 
governments. To make the matter more urgent, prefecture governments are in deeper 
fiscal problems than cities. All three have problems but Osaka Prefecture's condition is 
particularly serious. These political and economic environments press the three 
prefectures for administrative innovations and new concept of local government. Yet, 
these three governors maintain very congenial relations (interview). They help each other 
for mutual development and understand the existence of shared interest between the three 
prefectures as a region. For example, these leaders spearhead tourism/trade partnership 
with East Asian countries, particularly with China (Osaka Prefecture 2005a). With regard 
to recent anti-Japan sentiment flared in China and Korea and Japanese central 
government's stem response, the three leaders assert the importance of local level 
international relations with these countries to spread mutual understanding and confirm 
their planed visit to China in October 2005 as representatives of Kansai Region (Osaka 
Prefecture 2005b). Their other joint activities include recruitment of the ministry of 
culture to Kansai, campaign for decentralization reform, and personnel exchanges 
between their prefecture governments (Osaka Prefecture 2005a). 
There was some controversy in recent years over the construction of a new airport 
by Hyogo, which caused some conflict of interests between Hyogo Prefecture and Osaka 
Prefecture. There had been a long debate over whether the old airport of Osaka should be 
closed or not because of the slow growth of the new airport built off Osaka Bay in the 
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mid-1990s. The problem was the old airport was stealing customers from the new one, 
which were suffering from serious deficits and potential postponement of further grants 
from the central government. In the midst of this tough condition for Osaka, Hyogo 
decided to build to a new airport, which would the situation even harder for Osaka. 
However, the leaders of both prefectures managed to settle the issue by differentiating the 
markets of the three airports (Nihon Keizai Shinbun 2002/8/8). Provided with their 
cooperative attitude this airport issue demonstrates, a knowledgeable person confirms 
much better potential the coalition between these three governors possesses for political 
restructuring in the Osaka area than the KEF (Interview). Of course, these leaders work 
with the private sector but the three governors appear to share common goals and values 
that few others can see. 
To summarize, the urban politics for regionalism in Kansai include: 
• The private sector and the public sector agrees on the demand for 
decentralization but cannot create strong coalition 
• The private sector initiates regional inter-governmentlinter-sector 
organizations but face strong resistance from the public sector 
• An alliance between the governors of the core prefectures, Osaka, Hyogo 
and Kyoto is firm, making slow and modest but steady actions for regional 
development. 
Politics of Scale 
Two main ideas of local political space-making compete in Kansai. The two apply 
different rationales to define spatial structures of their regional communities in the scale 
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division oflabor. The first idea of regional space is upheld by Kansai's business sector 
led by Kansai Economic Federation (KEF). The basic logic of their spatial ideology is the 
economic competitiveness. Consequently, they look for the scale that guarantees the best 
economic advantages to their production activities. The other concept of regionalism in 
Kansai is based on the space of equitable society as well as economic development. The 
public sector is the advocate of this spatial concept. They try to identify regional space 
that allows the balance between urban and rural economies to be reached in the scale 
division of labor. These two concepts of regionalism also have different attitudes about 
power and time scale. The economic sector prefers a unified political body created 
through a speedy, top-down process while the public sector seeks consensus building 
through a gradual, evolutionary process. The clash between these two approaches 
characterizes the politics of scale in the Osaka area. 
The economic interest in the Osaka area seeks local political leadership and 
independence from the central governments. This is based on the historic patterns 
described in Chapter IV, Tokyo and Osaka. They see a strong relationship between the 
roles of central government in Japan's centralized developmentalism and the 
concentrated growth in the capital region. For example, their persistent goal of the 
"resurgence ofKansai" is always conceived relative to Tokyo (from interview). This is 
the reason that the private sector of Kansai very actively continues to take part in local 
public policy-making. A private sector leader explains: 
It is the local government that takes the role to plan and stimulate local 
development. Their capability to manage local community is very important for 
citizens and businesses ... If it were not for the centralized system, we could do a 
lot by our planning. Kansai can govern for itself ... Political decentralization will 
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tum around the economic concentration in Tokyo ... This is the right direction for 
the overall Japanese economy ... We need to get united to fight against the central 
government (from interview). 
This comment summarizes the tenets of regionalism concept that the Kansai private 
sector advocates. Economy and politics are bound up in order to establish a local political 
independence against the existing local-central relationship. Consequently, they aim to 
establish a regional political scale in which the economic interest of the region is 
represented and by which development policies are created to orchestrate and direct local 
governments. The tenets of "Kansai Declaration" and the slogan of "Kansai is One" 
detailed in the above Urban Politics section also indicate this underlying scalar political 
economy of Kansai's private sector. They insist on the creation of regional governing 
body above current prefectures because of their frustration from Kansai' s individualistic 
local governments unable to make concerted development efforts and the relative 
weakness of prefectures in relation to the central government under the current 
intergovernmental relations. On this basis, KEF (2003) proposes, apart from KC, a 
federal-style regional government, "Kansai-shu" model, which includes an extensive 
space for its control. It is said that they would rather abolish the prefectures to give more 
power to the regional government but they decided to retain them in order to appease 
prefecture leaders (from interview). More details on this topic will follow in the 
following Discourse of place-making section but, from the conclusion, their politics of 
scale is based on their desire to break the current nested system of Japanese centralized 
political system. With this confrontational perspective, the business sector leaders try to 
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restructure the scale division of labor from the current vertical unitary state form to a 
horizontal federal form. Conversely, they press for a vertical hierarchical form within the 
region for efficiency and command in place of the current horizontal federal form 
between prefectures and special cities for concentration-and-command. They tacitly 
rationalize this contradiction by conceptualizing the scale in terms of competition 
between Kansai and the coalition of central government power and its urban instrument, 
Tokyo. Their implied politics of scale is set up by defining the center/Tokyo alliance as 
the common adversary, against which their scale has to be fixed for competitiveness. For 
the private sector leaders, the region of Kansai, rather than individual prefectures or 
cities, is the scale by which they can prosper independently without the central 
government and against the capital region in the global economy. 
The public sector in the Kansai region agrees with the need to break the 
centralized nested system. However, in contrast to the economy-led politics ofthe private 
sector, the Kansai public sector seeks regionalism based on broad value systems than 
narrowly focusing economy and efficiency. For example, they defend their apparent 
functional inefficiency from the business people's point of view by explaining different 
organizational goals. The services local governments provide add up to "thousands" but 
often without clear indicators, such as business profit figures, to measure the delivery 
efficiency (from interview). Provided with the broader goals of the public sector, 
combined with the concept of subsidiarity, which advocates decentralized decision 
makings and service delivery at as close a level as possible to service users, the public 
sector has to oppose the concentrate-and-command objective Kansai's private sector 
proposes in their regionalism. 
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The public sector's organizational goals include the maintenance of equitable and 
livable communities in addition to efficiency and development (from interview). To these 
ends, the public sector needs to have certain spatial boundaries. Without them, they 
cannot pursue their organizational goals. Therefore, the ontology of the public sector is 
space. This makes the public sector's decision making prone to parochialism because 
their territory is the domain from which their policies and goals have to be determined. A 
local government bureaucrat honestly accepts, "It is organizationally impossible to expect 
local governments to have a regional view (from interview)." Therefore, although many 
local governments in the Kansai region implement bi-/multi-Iateral joint planning for, for 
example, garbage recycling, environmental control, natural disaster preparedness and 
economic development, there is great difficulty for these formats to develop into 
rescaling of local governments for integration. 
However, opinions for regionalism do exist within Kansai's public sector. For 
example, strong cities, such as Osaka, Kyoto and Osaka are in favor of creating a regional 
scale governing body to weaken the prefecture controls and give more autonomy to 
themselves (from interview). But even these pro-regionalization pubic leaders reject the 
concentrate-and-command objective assumed in the business sector's regionalism ideas. 
Even for these economically aggressive cities, economic development is only one of 
many public sector goals. Regionalism designed only for economic growth cannot be 
accepted. This is the fundamental reason that the KEF -sponsored regionalism actions face 
resistance from the public sector and this is the background against which the three 
governors of Kyoto, Osaka and Hyogo prefectures try to strike a balance between the 
goals of public sector values and the demands of Kansai's private sector and economic 
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reality. They try to innovate from the parochialism of the public sector and manage the 
impatience of concentrate-and-command desire by the private sector. For this objective, 
they appear to have started a process to find a new scale division of labor plausible 
among Kansai' s local governments. 
To summarize, politics of scale in the Osaka area include: 
• The private sector presses to break existing centralized nested scale system 
with regional local state because the current system economically favors 
Tokyo and disfavors Osaka 
• This local economy-oriented regionalism stands on regional economic 
scale with centralized concentrate-and-command 
• The public sector resists the economically oriented scale division of labor 
in Kansai and the governors of Kyoto, Osaka and Hyogo try to pursue a 
public value-oriented regionalism to balance against economic reality. 
Discourse of Place-making 
The main policy tool of politics of scale by Kansai' s business interest is the 
Kansai Model, or "Kansai-shu" proposed by KEF. This regional government model was 
first published in a report compiled by the Kansai Industry Competitiveness Conference 
(KICC). KICC was a special taskforce convened in 2002, representing the seven leading 
business organizations ll of the Kansai region to compile strategic plans to "strengthen the 
industrial competitiveness ofKansai." This is a private sector-based committee as 
11 The Kansai Economic Federation, the Osaka Chamber of Commerce, the Kyoto Chamber of Commerce, 
the Kobe Chamber of Commerce, the Kansai Association of Corporate Executives, the Osaka Industrial 
Association and the Kansai Executive Association (the Osaka Chamber of Commerce and the Osaka 
Industrial Association merged into the Osaka Chamber of Commerce and Industry in 2003). 
167 
opposed to the Economic Strategy Conference, which was sponsored by the prime 
minister as described in Chapter IV and V. The motive behind this private initiative was 
the strong sense of economic crisis in Kansai. Its report, "For the Industrial 
Competitiveness in Kansai: taking aggressive actions!" recommends local government 
restructuring along industrial policies and economic development plans as the "action 
plans that the Kansai private sector implements with its initiative." The report rationalizes 
their demand for local autonomy as follows: 
As the globalization of economy progresses, the need to appeal to the world with 
individuality, rather than with uniformity, increases. The speed is also required in 
policy decisions. However, the current system not only takes time in policy 
making but also produces uniform policies for all regions ... The central 
government should delegate local competitiveness development responsibilities 
to local governments for greater local autonomy. We must radically redistribute 
public finance resources between the central government and local 
governments ... to enable local governments to implement locally-specific 
development policies (KICC 2002, p45-46). 
The Kansai private sector criticizes the fragmented nature of Kansai's local governments 
for the mismanagement of rich resources, including three characteristic metropolises: 
Kyoto, Osaka and Kobe, rich nature as well as culture, and the economic size as large as 
Canada. They attribute the public sector's governance failure and fragmentation to the 
declining regional competitiveness (KICC 2002, p46-47). Thus, they argue: 
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Regional unity through the creation of a regional governance unit beyond 
prefecture boundaries is essential to utilize Kansai' s potentials and its cities 
characters and overcome the fragmentation (KICC 2002, p46). 
With this argument, the report recommends an establishment of a federal-type regional 
government. The top-tier of the three-tier local government system is called, "Kansai-
shul2," possessing its own political power and budget above prefectures. The report hopes 
the new regional structure will implement concerted regional decision-makings on 
strategic investments, such as, the international airport, harbors and freeways (KICC 
2002, p47). With weakening prefecture divisions, they hope the new regional government 
will implement the "concentrated and select" economic development strategy for 
collective competitiveness of the region in the global market. 
These arguments show that the business leaders identify the region of Kansai as 
the space of common interest based on two reasons. The first is the localism they argue 
for in relation to globalization and the other is the local government fragmentation, which 
is connected to the economic decline in the Osaka area. However, the underlying 
assumption in these two reasons is the need for competitiveness. Desire for 
competitiveness combines decentralization and regionalization in Kansai. This reasoning 
is more clearly expressed in KEF's regionalism policy plan, "A Presentation of Kansai 
Model, installing local autonomy and responsibility" (KEF 2003), in which the concept 
of Kansai-shu is elaborated. It is a political manifesto ofKansai's private sector leaders to 
12 "Shu" is a Japanese word used to describe a unit of political territory with larger scale and higher 
political autonomy than prefectures. Shu is used to describe American states, German Land, and Canadian 
province. For example, the state of Kentucky is called Kentucky Shu. However, Shu would not have as 
strong political power as American states under the current Japanese unitary system. 
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propose local government rescaling for greater planning capacity and increased political 
independence. 
KEF raises two reasons to justify its decentralization restructuring 
recommendation. Firstly, it argues that the Japanese centralized oligarchic political 
system and its clientelism caused the Japanese economic crisis since the early 1990s by 
allowing center-dependent political culture and continuing fiscal mismatch between local 
input and output resulting in large budget deficits. Secondly, it determines that Japan's 
existing two-tier local government system is inefficient and unpractical to accommodate 
the decentralization reform the central government currently plans. With these rationales, 
KEF (2003) demands the Japanese government to press forward the following reforms: 
1) To redistribute the responsibilities between the central government and local 
governments for decentralization under the concept of subsidiarity. This includes the 
privatization of public responsibilities. 
2) To redesign local taxing and financial system to implement self-sufficiency, self-
management and self-accountability. To clarify to citizens the relationship between 
payers and recipients of public funds. 
3) To allow for a flexible local government system to accommodate within single 
jurisdictions the cost-benefit relationships of large-scale public investments. Planning 
needs for regional approach is increasing and a regional government framework allows 
local initiatives, rather than reliance on the central government. 
KEF's own strategy to these reforms is the suggestion of a new local government system, 
the Kansai Model. The "Kansai-shu" is an example of the Kansai Model and it is a 
federal form regional government above existing municipalities and prefectures. In fact, 
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the same member prefectures of the KC make up the Kansai-shu - an extensive 
geographic scale, including highly urbanized areas and rural mountain villages and 
prefectures not usually considers parts of "Kansai" region, such as Tokushima Prefecture, 
Fukui Prefecture and Mie Prefecture. In fact, according to a survey conducted in the past, 
Kansai means a much smaller area along the cities of Kyoto, Osaka and Kobe for many 
people's perceptions, particularly in the context of business and economy. By identifying 
such a large, diverse area as a single unit, KEF (2003, p16) asserts that the Kansai-shu 
will develop into "the world-class free economic zone Kansai .. .liberated from the yoke 
of the Japanese centralized system." 
The Kansai Model is proposed as a policy suggestion to improve the economic 
viability of the entire nation as well as for Kansai's local interest. This is an effort to 
avoid the impression that the plan is an expression of "anti-Tokyo" feelings (from 
interview). This intention betrays the truth. To prove, after painting a grand objective of 
Japanese future, the Kansai Model plan cannot help making a causal relationship between 
Kansai's economic conditions and the political concentration at Tokyo. The business 
elites believes "Kansai's economic revival" will not occur without breaking the power 
concentration at Tokyo. In fact, to gain decentralized local political power from the 
central government is the fundamental goal of the Kansai Model plan (from interview). 
Rescaling of current local government system is secondary but necessary condition for 
the viability of the decentralization. A business leader comments: 
With the current system (with prefectures), devolution of authority is limited -
policies and functions covering more than single prefecture have to go to the 
central government (for planning). Prefectures do not demand authorities to deal 
with matters beyond their current boundaries" (from interview). 
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In this way, decentralization and regionalism are two fundamental elements for local 
competitiveness in Kansai business elites' minds. Regionalism will give the regional 
government sufficient scale of planning capacity to implement the "concentrated and 
select" investments on major infrastructure, such as harbors, airports, and transportation 
networks, for economic development (KEF 2003, pI7) - the key to the competitiveness 
in the global market. Consequently, the Osaka area will compete in the global market as a 
political economy of its own, breaking the monopolistic control of the central 
government, which favored Tokyo through the recent state history. 
The ideas of localism and regionalism prevalent among Kansai' s business elites 
position the Osaka area in relation to the central government/Tokyo. Their reasoning for 
the Kansai Model frequently mention globalization but the goal of their plan is in fact in 
the lateral relationship between Osaka and the center/Tokyo. The business sector puts 
emphasis on the importance of political decentralization and local autonomy for 
democracy. Yet, their ultimate objective is to achieve "economic revival of Kansai." But 
the economic end is not entirely for economic interest. There is undeniable personal 
identity with "Kansai" (from interview). Some local nationalism overtone does exist 
among some of the Kansai business leaders, although their definitions of "Kansai" may 
vary. This can be discerned from comments among leaders, such as: 
The problem is the lack of localism - the freedom of local self-determination. 
Local statism is not allowed under the centralized system (from interview). 
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The positioning of the Osaka area as a suffering number two economy vis-a-vis 
Tokyo/the state justifies the adjustment of Osaka's identity to the space of Kansai region. 
By defining the economic problem in Kansai as the result of the strong scale of Japanese 
state, it discredits the benefits of Japanese state scale-oriented political system and tries to 
rescale the state system towards local scale-oriented. The business elites play their 
politics of scale to "place" Kansai-shu as the space of commonwealth over an unusually 
large territory. It is the evocation of the "all-Kansai" spirit - the term often used to 
express its regional collective identity and local statism, which is supposed to tolerate 
uneven development in the region that the "concentrated and select" investments will 
produce under the concentration-and-command strategy of the regional government. This 
sacrifice for unevenness for overall goals is the "ordering" that the "all-Kansai" mentality 
subsumes and the inspiration that the "naming" of "Kansai-Shu" tries to implicate. 
Kansai's public sector is generally critical about the politics of scale the private 
sector engages. For example: 
Their (the economic sector's) strongest idea is that the fragmentation of local 
government is the obstacle for Kansai's economic development. This is the most 
important rationale for the Kansai Model. The current local government system 
prevents economic development. But we do not understand (from their 
explanations) what exactly wrong with the current system ... (lfwe know), we can 
fix that rather than the entire structure. What they want seems a decision-making 
power at the regional level to allow the "concentration and selection" to prioritize 
projects at the regional level. 
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For the business sector, the most important thing is to compete economically 
against Tokyo or Nagoya or Shanghai or whatever for economic independence. 
Thus, they prefer concentrated investments in the middle for efficiency. For the 
local public administration, economy is only one of many factors of 
organizational objectives. 
The businesses say we have lots of problems. That's why we have to rescale (the 
local government structure). It is true that the Kansai economy is declining and 
home-grown businesses are moving to Tokyo. But we wonder if the current local 
government scale is really the cause and rescaling would stop the economic 
problems. Economic scale merits exist but does it a matter of local government 
scale? We are really not sure. 
In the meantime, the reality of economic competition and fiscal crisis urge the 
public sector leaders to cooperate with the private sector for regional development actions 
under slogans, "All-Kansai" and "Kansai's revival." Yet, as executives responsible for 
the welfare of all citizens in their jurisdictions, the public sector leaders stand in difficult 
positions to implement regional development plans, which result in uneven development 
over their combined territories. Under this difficult condition, the governors of Kyoto, 
Osaka and Hyogo have started to take a slow, step-by-step cooperation approach towards 
making of regional space. The first of such steps was their joint declaration to "strive for 
the revitalization of Kansai thorough cooperation and taking advantages of individual 
strengths" (Sankei Newspaper 8/812002) at a press conference in 2002. These governors 
have maintained congenial relationship since then, sharing ideas about the future of 
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Kansai's local government. They have already informally agreed the leadership role of 
Osaka Prefecture in case of future stronger forms cooperation (from interview). Some 
speculate that the coalition of these three governors has a higher probability of achieving 
local government rescaling than the Kansai Model promoted by KEF (from interview). 
The concept of regional rescaling such as merger is accepted by these leaders 
based on the following premises (from interview): 
1. It must occur thorough democratic means; economic logic should not dictate 
the process and the goals of local government structure. 
2. The reform process should not start as a deliberate effort to rescale the local 
governments. Local government rescaling should result as a natural 
consequence from mutual cooperation between local governments. 
3. Citizen feelings and sentiments to their sense of place and community must 
be taken into account. 
4. Restructuring of local governments must take bottom-up approaches and 
methods acknowledged by citizens. 
5. Setting up a clear regionalization goal a priori invites resistance and prevents 
rescaling of local governments 
6. Decentralization is the ultimate objective. Regionalization of local 
governments by itself does not have meanings. After decentralization, we 
may find the current local government structure inadequate. That is when 
rescaling should be discussed. 
7. Kansai can only become a single community when regional cooperative 
projects produce cumulative positive results over time. 
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Few in the public sector think the imminence of regional rescaling in Kansai. Yet, the 
serious thoughts found in these premises indicate potential and possibility the leaders 
must be feeling. Indeed they have made further steps since the start. For example, they 
have started personnel exchanges. The governors are visiting China together on a 
commercial mission (Osaka Prefecture 2005a, 2005b). Four reasons compel the prefecture 
governments to consider rescaling for regional government. Firstly, the mismatch exists 
between urbanization patterns and administrative boundaries. An official testifies: 
We question the adequacy of current local government structure. This is a question 
that goes across Kansai because of the changing social and economic activities. 
People's activities go across local government boundaries. We feel the need to 
review the scales of government units to match their actions and to deliver adequate 
services (from interview). 
Secondly, the central government has been giving serious thoughts to reforming local 
government system, including the replacement of prefectures with a smaller number of 
larger block subnational political units (Refer to Globalization and Reforms in Chapter 
IV). The prefectures know that once the merger initiative for municipalities currently 
under way has achieved a certain result, the new block system would become a real 
possibility. Thirdly, prefectures are under serious fiscal strains. This has many 
implications. One of them is to cooperate for economic development "to increase 
economic and industrial capabilities when cooperation can brings about synergy effects." 
Finally, they consider the Tokyo monocentric concentration very problematic. An official 
comments: 
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Tokyo monocentric concentration is a real problem ... The national government 
considers the entire national economy. It is a rational decision making that they 
concentrate resources on the most competitive locations (under the global economy). 
However, it is wrong for them to decide policies for local governments from such 
economy-oriented rationality perspective only to divest weak areas. The central 
government must give authority to local governments for self-governance and efforts 
(from interview). 
The three public leaders stress that the objective of Kansai regionalism is not competition 
against Tokyo economically. They accept the market principle of economic centralization 
tendency (from interview). What they oppose is the political concentration in Tokyo, 
which further rationalizes Tokyo's monocentric economic concentration, and what they 
demand is local political and fiscal capability to determine its own future. The governors 
of the three prefectures attack Tokyo's economic concentration aided by the political 
concentration in Tokyo. Governor Ido of Hyogo prefecture suggests a need for a strong 
political attitude as if Kansai becomes an independent state to achieve decentralization 
(2003 in Kansai Summit 2003 p46). On the other hand, the three governors oppose the 
enhanced autonomy of the designated cities, such as Osaka, Kyoto and Kobe because that 
"goes against the current (need) for regional approaches" (Sankei Newspaper 2002/8/8). 
They also oppose the Kansai-shu model because ofthe model's "concentration-and-
selection" efficiency strategy. They believe, "One of important roles of the public sector 
is to adjust this tendency (economic concentration in the free market system) to maintain 
balance" (from interview). What these three leaders wish to achieve for Kansai region's 
governance structure in future is based firmly on the public value of equity, opposing the 
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globalization-supported economic rationalism used by any level of government. A 
bureaucrat explains: 
The centralized developmental economic policies using the global economy as 
rationale is leading to Tokyo's further monocentric concentration and destroying 
rural communities. If one contemplates on this tendency, globalization, demand for 
decentralization and local regionalism have to become interrelated ... Regionalism is a 
means to demand political autonomy. Regionalism in Kansai makes sense only in this 
context because it is a means to defend all communities from the global economic 
logics (from interview). 
The leaders of the three major prefectures in the Kansai region try to "place" the 
regional space as the community of resistance to the logic of competitiveness as well as 
to the centralized Japanese political system. The starting point is their current territories, 
from which they intend to take time for an evolutionary, bottom-up process of rescaling. 
They propose to "order" the new place of regional community and equity that resist the 
logic of competitiveness and the "concentration-and-selection" and the "concentration-
and-command" logics derived from globalization. Finally, they try to downplay to use the 
name "Kansai" for economic competition against the Tokyo area. Rather, the use is 
aimed for local identity against the political concentration at the center/Tokyo and for 
local political determination and cooperation. The positioning ofKansai is similar to the 
positing adopted by the private sector: Kansai is positioned vis-a.-vis the central 
government/Tokyo. Yet, the criterion for the juxtaposition is more strongly based on 
political autonomy than the economic competitiveness. Whereas the private sector 
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considers political autonomy a means for economic growth, the governors think the 
economy as the means for local autonomy inclusive of rural communities. 
To summarize, the discourse of place-making in the Osaka area includes: 
• The private sector positions an extensive Kansai-shu as the regional space 
to defend local competitiveness. To this end, they demand political 
decentralization and justify the "concentration and selection" strategy for 
efficiency and uneven development. 
• The coalition of three governors seeks regional space based on their 
prefectures to resist the competitive logic of globalization and defends 
community values. Decentralization and economic development are means 
to this end. 
• Decentralization and regionalism are complementary for local economic 
development and political goals 
• Both private and pubic sector place "Kansai" in the local state scale 
having a horizontal relation to the central state. Local identity and 
determination are part of Kansai's regionalism 
Conditions of regionalism 
With inauguration of Kansai Council, Kansai took an early start for regionalism 
through the business sector's leadership. KC, however, is losing its momentum and 
becoming even the source of misunderstanding between the private sector and the public 
counterpart. All actors in Kansai agree on the general goal of Kansai's economic revival 
and cooperation but cannot go further. Apparently, the logic of global economy and 
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competitiveness needs alone cannot unite the strong place identities of Kansai' s local 
governments. Powerful economic organization KEF (2003) launched its version of 
regional government place, the Kansai-shu model with substantial determination. Yet the 
fundamental disagreements between the private sector and the public counterpart get in 
the way of the model's success. The goal of economic growth for the private sector and 
the communitarian values of the public sector clash over the order of the regional space: 
whether concentrate-and-command for efficiency or resistance against the globalization 
competitiveness logics. However, it is important that the two disagreeing sectors firmly 
agree on their demand for decentralization. The private sector and the pubic sector, 
jointly or separately, campaigns hard for higher local autonomy in the vertical 
intergovernmental relations for a local state status. 
As opposed to the apparent stalls of the private sector-led regionalism actions, the 
governors of Kyoto, Osaka and Hyogo prefectures made a gradual approach to seek the 
potential of regional rescaling in the Kansai region. This is not intended as an attempt to 
develop a regional government but to set up foundations of cooperation that has a 
potential for the creation of regional scale. Interestingly, this much less ambitious method 
to regionalism than the private sectors models appears to making forward moves. Thus, 
the horizontal intergovernmental relations in the Kansai region are not as pessimistic as 
the failed attempts by the private sector show. Perhaps it cannot be said that substantial 
regional planning for economic development is taking place in Kansai. Yet, regionalism 
as a voluntary shared attitude of local governments towards certain future mutual goals, it 
is budding in the Osaka area. 
The summary of the conditions of regionalism in the Osaka area includes: 
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• The leaders of private and the pubic sectors consider regionalism a means 
to achieve higher local autonomy in the vertical intergovernmental 
relations towards a local state status. 
• Horizontal intergovernmental relations are making slow progress toward 
potential political rescaling although only limited to between three 
prefectures. 
• Economic logic by itself does not progress regionalism. It appears to 
require political ideas. 
The Story of Regionalism in Osaka 
Politics of scale for regionalism in Kansai is an indication of potentials and limits 
of private-public partnership for political structuring. It asks the question of economic 
competitive needs versus public values under supposed pressure from globalization. In 
other words, it is casting the question whether local governments can resist globalization 
or not. Probably because of the combination between the Japanese tradition of high status 
given to the public sector and the strategic locations the three prefectures of Kyoto, 
Osaka and Hyogo include in their territories, they are currently in a position to be able to 
resist the demand for regional rescaling for economic competitiveness made by the 
private sector. However, many of these private leaders can leave the Kansai region if 
their frustration levels reach certain point. Thus, the future for the defense of public 
values can be very uncertain. 
The most fundamental issue facing the leaders of the Kansai region is, in their 
minds, the resurgence of Tokyo-oriented urban development policies conducted by the 
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central government. For Kansai's private sector, this is the cause of economic decline in 
the Osaka area. For the public sector, further Tokyo monocentric concentration destroys 
rural communities. The leaders in the Kansai region see the regime between central 
government, Tokyo's economic elites and TMG is still in play, creating extremely 
uneven development in the state as it has been for a long time. Observing this trend, the 
private and public leaders of the Kasai region share the same sentiment that they have to 
stand for strong political independence towards local statism. Regionalism is considered a 
political and economic development instrument for this objective. In this way, 
regionalism in Kansai entails local identity and political determination possible to make 






This chapter starts by juxtaposing the case study findings of Tokyo and Osaka 
described in the previous two chapters. Insights gained from the two regionalism 
developments will be compared for further analysis on the interactions between local and 
central governments. This will reveal how various levels of politics of scale interact to 
develop decentralization and regionalism and how globalization factors in the 
interactions. This analysis will also be connected to the literature for theoretical 
implications in the fields of globalization, regionalism and urban politics. I will then 
discuss the rhetorical strategy identified in the politics of scale in Tokyo and Osaka in the 
same theoretical context. Finally, the resistance exhibited against the regionalism for 
competitiveness by local public leaders will be examined as a topic of future discussion. 
Comparative Analysis of Regionalism in Tokyo and Osaka 
Table7-1 compares the defining aspects of regionalism in Tokyo and Osaka along 




categories/ Tokyo Osaka 
Properties 
Structural • Tokyo as the site and tool to solve • Structural disadvantages vis-a-vis 
forces: the national economic crisis. It is a Tokyo. Unfavorable 
Global part of national strategic policy intergovernmental relations: the 
economy and reform central government is the cause and 
state/urban • Anti-Tokyo monocentric result of the structural disadvantages 
restructuring concentration and support for the • Globalization amplifies the structural 
capital function relocation agenda disadvantages 
• The steady progress towards • Osaka Prefecture suffers from 
political decentralization reform particularly serious fiscal crisis 
Local • Tokyo overwhelms the • Rivalries and conflicts existing 
institutions: neighboring polities though its between the local governments 
Local culture, economic might • Including physically diverse, large 
history and • Cautious cooperation between sections of rural areas along major 
ecology Tokyo and its neighbors metropolitan areas 
• With economic centrality, TMG • The business sector active in local 
takes the political leadership in the governance and reform towards 
region regionalism and decentralization 
• Strategic identity as the state • Mistrust between the private and 
economic champion defines the public sectors while acknowledging 
common interest and the basis of the need for cooperation 
the regional cooperation 
Urban • A league of governors/mayors • The private sector and the public 
politics: forms a loose coalition for urban sector agree on the demand for 
Urban regime functional planning and regional decentralization but cannot create 
and political political goals strong coalition 
arena • The core political-economic • A firm alliance between the 
alliance functions through LDP to governors of the core prefectures, 
make major urban policies of Osaka, Hyogo and Kyoto exists, 
regionaVnational significance in making slow and modest but steady 
Tokyo. actions for regional development. 
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Table 7-1 (continued from the previous page) 
Tokyo Osaka 
Politics of • The regionalism advocated by the • Private sector presses to break state-
scale: Capital Region Summit stood on centralized nested scale system into 
Scale division the existing scale of local regional economic scale 
oflabor and government system. • Governors of Kyoto, Osaka and 
scalar • The core alliance of Hyogo try to pursue a scale of public 
expressions LDP/economic elite/TMG values in their regionalism to balance 
implemented politics of scale by against economic needs. 
which the ideology of global-urban • Decentralization and regionalism are 
competitive nexus replaced complementary for local economic 
traditional national scale state development and political goals 
developmentalism 
• Decentralization and regionalism 
are different matters 
Discourse of • TMG implements strategic • Leaders place "Kansai" in the local 
place-making: discourse to re-identify Tokyo as state scale having a horizontal (as in 
Place identity the engine of Japanese economy by federalism) relation to the central 
and positioning it in the scale of global state. Local identity and 
positioning competition. determination are part of regionalism 
• With this, a functional urban • Private sector positions Kansai-shu to 
region is demarcated for the place defend local competitiveness. 
of the Capital Region, including Coalition ofthree governors seeks 
only urbanized parts of the Tokyo regional space to resist the 
area, for urban competitiveness competitive logic and defends 
and productivity. community values. 
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Table 7-1 (continued from the previous page) 
Tokyo Osaka 
Conditions of • Functional regional planning and • Regionalism is a means to achieve 
regionalism: development is the main form of higher local autonomy with the 
Scale of new regionalism and scale. political scale of local state. 
localism • Regionalism strengthened the • Horizontal intergovernmental 
vertical relations between the relations make slow progress 
central and TMG. between three prefectures. 
• Regionalism as voluntary • Economic logic by itself fails to 
cooperation among the local progress regionalism. It requires 
governments is still tentative. political ideas. 
Story of With the discourse of global economy The most fundamental issue facing the 
regionalism and competitiveness, and the reality of leaders of the Kansai region is the 
Japanese economic crisis, the core resurgence of Tokyo-oriented urban 
political power of the state, in which development policies adopted by the 
TMG is central, implements regional central government. The private and 
urban redevelopment in Tokyo for the public leaders of the Kasai region 
"national" interest. Neoliberal market share the same sentiment that they 
principle and devolutionary have to stand for strong political 
denationalization characterize this independence for local statism. 
"national" political ideology as Regionalism is the instrument for the 
opposed to the traditional Japanese economic and political resurrection of 
national interest. Tokyo's Capital Kansai. 
Region Megalopolis plan symbolizes 
this ideological shift. 
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Tokyo and Osaka largely share the same structural factors such the demise of the 
growth era under globalization, the post-bubble economy recession, the public sector 
fiscal crisis and the decentralization reforms. Yet, these forces have had diverging 
bearings on the two city-regions. For Tokyo, they turned out to be a rather fortunate 
break: their most feared structural condition, the Tokyo relocation agenda was discarded 
and replaced with the re-emergence of Tokyo-centered "national" developmentalism. On 
the other hand, the impact was just the opposite for Osaka: the renewed Tokyo-centered 
state policy, combined with the globalization effects advantaging Tokyo, created a very 
bleak picture for Osaka's prospect. However, it was not that the fortunate event just 
presented itself to Tokyo. On the contrary, the governor ofTMG strongly influenced it as 
a powerful national political figure through the arena of ruling political party. Leaders in 
Osaka, who are also one way or another affiliated with the ruling party, are aware of this. 
The neighboring local governments ofTMG opportunistically support TMG's assertion 
that the capital region is the engine that can pull the Japanese national economy back to 
normal; the economic elites in the Osaka area try to counteract to the re-concentration at 
the capital region by pressing local politicians for regional economic planning. The 
strategy TMG took to influence the central government and its neighboring leaders was a 
politics of scale towards global-urban nexus. In this scalar nexus, TMG projected itself as 
the most competitive city-region in Japan. With this, it pressed the need for the central 
government to reinvest in the Tokyo area for competitiveness, argued for neoliberalism in 
place of the even national development subsumed in the Japanese political system, and 
persuaded the neighboring leaders to consider the capital region as the space of urban 
functionality for competitiveness. The rationale is based on the "national" interest but the 
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ideological goal is highly biased towards the development of powerful Tokyo at the cost 
of the rest. The central government decision makers went along this concept of political 
economy. 
In the Osaka area, the private sector, having seen the historic pattern of Tokyo's 
growth sponsored by the central government, determines that they can reassert their 
economic strength only after having their own political representation at the local level. 
With this conviction, they have gone a great length to organize private-public 
partnerships for the goal of local state making. The proposal for Kansai-shu is analogous 
to a revolution calling for the declaration oflocal independence. However, its extensive 
size, spanning over nine prefectures to collect resources from as wide areas as possible, is 
found unwieldy for consensus making. The rural/urban diversity and historic local 
identities within the region cannot tolerate the economic interest's "concentration-and-
command" single-mindedness for competitiveness. Against this deadlock, the governors 
of the core prefectures Kyoto, Osaka and Hyogo slowly implement rescaling towards 
regional local state based on the scale that balances the need of economic growth and the 
public values of equity and democratic procedures. Nevertheless, Kansai's private and 
pubic sectors agree that they have to strengthen local autonomy and that they have to 
make regional cooperation for that purpose. For the leaders of all sectors in Kansai, the 
centralized nested government system, which allows the central government to privilege 
Tokyo, has to be changed. In this way, in Kansai, regionalism and decentralization are 
combined for political ends. 
The above comparison of regionalism in Tokyo and Osaka reveals the strategic 
interactions between the two areas: economic and political impacts flowing from Tokyo 
188 
to Osaka while policy initiatives taken at Osaka to respond. As a matter of fact, these 
flows of political and economic influences and policy counteractions are not direct. 
Rather, they are conducted through the policies implemented by the central government. 
It is the central government from which TMG gained the national champion status while 
leaders in Kansai negotiate with the central government for political autonomy. Thus, it is 
important to include the central government for analysis to fully understand the nature of 
competitive interactions between Tokyo and Osaka and their regionalism. To this end, the 
following section conducts an analysis that situates the rivalry between Tokyo and Osaka 
in the historic developments of the Japanese political system traced in Chapter IV. 
Process of Rescaling in Japan 
The following Figures 7-1 a, -1 b and -1 c represent the relationship between the 
international/global economy, Japanese central government, subnational governments 
(prefectures and TMG) and local governments (cities). For simplification, the explanation 
includes only TMG, Kanagawa Prefecture and Yokohama City as local governments in 
the Tokyo area, and Osaka Prefecture, Osaka City, Hyogo Prefecture and Kobe City as 
counterparts in the Osaka area. Kanagawa Prefecture is the largest among the 
neighboring prefectures of Tokyo and Y okahama City is its capital. The statuses of 
Hyogo Prefecture and Kobe City are the same to Osaka. These three stylized figures 
represent three distinct stages of Japanese political system and their vertical and 
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Diagram 7-1 a describes the conditions under the centralized developmental state 
traditional to Japanese political system. The relationship between the central government 
and local governments are hierarchically connected with central bureaus administering a 
welfare state system. Clientelism makes sure local needs are reflected though central-
local political channels. Prefectures are local agencies for the central government to 
supervise local standards of living and redistribute economy for even national 
development. Prefectures supervise cities likewise. As explained, Tokyo has a 
metropolitan government. TMG implements the distributive and redistributive functions 
through their word system. In this state system, horizontal relations are competitive 
despite the redistributive policy because the local governments compete for central 
resources. As for economic development, the central government directs industries and 
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manages international trade negotiations, by which definable national political/economic 
boundaries exists in the international market. 
With this centralized developmentalism and welfare state system, Japan's national 
economy and local governments experienced a robust economic growth since the post-
war period ofthe 1950s until the 1980s. Tokyo grew more rapidly and widely than the 
rest of the state as the capital, where the centralized political system created the 
concentration of politics, economy and culture. Competition existed between local 
governments: Osaka always tried to narrow the gap against Tokyo. Within regions, Osaka 
City and Kobe City were competitors. Yokohama City also competed against Tokyo. 
Kobe and Yokohama were rivals as Japan's international ports. Vertical conflicts existed 
as well. Rivalries between Yokohama and Kanagawa, Osaka City and Osaka Prefecture, 
and Kobe and Hyogo were often fierce. Yet, as a system, cities nested in prefecture 
governments, which, in tum, nested in the national state as a single political system for 
overall national identity and development. Tokyo's growth was accepted as a national 
symbol in this political structure. 
This nested harmony of the post-war Japan started to dissonate in the 1980s. The 
negative aspects of the centralized political system, such as oligarchy, clientelism and 
Tokyo's substantial outgrowth over other areas caused corruption and extreme land 
prices in the capital region. These problems were described as the consequences of the 
Tokyo monocentric concentration. This led to a political environment calling for reforms 
in the 1980s. Since then, neoliberal reforms towards privatization and decentralization 
have been major Japanese political issues. One of the most important political decisions 
made during this period was the resolution to promote the relocation of capital function. 
191 
It was considered the best policy to solve political, economic and social problems 
festered the Japanese society during the post-war growth era. At the same time during the 
1980s, economic globalization was gathering pace with increasing foreign direct 
investments and liberal international trade policies among advanced nations. In this 
environment, Japanese national economic barriers and boundaries were also becoming 
porous. Tokyo was booming during the 1980s because of the success of central 
government trade/industrial policies, expansionary government spending and intense land 
market boom. However, as the 1990s began, so did the demise of the upward-slope 
economy. A combination of Japan's integration into the global economy, consequent 
domestic economic policies and the economy booming on highly speculative investments 
conspired to create an economic crisis with sudden downturns and prolonged recession 
through the 1990s. This was called the burst of the bubble economy. It marked an 
economic and political turning point. The bubble burst stirred loss of confidence in the 
Japanese centralized developmentalism and local political leaders invigorated their 
demand for political autonomy. The call for the relocation of capital continued. After 
protracted negotiations, a comprehensive decentralization bill passed in the late 1990s, 
granting increased administrative autonomy to prefecture governments. The following 
Diagram 7-1b describes the Japanese political conditions of this period. 
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Diagram 7-1 b 
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Compared to the previous picture, the national economy is increasingly included 
in the global economic system. The linkages between the central government and 
prefectures have become weaker under decentralization reforms. Meanwhile, cities have 
increased their economic power and political strengths during this period. As the actual 
sites of production and headquarter functions in the global economic networks, cities 
have become directly connected to the global economy. These effects have caused the 
loosening of the nested system. As Japan's world city, Tokyo particularly benefited from 
the global economy while Osaka lost many business headquarters to Tokyo for an 
increased Tokyo monocentric concentration. Leaders in Osaka looked for solutions in 
regional, long-term development plans in the late 1980s, including a key major project, 
the Kansai International Airport completed in 1994. 
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In the latter half of the 1990s, the seriousness of the Japanese economic problem 
deepened and the central government made frantic public expenditures to stimulate 
economy. However, they turned out not only ineffective but exacerbating the situation. 
The public investments created huge budget deficits in the central as well as local 
governments. Osaka Prefecture became the most troubled under this condition. 
Ambitious projects, including the Kansai International Airport, failed under the recession 
only to leave massive public debts. To make the matters worse, corporate taxes declined 
partly because of few businesses in Osaka making profits and partly because many left to 
Tokyo. At the central government, to solve the economic crisis, the Economic Strategy 
Conference was convened between August 1998 and February 1999 to recommend a 
Tokyo-centered urban revitalization. Neoliberal economic policy believers took the 
decisive influence in this conference to reform the inefficiency of Japanese centralized 
developmental welfare state. It is important to remember that then prime minister who 
sponsored this conference first resisted following the urban oriented neoliberal policy 
recommendation. It was the interest groups based in Tokyo that changed the direction 
towards the urban-oriented policy and to redevelop the capital region. In this way, the 
interest ofTMG and real estate/construction industries based in Tokyo was strongly 
reflected in this policy solution and the geographic political economy of national state 
was rescaled from the nation-wide to the urban. Shintaro Ishihara, who became the 
governor ofTMG in April 1999, was a part of this interest group. Having being elected as 
the governor ofTMG, he moved to convince the central government to take up TMG's 
regional urban development plan as the state urban renaissance plan. This worked. The 
central government virtually canceled the capital relocation agenda in 2000 and shifted its 
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development policy back to Tokyo-orientation in 2001 to accept accelerated Tokyo 
mono centric concentration. 
Meanwhile, having seen the regional economic development plans and its main 
project, the Kansai International Airport, failing, the business leaders in Kansai became 
increasingly desperate. The policy decision by the Economic Strategy Conference to 
reinvest in Tokyo confirmed the re-strengthened alliance between the central government 
and the interest groups in Tokyo. In 2002, Kansai's economic leaders convened for their 
own version of economic strategic conference, the Kansai Industry Competitiveness 
Conference. Among many recommendations, a regional development plan called Kansai-
shu model was published. Its main objective was to gain local political autonomy, which 
was believed essential for local economic development. The private leaders have since 
tried to persuade Kansai region's public leaders to follow the Kansai-shu model. 
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Diagram 7-1 c depicts the conditions under this political development. The central 
government and TMG/the capital region increased political linkages, with neighboring 
local governments opportunistically aligning themselves with the Capital Region 
Megalopolis plan, which includes only urbanized areas as functional regional planning. 
Thus, regionalism is not very political and is a separate issue from local autonomy and 
decentralization in the capital region. Instead, the goal of the regionalism is to increase 
the competitiveness of the capital region in the global marketplace through improved 
urban functions. This economic goal justifies that the central government supports further 
Tokyo monocentric concentration. In response, the leaders in Kansai, despite 
disagreement on ultimate objectives, cooperatively seek local autonomy from the central 
government. They pursue substantive independence from the state scale system which 
privileges Tokyo. To make this separation economically feasible, some sort of regional 
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cooperation is inevitable. The public leaders resist the urgent, extensive and top-down 
regional governance method subsumed in the Kansai-shu model; the public sector groups 
together, particularly between Kyoto, Osaka and Hyogo prefectures, towards local 
political independence towards local state in the global market. In this way, in the Osaka 
area, decentralization and regionalism are complementary and conditional for each other. 
The combined effects from the urban-orientation in the central governmentlTMG 
and the local statism in the Kansai region amount to weakened nested state system in 
which local governments will find themselves more exposed to the global economy as 
illustrated in Diagram 7 -c. 
Decentralization, Regionalism and Globalization 
The above section made an accentuated review of the historical process in which 
Japan and its two world cities have experienced political rescaling and regionalism. 
Based on this case study, this section looks into the relationship between decentralization, 
regionalism and globalization for theoretical understanding. 
Decentralization has been an important political agenda since late 1980s in Japan. 
During the 1990s, political debate for decentralization grew to a major political battle 
between local government leaders and the central bureaucracy. Eventually, the struggle 
gave the birth to a historic legislation of the Comprehensive Decentralization Promotion 
Law in 1999. This law allowed prefectures for an equal legal status with the central 
government for political sovereignty. Although its substance was rather limited, it 
became a turning point for further decentralization negotiations. 
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The reason behind the political thrust toward decentralization in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s was the economic polarization in Japan, known as the Tokyo 
monocentric concentration, the cause of which was Japan's traditional political system 
and policy. Globalization of economy helped Tokyo's superiority over other Japanese 
cities but this was not a crucial factor for the Tokyo mono centric concentration. Tokyo 
became dominant during the 1960s after its hosing of Olympic Games, i.e. before 
globalization. Thus, it was the policy, political structure and socio-political culture that 
turned Tokyo to a giant in Japan. After long campaigns mainly fought by local leaders, 
particularly governors, the Comprehensive Decentralization Promotion Law of 1999 was 
passed to change this centralized political culture. 
Regionalism became a major political topic in the Osaka area in the 1980s, when 
the growth gap between Tokyo and Osaka became particularly conspicuous. Figure 7-1b 
represents the political developments in this period. Explanations for the accelerating 
economic growth of Tokyo in this decade include that Tokyo was a world city in the 
globalizing economy. However, Tokyo's world city status was a result from years of 
central policies giving advantages to Tokyo. Against this background, Kansai's first 
major regional development planning took place in the 1980s as a response to such 
Tokyo-biased central government policies. In contrast, there was no remarkable regional 
planning initiative taken by the local governments in the capital region during the same 
period. The Capital Region Summit already existed in the 1980s but their activities were 
very limited. 
In the most recent regionalism in Tokyo and Osaka, which were explained in the 
above section with Figure 7-1c, we see important differences between the two areas. 
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Regionalism in the capital region was considered irrelevant to local decentralization 
demand. It was purely functional to improve the quality of urban life in the capital region 
for global competitiveness. In contrast, regionalism and decentralization are highly 
integrated in the Osaka area. There, regionalism was considered a necessary condition for 
decentralization: regionalism was expected to produce economic vitality and to provide 
collective identity to support the political claim for local sovereignty over claimed space. 
The differing natures of politics of scale engaged in Tokyo and Osaka account for 
the difference in the nature regionalism. The central government was in deep trouble in 
the late 1990s under severe economic recession. With then new decentralization law 
having being passed, the scale of national state was changing, yet not fundamentally from 
the traditional hierarchical nested system. The politics of scale promoted by Tokyo 
Metropolitan Government and its core coalition swept away the hesitation felt by the 
central administration for neoliberalism. The TMG-based coalition placed Japan in the 
global scale. With this competition framework, they succeeded in identifying Tokyo as 
Japan's growth pole in the global scale of economy. In this scale division oflabor and 
place identity, Tokyo positioned itself as the champion of the national economic interest. 
Under the dubbed scales of the nation and Tokyo, the capital region projected itself as the 
nation. Local decentralization of the capital region was not an important issue in Tokyo 
and decentralization and regionalism were not connected. 
On the other hand, the leaders in the Osaka area find the need to fight off the 
Tokyo-oriented state development policy. Their politics of scale begins with the denial of 
the scale of national state. They identity their region as sovereign local state in the global 
market and position it as a peer to the central government/Tokyo coalition. In their scale 
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division of labor, the Kansai region, however its space is defined, is a space of the 
political economy of Kansai in the global-local scale. Consequently, in Kansai, 
regionalism and decentralization are mutually reinforcing, integral elements of local 
statism. 
The two Japanese world cities take different paths to pursue regionalism under 
globalization. Yet, fundamentally, both act for economic survival, which became the 
main goal oflocal governments under globalization. The motivation behind Tokyo's 
regionalism is to reestablish its economic supremacy. On its way, it persuades the central 
administration to give up the welfare state model. Meanwhile motivation behind Osaka's 
regionalism is to achieve economically viable decentralization in counter to the political 
alignment between Tokyo and the central government. This shows that new economic 
reality of globalization echoes in differing ways in the horizontal as well as vertical 
intergovernmental relations of Japanese political system. Uneven impacts of globalization 
on cities and their competitive prospects propel local leaders to respond politically and in 
different manners for their best interests. Intergovernmental relations, both vertical and 
horizontal, are the main policy instruments for the leaders of Tokyo and Osaka areas in 
their political actions. In Japan, it is these locally-initiated policy interactions that are 
creating decentralization and regionalization. These political interactions for rescaling at 
the local level are the consequences of globalization. 
Rhetorical Process of Regionalism 
Local leaders in Tokyo and Osaka implemented politics of scale. The attempt of 
the Tokyo Metropolitan Government (TMG) for functional regionalism was successful in 
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that the central government adopted the scale division oflabor designed by TMG while 
the neighboring governments acceded to the tenets ofTMG's regional planning: the 
capital region was the economic engine of Japan, capital function should not be relocated, 
and the state should redevelop the region accordingly. On the other hand, TMG's 
regional planning was not successful in that the neighboring local governments were not 
involved in the decision-making processes of the regional plans. In the Osaka area, its 
private sector's regionalism plan faced a stiff resistance from their public counterparts. 
Realization of Kansai -shu model proposed by the Kansai Economic Federation (KEF) 
appears very remote unless provided with some unexpected breakthrough. In the 
meantime, a coalition of the three governors from Kyoto, Osaka and Hyogo share the 
same idea about the future of the Kansai region and is making gradual steps towards 
regional solutions. If regionalism was defined stringently as the voluntary intention and 
capability to collaborate for common goals over mutually shared political space, the 
coalition of the three governors is making the best progress among the three attempts. 
Table 7-2 compares the elements of discourse identified in the place-making in 
these three cases (scale division oflabor, scale structure, identity, positioning). 
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Table 7-2 
KEF Three Governors TMG 
Scale • Kansai region • Kansai region • Capital region 
division of representing local representing local public representing the national 
labor economic interest responsibilities scale as its champion 
• Kansai region standing • Kansai region standing • Capital region 
as a local state in the as a local state in the representing Japanese 
global economy global economy nation state as its world 
city competing in the 
global economy 
Scale • Global-local scale • Global-local scale • Global-national/local 
structure scale 
Identity • Local state • Local state • National champion 
• Space of economic • Space of public • Space of urban 
growth community competitiveness 
Positioning • Local state vis-a-vis • Local state vis-a-vis • Japanese world city-
other world cities other world cities region vis-a-vis other 
• Central gov/Tokyo vis- • Central gov/Tokyo vis- world cities 
a-vis Kansai nexus a-vis Kansai nexus • Central gov/Tokyo vis-
a-vis the rest of Japan 
The objective of politics of scale is to create and justify a particular spatial scale 
by which shared interests and mutual-dependence of communities are claimed in spatial 
form. Identity based on the space of shared interest and mutual-dependence is the bases 
for local state. The analysis in this section examines the process by which discourse 
assists political actors to assert the legitimacy and relevance of their scalar definitions and 
territorial claims. Regionalism is considered an example in which place-based identities 
and interests are produced through politics of scale. Redefining of spatial identity and 
regionalization of local governments are implemented by an adoption of new scale while 
there factors occur recursively and in mutually reinforcing manners. The following three 
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regionalism attempts in Japan explain the interactive process of new scale adoption and 
redefining of local identity and its positioning. 
KEF's goal is to establish a space of economic growth in Kansai. This is 
positioned against the central government/Tokyo coalition in a scale division oflabor 
because KEF believes political autonomy conditional for local economic growth. 
Therefore, identity of local state status is essential for them to develop a regional 
representation of economic interest in Osaka. To justify this scale division oflabor, they 
realize they need to establish a new scale order. The scale of Japanese state identifies all 
local governments positioned as members of the national state cooperating for national 
goals. Therefore, KEF needed to undermine this national sate scale order to assert new 
political space in Kansai. To this end, KEF asserts the prevalence of global scale and its 
impact on the local economy of Kansai in the global-local scale. 
The regionalism attempt by the coalition of three governors in Kansai also 
includes local state as its identity positioned against the central government/Tokyo 
coalition. However, the scale division oflabor assigned for their regional state includes 
public representation of all communities in the Kansai region (within their prefectures) as 
well as the economic interests of urbanized areas. Thus, the identity of their local state 
can be defined as a space of public interest. Yet, to emphasize the political independence 
from the central government, the governors also position Kansai in the global-local scale 
order, analogous to KEF's rationale. 
TMG's strategy differs from these two regionalism actions in Osaka. Governor 
Ishihara's regional goal is to construct a competitive world city-region in Tokyo. With 
this identity, he argued for concentrated investments from the central government. To 
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rationalize this identity and policy, TMG position the space of Tokyo against other world 
cities as well as against the rest of Japan in the division of labor. TMG identifies the 
capital region as the national champion positioned as the representative of Japanese 
economic interest in the global-national/local scale order. In this rhetoric, the scale of 
capital region is dubbed over the scale of national. The national economic interest and the 
capital region's competitiveness are equalized as the interest of Japanese nation state. In 
so doing, Tokyo's politics of scale stimulates politics of scale in other locales. The 
stronger Tokyo's politics of scale becomes, the more urgent for the leaders of Osaka, 
among other local leaders, to implement their own politics of scale to establish regional 
political economy through local statism. 
Regardless of the differences in the three politics of scale, a common factor exists. 
Their rhetorical claim for the existence of global scale is virtually unquestioned. 
Economic globalization and subsequent need for local competitiveness are accepted as 
given by decision-makers at national and local levels. This strongly helps to make 
arguments plausible for the repositioning of local identity and reframing of regional 
territories of common interest. The acceptance of global scale in place of national control 
over the economy of nation state is the basis for the politics of scale by local leaders and 
for the regional rescaling from below. Rhetoric matters in this politics of scale. 
From Below Rescaling to the Limits of Urban Politics 
Politics of scale implemented by Japanese local leaders described above 
exemplifies from-below restructuring of intergovernmental relations. TMG conducted 
bottom-up political rescaling to change the nature of external structures to their polity. 
204 
The centralized developmental welfare state pursued in the traditional Japanese political 
system was a constraint for Tokyo to enhance its competitiveness in the global 
marketplace. Given this, TMG changed the nature of state political ideology toward 
urban-centered neoliberalism through its politics of scale. Japan's top-down "nested" 
political system has been restructured as a result. The consequent regional revitalization 
plan allowed the capital region to improve its position in the global marketplace. In 
response, the political leaders in the Osaka area campaigned for stronger local autonomy 
while taking steps to increase regional political integration. In this way, the leaders in the 
Osaka area also reconfigure the hierarchical nested system ofthe Japanese political 
system, through which it also aims for better competitiveness. 
These local political initiatives of Japanese world cities demonstrate the 
capabilities of local leaders to alter the nature of structural constraints from below. The 
interactions of politics of scale between the central government and local governments 
illustrated through Figures 7-1a, 7-1b and 7-1c in the above section is the trace of from-
below political changes, where local actors increasingly made policy decisions of 
national influence. This shows the capability oflocalleaders restructuring the central-
local government relations. This capability should be taken into consideration in order to 
understand the urban political decision process. This is particularly so under globalization 
because globalization provides local leaders with more opportunity for politics of scale as 
explained in the above section. 
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Local Resistance to globalization 
The above analyses indicate that the concepts of "local community" and "local 
interest" are detennined by the scalar perspectives with which political leaders view their 
political space. The most relevant scalar perspective to define the "local community" and 
"local interest" are, in turn, detennined by perceived advantages: differing special scopes 
of political territory are compared and the "most advantageous" is detennined politically. 
In the past, the political sovereignty of the central government and their scope of nation 
state as the common political territory were unquestioned in Japan. This concept of 
national interest is now manipulated as well as challenged by local leaders. 
In Tokyo, TMG adopted the scale of global-national/local order. In this scalar 
order, they identified a functionally-defined urban area as the capital region and 
positioned it as the economic champion for the Japanese nation while the other parts as 
inconsequential. Consequently, only those areas contributing to the competitiveness of 
the capital region should be included in the capital region. In Osaka, the three governors 
similarly adopted the scale of global-local order. However, in addition to economic 
advantages, they consider political autonomy and community values as well for the 
ideological basis of territorial scaling. Therefore, although economic development was an 
important goal, their space of region is inclusive, covering rural areas as well as 
urbanized places. In this way, relevant scale and space are politically detennined, rather 
than rationally, for "local interest," "local community" and, thus, the space oflocal state. 
The political detennination of scale suggests possibility that local communities 
can resist the rescaling towards economic competitiveness promoted under the economic 
globalization logic and defend territorial integrity based on communitarian values. 
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Indeed, in the Osaka area, politics of scale based on communitarian values have been 
resisting KEF's Kansai-shu model designed for "concentration and selection" strategy. 
Elite economic motivation tries to pull resources within a political territory towards the 
most strategic "growth pole" to implement orchestrated development policies. The 
economic "pull" destroys existing scale of communities by marginalizing public values 
supported under existing administrative boundaries. In Japan, prefectures tend to 
maintain a sense of spatial commonwealth through redistribution between the urbanized 
and rural areas within their territories. In the Osaka area, Hyogo, Kyoto, Nara, and Shiga 
prefectures insist on the public values and have been successful in fending off the 
economically-driven regionalism, which tries to concentrate resources only on 
competitive areas and divest itself of rural/uncompetitive areas. In the Tokyo area, Chiba 
Prefecture persistently resists the regional influence of Tokyo's economic growth. Its 
governor, Akiko Doumoto launches her politics of scale to stress "Chiba Sovereignty" 
and to establish a place-based identity that can resist Tokyo's economic logic towards 
functional regionalism. In contrast, at the state level, the economic competitiveness logic 
appears winning: the regime based in Tokyo has successfully rescaled the spatial 
meaning of "national" interest to adjust to uneven development located in the strongest 
global city-region. 
The case of Japan shows that national state is vulnerable to the competitiveness 
arguments raised by its growth pole, Tokyo. After all, the scalar interest of the central 
government is aggregate. What matters is the sum of its subnational governments and 
their economies. Thus, sacrifice of part for overall growth is a viable option for the 
central government. Even local government officials accept this decision logic, "As the 
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representative of the nation state, the central government is obligated to invest in the 
strongest cities" (from interview). The contradiction of concentrated urban investment 
while implementing decentralization reforms occurs under this condition. Japanese post-
bubble-economy recession occurred mainly as a result of policy failures at the central 
government. It can be argued that now globalization is politically introduced by strong 
local leaders based in Tokyo to counter these policy failures for their advantages. What 
followed in this politics of scale is the breaking up of a "space of community." The 
Japanese national community was divided into the economic champion deserving of 
national investments and the rest. 
In the capital region, the space of community defended by prefectures is being 
divided into areas that are competitive and those that are otherwise. In Kansai, the logic 
of "concentration and selection" will be a constant threat to the public values protected by 
the existing government space. Viability of the resistance against globalization exhibited 
by these government leaders depends on the fundamental question: when, on what 






Based on the analysis results discussed in Chapter VII, this chapter responds to 
the research questions described in Chapter I, namely: 1) how globalization, political 
decentralization and local regionalism interrelate, 2) what political leaders do to 
implement regional rescaling under globalization, and 3) how local communities can 
resist the rescaling driven by economic competitiveness. This chapter concludes this 
research with an overall conclusion and implications for future research. 
Research Goal, Questions and Findings Scheme 
Before starting concluding descriptions, a schematic diagram (Figure 8-1) would 
help to clarify the relationships between the research goal, questions and objectives on 
the one hand, and the feedback loops from research findings and conclusions to the 
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local actions in the strategic interactions of local leaders 
government restructuring 
/ and their from-below politics of scale 
Finding Two: 
Rhetorical creation of Conclusion Two: 
~ scale, place identity and r--+ Structuration of global scale is central to I---positioning constitute the discourse of politics of scale 
politics of scale 
Finding Three: Conclusion Three: 
Equity problem in local r---. The scope of government determines the -~ government rescaling resistance against rescaling for 
competitiveness 
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The overall goal of this research is to clarify theoretical ambiguity as to the effects 
of globalization on government structure and intergovernmental relations. Available 
theories in the literature tend to explain only certain aspects of governmental structure 
affected under globalization. Generally, these theories are limited in capturing the 
dynamic political reactions and interactions, horizontally as well as vertically, among 
various levels of governments. For example, many observe the declining control of 
national government over local affairs. World cities theory asserts the emerging 
significance of world city networks and declining importance of national states. 
Regulation theorists explain the "hollowing out" of national governments and 
"glocalization" based on central government neoliberal policies. Economic geographers 
describe the formation of new regional economic agglomerations, again undermining the 
relevance of existing political boundaries and national political space. Others observe 
increased local political activities under globalization. New localism stresses increased 
local political activities under globalization. Some see regionalism occurring based on the 
reassertion of traditional local identity and history. On the other hand, there are 
researchers who insist on the remaining influence of the national government and the 
firmness of the nested institutions mediating global economic forces on cities and local 
governments. New localism and cultural identity regionalism include from-below 
intergovernmental political actions. Nested scale theory also explains interactions 
between different levels of governments. However, they do not see competitive 
interactions between local governments in relation to the central government 
involvement. This study, on the other hand, has taken a holistic approach to examine 
strategic interactions between different government actors competing for central 
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government aid as well as for higher economic growth to explain the dynamic nature of 
political restructuring resulting from economic globalization. 
In the remainder of this section, I will connect the political actions and 
developments of the Japanese case study explained in Chapter VII to the research 
questions to respond to the research goal. The findings obtained from this study are based 
on a single case study including only two observation sites. Thus, extrapolation of the 
finding to other countries and environments is not warranted. The purpose of discussions 
and conclusions in the following sections is to gain insights for further analysis and 
research. 
How do globalization, political decentralization and local regionalism interrelate? 
The first research question was posed as an operationalized form of government 
rescaling under globalization. Answers to this question directly account for the content 
and nature of globalization's effects on the existing sociopolitical institutions. After 
1980's economic boom came the bust of the 1990s. The competition between local 
governments for central government aid became particularly acute, accentuated by a plan 
to move the capital from Tokyo to a new location. Now it became Tokyo that had the 
highest stake in the central government decision. To convince the central government of 
the continued viability of Tokyo as Japan's world city and economic engine, TMG 
launched a regional development plan that would make the city competitive in the top-
tier world city league. The retention of the capital and further investments in Tokyo by 
the central government were the objectives. Tokyo's neighboring governments could not 
complain despite the fact that TMG, without consultation, made development plans to 
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their territories because of their need for TMG's economic strength and capital status. 
TMG in practice sold this regional planning to the central government along with a new 
political ideology that justified further investments in Tokyo despite furthering uneven 
national development. The central government had a reason to buy this plan: it had to 
agree that the rebuilding of Tokyo was the most effective way to reverse the economic 
crisis and compete in the global economy. The scale ofthe national state had been 
reduced to the size of its world city. These developments in Japan contain all the 
elements of globalization theories on government change: 
• The hierarchical effects of world cities and the increased economic 
importance of city relative to the national government 
• The national government accepted the glocalization of Japanese state 
• New regional economic agglomeration became the basis of a local planning 
scope 
• A local government successfully changed the national urban policy 
• Historic identity of Tokyo was used to portray it as the core of its region as 
well as the center of Japan 
• Tokyo still had to rely on the planning authority and finance of the national 
government for the revitalization of the capital region 
If the story of Japanese government rescaling had stopped here, no new 
theoretical proposal would have been needed. But it did not. The number two city-region 
of Osaka was particularly alarmed by the further coalition between the central 
government and TMG. It responded it with two fronts: demand for political autonomy, 
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along with other local government leaders, and the plan for regionalism to enhance 
economic capability and independence. Some other regions considered similar plans. 
The motivation behind this from-below government rescaling efforts was strategic: 
recognizing what was occurring in the competitive environment and what would likely to 
happen in the future, the leaders of Kansai region took actions. It was a response to a 
competing political action rather than to simple global economic effects on local 
governments. Osaka's leaders still tried to receive financial aids from the central 
government but they were opportunistic efforts; the intention for local statism among the 
leaders was firm. The consequence was one step toward a fragmentation of once a solidly 
centralized unitary state as explained in Chapter VII. 
In this way, uneven economic effects of globalization were translated into 
political competition between within-state rivals over central government aid. Given the 
lack of central help, leaders of the regions that missed central government aid sought 
local statehood. For the economic viability of the local state, the leaders implement from-
below regionalism campaigns along with decentralization efforts. The consequence is the 
combination of decentralization and regionalization under globalization, explaining the 
effects of globalization on political system and the mechanism and political logic 
involved in such restructuring. 
This theoretical approach to globalization and its effects on government do not 
contradict existing theories in the literature. On the contrary, as described above, this 
local strategic interactive approach supplements them by weaving them together. By 
introducing the strategic actions of local actors to the existing theories, it can reconcile 
theories considered contradictory; such as world cities thesis and the nested scale theory; 
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and state glocalization and new localism; as relevant aspects of political dynamics 
demonstrated in the actions of local leaders and in their relation to the central 
government. . 
What do political leaders do to implement regional rescaling under globalization? 
The second question is about the content of from-below political actions 
implemented by local leaders. Specifically, the analytical subject is the function of 
rhetorical arguments political leaders use to reformulate the concept of place identity and 
positioning for institutional rescaling. This study observed three political discourses of 
regionalism. Although the progress, status, and strategies of the regionalism actions taken 
by KEF, Kansai's three governors and TMG differ, they all try to establish global scale as 
given rhetorically and explain the need for competitiveness under this scale. Based on 
this new framework, political leaders then maneuver the concepts of place identity and 
positioning to redefine who and which areas share common interests and what are the 
threats to them. Identities of individual membership to place would also be assigned 
during this process (Smith 1992). Through this rhetorical process, political elites rescale 
the space of local commonwealth. In other words, discourse on global scale can trigger a 
new scalar sociopolitical structure. Human agent's political actions for the existence of 
global scale and its effects on places can be raised to a social structure. This research 
provides an empirical account of global scale being turned into structural reality through 
a politically motivated rhetoric process. 
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How can local communities resist the rescaling driven by economic competitiveness? 
The final objective of this study is to develop arguments that build normative 
grounds for the scope and role of local governments under globalization. This study has 
observed the tension, contradiction and correlation between political scale and economic 
scale. Politics of scale implemented by the Japanese central government, Tokyo 
Metropolitan Government (TMG) and the Kansai Economic Federation (KEF) 
fundamentally attempt to redefine what areas are in their core space of economic 
development and what others, outside the space of shared economic interest. The 
discrimination function of scale to determine insiders and outsiders is palpable, 
implicating economic improvements of one group at the cost to the others. This 
observation demonstrates that ideology of political economy has strong bearing on the 
determination of scale. As described in the above section, the effects of globalization are 
rhetorically amplified. TMG and KEF both tried to justify their rescaling by resorting to 
this rhetoric to defend the legitimacy of exclusively defined spatial interests. 
The politics of scale being pursued by the governors of Kyoto, Osaka and Hyogo 
is rooted in the desire for political independence from the central government as well as 
from the global competitiveness logic. For them, economic growth and regionalism are 
means to this end. Their resistance against the economic determinism has been firm but it 
is uncertain as to how much longer they can sustain it. The economic conditions of the 
area continue to stagnate under Japan's prolonged economic recession. Fiscal conditions 
of the three prefectures are under severe constraints. This prompts the question, should 
they resist globalization? Should they not rather concentrate resources on their growth 
pole? The answer exists in the logic of competitiveness promoted by TMG and KEF. As 
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explained above, their rescaling logic creates winners and losers and would continue to 
do so in search of most competitive core urban region under the scale of global economy. 
This pursuit of competitiveness cannot sustain democracy, for equitable participation is 
denied. In addition, such society would severely undermine economic vitality, for society 
without institutional trust lacks economic capabilities (e.g. Amin 1999; Healey 1999; 
Putnam 1994). More importantly, the pathological social consequences of divided 
unproductive society must not be forgotten. 
The logic of competitiveness is the logic of market that demotes the "space of 
community" to the scale of sectionalized competition. A local leader in the Osaka area 
explains, "After all, the market principle has the centralization tendency regardless of the 
scale. One of the important roles of the public sector is to adjust this tendency to maintain 
balance ... For this purpose, regionalism in Kansai makes sense. It is a means to defend 
the local communities" (from interview). The role oflocal governments exists for this 
very objective when the logic of global competition is taking the upper hand and the 
space of the nation-state is giving in to this logic. It can be argued that local governments 
are in a better position to promote the scope of the public sector than the national 
government because the proximity to citizens is closer and geographic diversity is less. 
Local governments should not hesitate to defend community values through the concepts 
of "space of community" and intrinsic interest of place. 
Rescaling the city limits: implication for new urban model 
It is the politics of scale referring to globalization and played out in the domestic 
political environment of Japan that created new tension to the economic interests of 
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various local governments, which were previously fixed at the national scale. In this 
politics of scale, this study showed that local leaders have had significant impacts in the 
rescaling of Japanese political structure. Defining the global as the scale for new local 
identity and positioning, local political leaders can and do change the nature of the 
political and economic constraints that have been limiting the scope of local policy 
choice. Consequently, the model of urban development and politics should reconsider the 
theses ofthe "city limits" and "dependent city." The constrains imposed by the 
intergovernmental relations and local economic conditions in the global marketplace 
should be relaxed to accommodate the from-below capability of local polities 
implementing regional rescaling. 
Conclusion 
This study demonstrated the capability of local political actors in shaping the form 
and scale of government and governance in the global economy to fully account for the 
effects of globalization on the structure of government. We observed the centrality of 
local actors in rescaling of government that resulted from globalization by observing 
decentralization and regionalization activities in Japan. 
Globalization no doubt includes purely economic impact on various localities and 
scales of communities. Yet, reactions to it by decision-makers appear incapable of being 
purely economic. Local leaders, facing the effects of the globalized economy more 
directly than their national counterparts, restlessly attempt political responses. This 
research finds that their main policy instrument is the intergovernmental relations, both 
horizontal and vertical. Their sense of competition against other locals in the central-local 
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distributional relations accentuates their policy decisions. For Tokyo, its competitor was 
the rest of Japan demanding the relocation of the capital whereas, for Osaka, it was the 
regime of Tokyo/central government elites. In their strategic rescaling efforts, the leaders 
of both regions implement rhetorical politics to adopt a new scale of socioeconomic 
order. This amounts to the creating of a new social structure by human agents. This 
structuration imbeds globalization and its scale in any future policy decisions, including 
local and national political restructuring, as a defining structural force. 
If these developments were consequences of human behaviors, then the space of 
community should also be created by human ideas and political actions. As stated above, 
local leaders and their claim for public space appear better positioned to achieve this than 
the national leaders. 
Implications for Future Study 
The findings and conclusions from this study cannot be generalized. Case study of 
Japan and its world city-regions have a virtue of being extreme case, where theoretical 
implications from research findings are amplified. It is a useful approach to gain insight 
for a particular research question but it is not designed to obtain generalizable findings 
applicable to larger societies without cautious qualifications. 
The logical next step is research to confirm claims made in this study: the 
centrality of local leaders in rescaling, their from-below capabilities, the crucial function 
of inter-local rivalries over central government involvement as rescaling motivation, and 
the rhetorical creation of the global scale. Also, Gidden's explanation ofstructuration 
needs to be confirmed (for example Archer (1995) challenges his thesis). Comparative 
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study across different countries and quantitative methods including international data are 
two feasible research designs for this purpose. 
Another claim made in this research in need of further confirmatory research is 
the development of urban politics model accommodating from-below restructuring 
capability of local leaders. From-below rescaling, such as substantive regionalism, is 
indeed an option for local leaders but only very sparingly exercised. On the other hand, 
there appears a clear trend for regional economic development strategies, called for by 
the camber of commerce, other economic development organizations and local political 
leaders. Therefore, research question can include the identification of the conditions that 
are conducive to regional economic planning from below. 
The rhetorical process of rescaling in the politics of scale needs further 
examination. The findings in this study are preliminary. This subject can be expanded 
into many directions, including the issues of epistemology and power. The main 
importance would be the relationship between scale, space and polity and the rhetorical 
and discursive elements. The relationship between discourse and material orders to 
determine the scale and political space is crucial to define the scope of government under 
globalization. 
Finally, as policy analysis, the function of rhetoric in politics of scale may provide 
planners with tools to promote new scale concept. For example, environmental issues can 
be approached as policy for the adoption the global environment scale. Issues such as 
NIMBYism, sprawl, traffic congestion, and urban school quality are issues of scale and 
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